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INTRODUCTION
"When two Elephants fight, it is the Mousedeer 
in the middle who get hurt".
This Malaysian proverb has particular reference to its region of 
origin - Southeast Asia. The latter - the mousedeer - has for many decades 
been caught in an elephantine struggle between the Great Powers of the 
globe. Over the years these powers have changed, even the mousedeer has 
become nominally independent of them, but the results of the continuing 
conflict have remained basically the same - with all the heritage of bitterness 
and suffering that is the latter's inevitable reward. This proverb simplifies 
the issue, treating it on the level of the Great Powers' impact on the region. 
There is another level - the interactions of the mousedeer themselves - the 
ten states which are numbered in this region . As, however, it is proposed 
to examine the most recent neutralization proposal for Southeast Asia, and 
the prospects for its implementation, emphasis will be placed throughout this 
thesis on the level of the Great Power impact. This is due to the fact that 
the latter is considered to be more vital to the realization of the scheme, even 
if internal developments will play a central role in dictating its success there­
after. Hence, while three chapters deal with the elephant-mousedeer 
relations, and one with inter-elephantine situations, the internal workings 
of the mousedeer are related to two - one dealing with their 'dream1 and the 
other their 'quandary'. A further chapter glances at 'Interested Neighbours' 
who encircle the arena.
( la )
Before proceeding to enlarge on my theme mention might 
be made of the time-frame within which this 'most recent' 
neutralization proposal was made. 1968 was the year in question, 
the issue being raised in the Malaysian House of Representatives 
during a Defence debate. In the following thesis I propose to 
trace the development of this neutralization proposal from 
1968-1974. No particular significance need be attached to my 
concluding date - 1974 - nor do I deem it necessary as this study 
is not examining some historical event but rather - at the time 
of writing - an on-going development in International Relations. 
The latter can also be taken as my reason for writing in the 
present tense and I would remind readers that the described status 
quo and speculations below should be read as being applicable to 
December, 1974.
Returning to a consideration of the following chapters,
(2)
----  in the chapters on the elephants outlines are drawn of their
respective foreign policy stances. This is not because it is considered that 
this alone explains their relations with each other, or with the states of 
Southeast Asia - foreign policy being not only initiatory but also reactive - 
but because these policies reflect certain attitudes and aspirations that are 
worth noting. Particularly as such attitudes and aspirations must be adapted, 
to a certain extent, with the realities of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, policy 
and ideology invariably have a certain bearing on each other that cannot be 
overlooked.
With regard to Southeast Asia, while not ignoring that what we 
call Southeast Asia is a diverse collection of very consciously independent 
states, composed of numerous peoples, ethnic minorities and dialects - 
with, in short, as much that is divergent as unifying - both for the purpose 
of convenience and being in line with recent developments, it will be 
regarded as a region. Arriving at an acceptable definition for a region 
would appear to be as profitable as providing a definition for the shape of 
a liquid, as Inis Claude pointed out:
"The world does not in fact break easily along neatly perforated lines. 
Rational regional divisions are difficult to establish, boundaries determined 
for one purpose are not necessarily appropriate for other purposes, and the 
most carefully chosen dividing lines have a perverse way of changing and 
coming to require change, and of overlapping". (I)
As illustrated by the taking to task of Bruce Russett's work - 'International
Regions and the International System1 - by Oran Young in his review of the
same (2) it is far from easy to decide on even the criteria for designating
what a region is. Professor Russett examined regions from the point of -
(1) Swords into Plowshares, I. Claude, (New York, Random House,1959) p.113.
(2) International Regions and International Systems, B. Russett, (Chicago,
Rand McNally, 1967).
'Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor1, O. Young. 
World Politics, Vol. XXI, April 1969. pp. 487/8.
(3)
(a) Socially and culturally homogeneous groupings;
(b) Political attitudes and United Nations voting-
(c) International Organisations;
(d) Contiguous regions;
(e) Conflict and integration .
Claiming that -
"the task, in effect, is one of making the definition operational; at 
best the concept of region is but an analytical device for separating 
certain areal features thought relevant." (3)
However, having attempted to do so the conclusion is reached that there
are no sharply identifiable regional systems - even less so in Asia, and
particularly Southeast Asi a, than in other areas. Duly mindful of
Professor Russett's warning against the 'facile use1 of regional labels so often
employed in International Relations, it is nevertheless proposed that Oran
Young's formula should be adopted -
"It is important to point out clearly in any given analysis that the 
concept 'region' will be defined in terms of X, Y, and Z, and 
to proceed with the construction of hypotheses involving the 
phenomenon of regionalism on this basis". (4)
My concept of region, therefore, will be defined in terms of geographical 
propinquity and regional identification - providing the following definition, 
'a group of states linked by both a close geographical relationship and a 
similar regional identification of themselves, the latter being held in 
common'. Hence, Southeast Asia consists of Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Laos, the Khmer Republic 
(Cambodia), North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Within this grouping 
the status of 'core' could be given to the member states of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), due to their common bond of member­
ship and their closer identification, these comprise - Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
(3) Extract from Russett - Op, Cit. - in Regional Politics and World Order, 
Falk & Mendlovitz, eds. (Freeman & Co. 1973).
(4) Oran Young - Op. Cit.
(4)
It is these 'core1 nations that have in recent years been advocating 
neutralization for first their 'zone' - ASEAN - and ultimately the entire region.
As this is the proposal - or proposals as it has now become - that is the focus 
of this thesis it is necessary to undertake a closer inspection of the concept of 
neutralization, and of related counterparts that it has tended to be confused 
with - neutrality, nonalignment and neutralism.
The best known, and arguably the greatest, of these is neutrality,
whose position in power politics has been ably summarized in the early Indian
treatise 'Arthasastra' -
"Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace with him- whoever 
is superior in power shall wage war; whoever thinks, 'No enemy 
can hurt me, nor am I strong enough to destroy my enemy', shall 
observe neutrality. " (5)
The context of neutrality has remained basically unchanged despite the
glosses imposed by the theoretical formulations of later ages. Neutrality
is, and remains, a matter of national policy which is at all times subject to
change. When adopted it does, however, carry with it a legal status with certain
rights and duties generally established and recognized under international law -
these being implemented upon the existence of a state of belligerancy. A
policy of nonalignment on the other hand, is without legal implications of
its own, and is rather a conscious refusal to add the potential of one state to
that of another. George Liska has categorized the latter under three headings -
(a) An anti-alliance policy which rules out an alliance with a particular 
state while approving or condoning policies of alliance generally;
(b) Abstention from all alliances - the policy of traditional neutrals, 
while not objecting to alliances for others;
(c) The anti-alliance policies of neutralists which are opposed to all 
alliances including those amongst other powers. This view claims that 
competition for allies is a cause of tension and war. The fear of 
isolation is seen as the reductio ad absurdum of the rationale for
alliances. In the absence of alliances all nations would be
(5) Arthashastra , Kautilya. (trans. Shamastry) Bk. VII, Ch. I. 
(Mysore, 1951) 8th ed.
‘isolated1 and as such more amenahfe to universal laws and 
their sanctions. (6)
From this, and from the membership of the Nonaligned Movement, it can be
seen that nonalignment is a far broader concept than the other three -
neutrality, neutralization and neutralism.
Although 'neutralism' could be described as the doctrine of
neutrality, and 'neutralists' as those that advocate it; it is a concept that
has gained both global prominence and certain overtones in the last three
decades. One general definition reads as follows -
"Neutralism is the determination of the majority of the new countries 
(states of the post-coloni al era) to resist entanglement in either of the 
great power blocs in the Cold War". (7)
The moralistic implications that are so often adopted by neutralists were 
virtually inevitable given that neutralism was a concept forged in response 
to an ideological conflict and was itself often under attack from a different 
morality - hence President Eisenhower in 1956 as summarized by the Depart­
ment of State
"The President does believe that there are special conditions which 
justify political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be 
indifferent to the fate of another, or, as he put it, to be 'neutral 
as between right and wrong, or decency or indecency1 (8).
However, the likelihood that new states freed from colonial control would be 
prepared to listen passively to speeches as to what one of the Great Powers 
identified as 'right and wrong or decency or indecency1, was remote. Too 
many of them continued to regard the actions of the Great Powers as a 
sophisticated version of the old cliche - 'might is right'. Although the 
American position was to become - rhetorically at any rate - more liberal 
with respect to neutralism, both blocs limited their favour of a neutralist 
position to the cases which caused the loosening of links between the 
neutralist state and the rival bloc, such cases constituted a 'respectable'
(5)
(6) "The Third Party: The Rationale of Nonalignment', G. Liska.
In Neutralism and Nonalignment , L. Martin, ed. (Praeger, 1962) p.83.
(7) L. Martin - Op. Cit. p. XI.
(8) Dept, of State Bulletin, XXXIV (18 June, 1956) pp. 1004/5
neutralism. As with the above two concepts, neutralism is also a matter 
of policy; it is, however, quite distinct from neutrality, because whereas 
the latter means non-involvement in war, neutralism has come to mean 
non-involvement in the Cold War alone, whilst involvement in local 'hot1 
wars can be pursued with rigour. Finally, where the status of a neutralized 
state entails definite restrictions on the activities of that state, neutralists 
tend to emphasize that they will tolerate no limitations on their sovereignty. (9) 
Unlike the others, neutralization is not a policy decision made solely 
by the state to be neutralized - it involves two sets of states: -
(a) Guarantors - who undertake certain specific obligations in relation 
to (b), and
(b) Guaranteed states - who, in turn, undertake certain complementary 
commitments about their own behaviour.
Proceeding on the basis of past practise, neutralization has usually required 
the neutralized state to:-
(i) Refrain from all hostilities except self-defence;
(ii) Abstain from alliances involving the risk of hostilities;
(iii) Defend itself against attack even when calling on the guarantors for aid.
Moreover, 'to be effective, neutralization must be buttressed by the obligations 
of the guarantors to respect the obligations of the neutralized state and to come 
to its assistance if its neutrality is violated by outside aggression'. (IO)
Hence, 'self-neutralization' - where a state makes an unilateral declaration 
of neutrality without guarantees by other states - is rather a misnomer.
However, as witnessed by the Austrian case the borderline between the declaration 
of a state of its 'permanent neutrality' and the international neutralization of 
that state can be very narrow. The latter case rewards consideration.
The Austrian saga was a lengthy one - sectioned and policed by Allied 
Forces since the end of the Second World War, the country became a pawn 
in a game of early political manoeuvre in the Cold War, with the Soviet Union 
seeking to use the Austrian question to prevent the re-armament of West 
Germany. Having failed in the latter, talks took place in Moscow in April 1955,
(9) 'Neutralists and Neutralism', S. Anabtawi. The Journal of Politics,
Vol. 27. May 1965. pp. 351/61.
(10) Neutralization in South-east Asia, Problems and Prospects, Black,Falk 
Knorr & Young, eds. (U.S. Senate Study, 1966).
(6)
when an Austrian delegation was invited there, the talks pivoted on 
Austrian neutrality. The Soviets emphasized the use of the word 
'neutrality1, rejecting 'freedom from alliances' and 'foreign policy 
based on the principles of neutrality'. The Austrian Government was 
to prom ise in an 'internationally binding form' to observe perpetual 
neutrality after the Swiss model. After the Moscow talks, the Western 
powers and the Soviet Union agreed to call an Ambassadors' Conference 
in Vienna on May 2, 1955. On May 13 the State Treaty was signed - 
providing for the evacuation of the Four Power forces from Austria. The 
following October, the Austrian Parliament enacted a Constitutional 
Federal Statute, in which:-
"Austria, of its own free will, declares herewith its permanent 
neutrality.... (and) will never in the future accede to any military 
alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign 
states on its territory".
The four Allied Powers delivered identical notes to the Austrian Government 
on December 6th. They declared that they recognized the perpetual 
neutrality of Austria in the form as set forth. In the course of the following 
months Austrian neutrality was recognized by some sixty countries altogether. 
Nevertheless, it may be noted that the recognition of the Constitutional 
Federal Statute was not accompanied by a Four Power guarantee of Austrian 
neutrality. (II)
Austria is an interesting derivation of neutralization. Certainly the 
international pressures were present with the choice being between neutrality 
and the status quo; the latter amounting to neutralization by occupation.
As stated in the constitutional lav/ the status of neutrality is irrevocable.
By the notification of the enactment and implementation of the law, and 
by the government application for recognition of its perpetual neutrality, 
Austria has pledged itself - at least with regard to those countries which 
have received and acknowledged the receipt of the notification - to maintain 
forever its neutral status. In this manner, the Soviet demand that the 
declaration of neutrality should be made in an internationally binding form 
has been met.
(7)
(II) Russia and the Austrian State Treaty, S. Allard, (Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1970) pp. 185/91.
The Austrian example did much to revive the concept of neutralization 
as a political solution. At the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961, Prince 
Sihanouk of Cambodia was recommsnding an "Austrian style neutrality' for 
Laos. (12) Despite this, it was the Cambodian representatives who had 
fought against the imposition of such a status on Cambodia at the Geneva 
Conference of 1954. In the Laotian case neutralization was proposed as 
a compromise solution for a complex international dispute, with a number 
of guaranteeing Powers having already been directly involved in the internal 
affairs of Laos. One writer on the Laotian issue claimed that while the 
Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos was signed in Geneva on 
July 23, 1962, it was, nevertheless, for all the major Powers more of a face- 
saving device to freeze the status quo, than a foundation for stability in the 
area. (13) Furthermore, while the arrangement was viewed positively by 
North Vietnam and China (14), it was regarded negatively by the United 
States of America. Despite a total of thirteen signatories and the fact that 
the neutralization treaty for Laos was more detailed than any other treaty 
of this kind, the provisions proved to be full of loopholes in a relatively 
short period of time. Two major factors that were to ensure the breakdown 
of the Laotian framework were the internal instability of Laos itself, and 
the inability of some of the guarantors to refrain from interfering in internal 
Laotian affairs.
Before passing on a further short note is in order concerning the 
practice of neutralization. The initiative in imposing this policy is generally 
taken by the guarantors - whether implicitly or explicitly - hence as has been 
pointed out:-
'Neutralization definitely involves some form of international tutelage, 
and this is probably why states are more ready to recommend it for others 
than adopt it themselves'. (15)
(12) The Guardian , 17 May, 1961
(13) Conflict in Laos, A. Dommen, (Pall Mall, 1964) p. 224.
(14) In this thesis China refers to the Peoples' Republic of China and Taiwan 
to the Republic of China .
(15) Neutralization and World Politics, Black, Falk, Knorr & Young,eds. 
(Princeton University Press, 1968).
Neutralism P. Lyon, (Leicester University Press, 1963) pp. 91/2.
(8)
In the 19th century neutralization was employed by European states as 
one of the means for maintaining the Balance of Power - in other words as 
an instrument for preserving the status quo. In this century the functions - 
or rather the hoped for functions - of neutralization have been:-
(a) The reduction and regulation of overt hostilities;
(b) The reunification of divided states when such division is due to 
political and ideological alignments;
(c) To remove an area from competition.
In the post Second World War period this has meant attempts to separate 
'national patterns of interfactional struggle from regional or global 
patterns of rivalry'; neutralization tending to be implemented as a 
compromise or stalemate at points of active encounter. (16) The major 
problems in seeking to successfully realize a neutralized condition are:-
(i) Change of Internal or External circumstances;
(II) Non-assent of a major actor;
(iii) Non-fulfillment of guarantees.
These, at any rate, from experience have presented themselves as the major 
problems.
This then is the concept the implementation of which, it has been 
suggested, would preserve Southeast Asia from the ravages wrought by Great 
Power disputes. It would undoubtedly be more difficult to neutralize a 
region than a single national entity; however, it Is hoped that an united 
front can be presented on this issue when all the common benefit of the 
proposed situation compared with the suffering of the old, is taken into 
account. With regard to the guarantors, the new global balance of power - 
which is considered in Chapter Two - would appear to be changing the pattern 
of conflict somewhat, and may yet prove to be more suited to ending the 
subjection of this region to that pattern of conflict. However, it must at 
this point be admitted that despite all changes in the international scene, 
there are yet some fundamental truths:-
(16) Neutralization and World Politics. Black, Falk, Knorr & Young,
eds. - Op. Cit.
(IO)
"... I am not disposed to attach very much importance to such engagements 
(neutralization), for the history of the world shows that when a quarrel 
arises, and a nation makes war, and thinks it advantageous to transverse 
with its army such neutral territory, the declarations of neutrality are not 
apt to be very religiously respected". (17)
- Lord Palmerston, 1855.
(17) Hansard, CXXXVIII (June 8, 1855), 1748. Lord Palmerston, (Bell,1935).
Although there is also truth in what Lord Curzon of Kedleston pointed out 
in his Romanes Lecture - Frontiers - delivered on 2 November, 1907, at 
Oxford. (Clarendon Press, 1907) .—
"Neutralization does not absolutely protect, and has in practice not 
protected, these countries (Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg) 
from violation: but it renders aggression less likely by making it an 
international issue. The desire to extend a frontier at the expense of 
a neutralized state can, therefore, only be gratified at a rather 
expensive price."
(II)
THE DREAM OF THE MOUSEDEER :
History has long made clear to Southeast Asia that activities 
in the region occur in a global context. History also shows that the 
extra-regional powers who have made their presence felt in the region 
have changed over time. It is, however, the misfortune of the past 
four decades that Southeast Asia has become a pivotal area in which the 
global dialectic has been playing itself out. As a result, whether 
Southeast Asian states have acted - or been forced to act - in the interests 
of the American thesis or the Russian or Chinese antithesis, it is F*ew more 
than obvious that all would benefit from the evolution of an independent 
synthesis - be that what it may. In order to bring a - hopefully - peaceful 
synthesis to the region it is necessary for Southeast Asian political leaders 
to make choices as to what policy they will follow with regard to both their 
neighbours and to the external powers. If such choices are ignored then 
it is more than likely that the regional states will be merely carried along 
by Great Power interests, or else find themselves turned into a battlefield 
should such interests come into conflict.
What are the choices available ? These include:-
(a) Alignment with one particular Great Power - thus tending to be placed 
in a sphere of influence and possibly in a position of risk vis-a-vis
the activities of a rival Great Power or its allies;
(b) Attempt to form a weak multiple alignment with all of the prominent 
powers;
(c) Retreat into a totally isolationist position;
(d) A position of neutrality or neutralization.
CHAPTER ONE :
(12)
These alternatives - and the combinations and permutations thereof - 
can be adopted on two levels, that of the individual states and that of 
the region. For such policies to be implemented on the regional level 
a concensus would have to be reached on policy approach to external powers; 
hence, a certain community of interests would have to emerge. It is, however, 
true that the central aspects oftjuch a community already exist - the desire for 
peaceful development- the aspiration of meaningful Independence and the 
need to curtail external interference.
The realization that Great Power interests do not necessarily coincide 
with the interests of their smaller allies would appear sufficient to warrant 
the rejection of the hegemonic arrangement - choice (a) - by Southeast 
Asian states as a long-term solution to their difficulties. The second and 
third alternatives have been attempted by Individual states - Cambodia and 
Burma respectively - but have not been accepted by many as realistic 
options for regional implementation; I eaving the fourth choice as the one 
which has gained the most support - although the latter was by no means 
unanimous - since 1971.
Neutralization is no stranger on the Southeast Asian scene, although 
the more recent examples have not been very encouraging. As early as 
1896 the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand) was subjected to an Anglo-French 
neutralization plan; and, in later years, the concept was mentioned during 
the Second World War, with particular reference to Thailand and the 
Philippines. In neither case was neutralization implemented, resulting in 
Thailand accepting a treaty of alliance with Japan and bringing the Philippines 
into the war as an American ally. The question of the neutralization of Indo- 
China was raised at the Geneva Conference of 1954; this was to be another 
abortive attempt, being replaced by an unsigned undertaking by Great Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, Laos and the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam to respect the sovereignty, Independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and to refrain from any interference 
in their internal affairs. Despite this failure the sixties was to see a 
reappearance of the concept with the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality 
of Laos being signed in Geneva on July 23, 1962. The latter was to be no more 
successful than its predecessors over the previous twenty years for reasons
All such proposals for neutralization were, however, to apply to 
individual states. A change in emphasis was to appear with President de 
Gaulle, who in 1963, 1964 and again in 1965, was to propose that the 
Geneva participants conclude"a neutrality treaty concerning the states of 
Southeast Asis". (I) It is true that the General was chiefly concerned with 
IndoChina but the extension of his proposal to cover a wider area of the 
region was an interesting initiative which was not particularly welcomed 
at that time«, The proposal was accused of being nebulous and a highly 
personal inspiration which 'had all the marks of a policy of despair8 (2) ; 
while it was bitterly attacked by the Thai Government at the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) Council Meeting on April 13, 1964. On the 
other hand, different opinions on the matter were that the President's 
suggestion was rejected, not because it was unwise ‘but because the expediency 
of politics demands its rejection1. (3) In short, the die had been cast against 
the initiative when the United States rejected it.
The next general consideration of the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia came with the proposal of a Southeast Asian state itself - Malaysia.
The Malaysians' enthusiastic acceptance of the idea can be attributed to
a multiplicity of developments - each of which undoubtedly played its
part - (a) growing disillusionment with existing alliances which were crumbling;
(b) a fear of becoming too closely associated with one Great Power thereby 
inviting attack from another; (c) the lack of an external military threat and 
the realization that internal opposition must be dealt with by indigenous security 
forces; (d) a desire to avoid a repeat of the Vietnam experience; and (e) an 
increasing sense of self-reliance and hope in Southeast Asian regionalism.
All in all there was a feeling that Great Power involvement served to escalate 
conflict to a point which was disadvantageous to the interests of the smaller states.
(13)
outlined in the foregoing.
(1) New York Times, I February, 1964; IO September, 1965. Cited in
The Southeast Asia Crisis, L. Tondel, Jr. ed. (Oceana Publications, 1966) 
p. 98
(2) The Manila Chronicle, 29 April, ¡964. (Scotsman).
(3) The Manila Chronicle,, I September, 1964. (Soliongco).
(14)
This proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia may be traced 
to a Defence debate in the Malaysian House of Representatives (the Dewan 
Ra'ayat) on 23 January, 1968. A debate which revolved around the proposed 
British withdrawal from the area and the defence vacuum that it was feared 
would follow. The former Minister of Home Affairs, Tun (Dr.) Ismail stated 
that while he was not opposed to the five-nation conference that was proposed,
(4) he did think that it would be a worthwhile idea to consider other alternatives 
in case the mutual defence arrangements did not materialize. The alternative 
that the Tun favoured was a three-point programme towards the neutralization 
of the region. The plan of action suggested was that:-
-<i) The countries in the region should declare collectively the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia;
(ii) This must be guaranteed by the big powers, including Communist 
China; and
(iii) The countries in the region should sign non-aggression treaties with 
one another. (5)
The alternatives to these steps were predicted by Tun Ismail as giving the 
Great Powers an open invitation to make the region a pawn in Great Power 
politics; to increase subversion in the area; while the alternative to the 
signing of internal non-agression treaties would be a costly arms race in the 
region. Tun Ismail claimed that he had not discussed his proposal with the 
Prime Minister or with any of his former Cabinet colleagues. Nevertheless,
Tun Abdul Razak - Deputy Prime Minister at this time - immediately adopted 
the idea, and as early as February 1968, was informing Merdeka, the official
(4) The Five-Nation Conference that was proposed (Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) was due to the determination of the 
British Government to reduce its commitments 'East of Suez'. In fact 
the Conference did take place and the five powers agreed that in relation 
to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore they would immediately 
consult together for the purposes of deciding what measures should be 
taken, jointly or seperately, in relation to any attack or threat. Besides 
this the A N Z U K  forces were established by the three external powers.
These were to be stationed in Malaysia and Singapore. The agreement 
came into force in November 1971, and has been steadily run down ever 
since.
(5) Straits Times, 24 January, 1968
(15)
publication of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), that 
‘As a long term measure in securing the security of the country, the Government 
v/ould make every effort to have a neutral Southeast Asia1. (6) Later that 
same year Tun Razak raised the matter at the end of a visit to Moscow - 
'I also suggested that in the interests of peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia, the big powers, including the Soviet Union, should guarantee the 
independence and neutrality of the countries of this region1. (7) Hence 
the official adoption of Tun Ismail's proposals with the seal being set when 
the Tun rejoined the Government.
There was little reaction from any of the Great Powers to these 
developments. The Chairman of the British Conservative Party, Mr .Anthony 
Barber, did lash out at the Labour Government's plans to withdraw from 
East of Suez, sharply criticizing the Malaysian neutralization plan in the 
process, adding that the latter was 'only for dreamers'. This, however, 
can largely be put down to internal political manoeuvrings and was not a 
criticism that was likely to cause serious concern to the Malaysian Government.(8)
Undeterred, Malaysia pressed ahead in its role as advocate for the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia, becoming, if anything, even more enthusiastic 
about the idea on Tun Abdul Razak's succession as Prime Minister. Even 
prior to this event, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, then Permanent Secretary in the 
Malaysian Foreign Ministry, had told a preparatory conference on non-aligned 
countries in Dar es Salaam on April 17, 1970, that Malaysia hoped they would 
endorse 'the neutralization not only of Indo China but of the entire region of 
Southeast Asia guaranteed by the three major powers (the Soviet Union, the 
United States and China) against any form of external interference, threat, 
or pressure'. This proposal was repeated at the meeting of the non-aligned 
conference in Lusaka in early September, when Tun Razak appealed to the 
non-aligned nations to take a 'positive stand1 in endorsing the neutralization
(6) Straits Times, 17 February, 1968
(7) Sunday Times, 26 May, 1968. Cited in 'The "Neutralisation" of South- 
East Asia', N. Sopiee. Paper delivered at the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs Conference, Canberra, 14-17 April, 1973. Session 2;
Paper 5. (Footnote 12).
(8) Straits Times, I February, 1968
(16)
of the region. "I mention the need to extend the area of peace and 
neutralization to include all of Southeast Asia", he said " because it is 
obviously easier and wiser to strengthen the fabric of peace before it is 
ruptured rather than attempt to eliminate disorder and conflict once they have 
penetrated the regions". (9) Tun Razak was to raise the matter again 
in his first policy address as Prime Minister, September 22nd, when he spoke 
of a 'neutralized zone."
It is not, however, sufficient for Malaysia to accept the value of 
the plan for its region, it w-cis also necessary to convince regional neighbours 
and the relevant external powers. Making use of the world forum-Jun Dr. 
Ismail - then the new Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia - spoke at the 
United Nations General Assembly on October 15, 1970. He emphasized 
that the lessons of Vietnan had shown the need for neutralization to "eliminate 
the seeds of future conf lict and.... ensure durable and lasting peace".
He admitted that his government was conscious of the fact that "we are still 
a long way from attaining the desirable objective" and pinpointed three 
developments that were necessary before the region could ask the "three 
super-powers to guarantee their independence, integrity and neutrality."
There was the need for each Southeast Asian country to "set its own house in 
order" ; to encourage "a greater sense of regional consciousness and solidarity" 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and to "demonstrate that our 
activities and policies do not adversely affect the basic legitimate interests 
of the major powers". (IO)
Discussion concerning the prospects for the neutralization of the 
region continued to take place largely in response to Malaysian initiatives.
Tun Abdul Razak proved himself indefatigable in his ability to raise the issue 
on state visits, in international assemblies and during inter-regional meetings. 
The responses were varied, ranging from a lack of trust in Chinese intentions 
to differing interpretations as to what might be meant by neutralization of the 
region.
(9) Straits Times, 28 September, 1970
(10) Malaysian Digest, 31 October, 1970 (Published by the Malaysian
Government).
(17)
1971 proved to be an important year in the Malaysian effort, 
with Tun Razak, himself, setting the scene when in a statement on Foreign 
Affairs in Parliament he pointed out changes that had to be adjusted to:-
(a) The British military withdrawal from the Malaysian-Singapore area;
(b) The gradual American disengagement from the Indo China area;
(c) The growing power of Japan and her increasing interest in 
Southeast Asia beyond questions of trade alone;
(d) Above all e lse , the new posture of Chinese foreign policy after the 
ending of ithe turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution a couple of 
years previously.
In advocating neutralization the Tun said that he saw it "as the best 
permanent solution to ensure the security and stability of Southeast A sia"  
in the uncertain future. H e, nevertheless, admitted that it was a '"long 
term solution" and required acceptance "by the super-powers as well as 
by the countries of the region themselves". (II)
As the year progressed the concept of neutralization took on a 
firmer outline. In an article written by M alaysia's influential Minister with 
Special Functions and Information Minister -  Tan Sri G h a za li bin Shafie -  
the proposal was expounded on as follows:-
Level O ne: Countries of Southeast Asia should get together, examine their 
present situations and agree that individual countries in the region must 
respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not participate 
in activ ities like ly  to directly or indirectly threaten the security of another.
It should be agreed that all foreign powers should be excluded from the region 
and that the region should not be allowed to be used as a theatre of conflict 
in international power struggles. Preferably a co llective view should be held 
before the major powers on vital issues of security. Regional cooperation 
should be promoted and ways and means should be devised for ensuring peace 
amongst member states.
(II) Straits Times, 27 Ju ly , 1971
Level Two: On the other hand, the major powers ( U .S .A . ,  C h ina , and 
U .S .S .R .)  must agree that Southeast Asia should be an area of neutral ity .
The powers should undertake to exclude countries in the region from the 
power struggle among themselves, and should devise supervisory means of 
guaranteeing the region's neutrality in the international power struggle.
H ence, just as the Southeast Asian countries w ill be responsible, under the 
neutralization plan, for maintaining peace among themselves, so w ill the 
guaranteeing powers be responsible for preventing externally inspired 
conflict in the region. The importance of having a supervisory body 
capable of enforcing the neutralization arrangements was emphasized. (12) 
Added to this account Tun Ism ail, in his opening address to the 
plenary session of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in September, 
suggested that not alone must the Init Iativefor neutralization come from the 
states in the region, but they must also have the capacity to resist the blandish­
ments of the big powers, and must maintain non-aggression pacts among 
themselves. (13) While raising the matter once again in the U .N .  General 
Assembly, Tun Razak outlined the prerequisites for the realization of 
neutral ization :-
(i) The recognition and accommodation of the legitimate interests of all 
powers concerned in the region - "both the guarantor powers as well
as the countries within the area itself" .
(ii) The cultivation among Southeast Asian countries of a sense of regional 
cohesion and solidarity.
(iii) The existence of a dialogue among the major powers -  this requiring 
China's participation in the United Nations. (14)
Malaysian action, by now, focused on specific objectives - gaining a 
regional adherence to the idea of neutralization- furthering amiable relations 
with China (in 1971 Malaysia voted for the admission of China into the U .N .) ;
_ and keeping the issue of neutralization constantly before the public eye of 
nations.
(12) 'The Neutralization of Southeast A s ia 1, M . Fhazali bin Shafie 
Pacific Community. V o l. 3 , N o . I .  October 1971. p. IIO
(13) Straits Times, 14 September, 1971
(14) Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. I ,  N o . 6 . November, 1971 p. 418 C .
(18)
(19)
A significant step was taken in the realization of the first of these 
objectives with the emergence of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration at the 
end of the 26-27 November, 1971 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of A S E A N .(15)
In this it v/as agreed "that the neutralisation of Southeast Asia is a desirable 
objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its 
rea lisation ." In the interim, Indonesia, M alaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand stated that they w ere:-
" . .  .determined to exert in itia lly  necessary efforts to secure the recognition 
of, and respect for, Sout heast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
N eutra lity , free from any form or manner of interference by outside P owers ".
It was also agreed that the Southeast Asian countries should make concerted 
efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their 
'strength, solidarity and closer relationship1. In the joint communique that 
was issued after the meeting, the participants decided that:-
(a) They would recommend that a Summit Meeting of the Heads of State or 
Governments of the members of A SEA N  should be held in M anila at a 
later date;,
(b) They would establish a Committee of Senior O ffic ia ls  to study the ways 
and means of implementing the proposals; and
(c) They would bring the contents of their Declaration to the attention 
of the other countries of Southeast Asia and would encourage them to 
associate themselves with the aspirations and objectives expressed in 
the D eclaration. 16)
On this point the region envisaged for neutralization consisted of all the 
ASEAN  member states, Burma and the whole of Indo C h in a . Indonesia agreed 
to approach North Vietnam, Thailand to sound out Cambodia and South 
Vietnam , while Malaysia undertook to discuss the proposal with Burma and L a o s .(17)
(15) A SEA N  was established in August 1967. Its membership consists of 
Thailand, the Philippines, M alaysia , Indonesia and Singapore. The 
aim of the organization is to promote economic and cultural cooperation 
within the region.
(16) Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of A SEA N  member countries,
Declaration and Joint Communique, 26-27 November, 1971, Kuala 
Lumpur«, (Published by Ministry of Foreign A ffairs, with assistance 
of Federal Dept, of Information M alaysia).
(17) Manî 1 a Bulletin ,  II November, 1971.
N .  Sopiee -  O p . C it .  -  pe 6 .
A Cambodian observer at the meeting, M r. Vim Sim/ said that the idea of 
neutralizing the region was "most welcome" to C ambodia. However, he 
added that he hoped that the meeting would also come out with some 
effective measures to ensure the successful implementation of the neutrality 
of the region. (18) South Vietnam also had an observer at the Kuala Lumpur 
conference „
Mixed reactions have greeted the neutralization proposal from countries
outside A S E A N . By February 1972r the Khmer Republic announced official
support for the concept, while Laos had supported it as early as A p ril, 1971.
With regard to Burma, Tun Razak went on a three day visit there in February 1972
to discuss the issue with the Burmese Premier, General Ne W in , and
returned in an optimistic mood. "Burma supported the id ea", he said,
"because she has always been neutral, but she w ill take part in a regional
plan only if all the other countries are genuinely neutral." (19)
Both North and South Vietnam , on the other hand, have been more cautious
about the scheme. The former has extended some conditional support,
commenting that:-
"T he first thing to do to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom 
and neutrality is to put an end to U .S .  interference and aggression, 
take all the troops of the U .S .  and its allies aw ay, dismantle 
all U .S .  military bases and break up all the U .S . controlled military 
blocs in this region, and turn down with resolve the Nixon Doctrine." (2 0 )
Nevertheless, in a post Vietnam War situation a neutralized Southeast Asia  
would appear to be in the interests of Hanoi as it would avert too strong a 
Soviet or a Chinest influence in the area. As for South Vietnam, given the 
hostile attitude of the Thieu Government towards neutralist movements within 
the country, and its dependence on American milit ary and economic a id , it 
can hardly be considered favourable to the idea.
Since the November 1971 meeting work has been progressing in defining 
the meaning and implications of neutralization -  or the establishment of a 
'zone of p sace , freedom and neutrality'. In January 1972, in an effort 
to emphasize that the neutralization proposals were made outside the formal 
auspices of A S EA N , it was decided not to establish a joint committee on
(18) Straits Times/ 27 November, 1971
(19) Straits Times, 21 February, 1972
(20 ) Japan Times, 2 December, 1971
(2 0 )
Southeast Asian neutrality, but that each member country would instead 
set up its own study group to examine the details of the neutrality 
concept and how its implementation would affect. It was suggested that 
this was a necessary step "before we look into its effects on the region'. (21)
By Ju ly it was reported that a meeting of A SEA N  senior officials had taken 
place in Kuala Lumpur, followed later in the month by an informal meeting 
of ASEAN  Foreign Ministers in M anila . The o ffic ia ls , comprising the 
fitst meeting of the A SEA N  Committee on N eutralization, came to a common 
understanding of a "Zone of peace, freedom and neutrality' in the context of 
Southeast A sia . The definitions agreed upon at the meeting were as follow s:-
(a) Zone of Peace, Freedom and N eutra lity . 'A  zone of peace, freedom 
and neutrality exists where the national identity, independence and 
integrity of the individual States within such a zone can be preserved 
and maintained, so that they can achieve national development and 
w ell-being and promote regional cooperation and solidarity, in 
accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples and the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, free from any 
form or manner of interference by outside powers1.
(b) Peace. 'Peace is a condition where the prevalance of harmonious 
and orderly relations exists between and among States. No reference 
is hereby made to the internal state of affairs in each of the zonal 
States. A situation of ideo logical, p o litica l, econom ic, armed
or other forms of conflict, either among the zonal States themselves, between 
one or more of the zonal States and outside powers or between outside 
powers affecting the region, is not a condition of p eace'.
(c) Freedom. ‘Freedom means the freedom of States from control, 
domination or interference by other States in the conduct of their 
national and external affairs. This means the right of zonal States 
to solve their domestic problems in terms of their own conditions and 
aspirations, to assume primary responsibility for the security and w ell-
(21)
(21) Straits Times, 13 January, 1972
being of the region and their regional and international relations 
on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual benefit1.
N eutra lity . 'Neutrality means the maintenance of a state of 
impartiality in any war between other States as understood in 
international law and in the light of the United Nations Charter.
Taken in the context of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, however, it 
means that zonal States shall undertake to maintain their impartiality 
and shall refrain from involvement directly or indirectly in ideological, 
p o lit ica l, economic, armed or other forms of conflict, particularly  
between powers outside the zone, and that outside powers shall not 
interfere in the domestic or regional affairs of the zonal States'.
The Committee recognised that alternative means for achieving a ‘zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality' should be considered, and decided to continue their 
study at future meetings. The subsequent meeting of the A SEA N  Foreign 
M inisters:-
1. . . .  noted with satisfaction that the Committee had reached a 
common understanding of the interpretation of a "zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality" in the contezt of South-East A s ia " . (22)
This was undoubtedly a step forward and further progress was made in 
working out guidelines by the Neutralization Committee at a meeting in 
December. This emphasized mutual respect for national sovereignty and 
noninterference in the internal affairs of the zonal states. Foreign military 
bases were to be banned and participants were to be restrained from inviting 
or giving consent to intervention by external powers in the domestic or 
regional affairs of the zonal states (23). A summit meeting of ASEAN  
Foreign Ministers in April 1973, confirmed that they would like to see 
foreign intervention excluded from the region, while balancing the interests 
of the Great Powers in a manner in which to prevent any country becoming a 
satellite of any such Power. Furthermore, with the withdrawal of foreign
(22)
(22) Current Notes on International Affairs, V o l. 23, 1972. pp 501/2  
( Australian Government Publication).
(23) Bulletin Today, I February, 1973.
(23)
forces from Southeast- Asian bases the Foreign Ministers expressed the hope that 
they would be able to realize their proposed zone of peace, freedom and 
neutrality. The meeting also endorsed the report of the second meeting 
of the committee of senior officials outlined above; (24) whilst -  in order to 
expand its work in the region -  an A SEA N  Coordinating Committee for the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Indo China was also established.
The third meeting of the N eutralization Committee, which took place 
in June 1973, agreed that there should be no foreign troops in the region to 
ensure its neutralization. A significant suggestion that was accepted was 
that instead of seeking iron-clad guarantees from outside powers on the 
proposed neutrality zone, that these powers could be allowed to recognize 
and respect the zone. According to one conference source
'To do this, we have to be ready with a specific blueprint which we 
could show these big powers so that it would be also to their own 
interest to insure the neutrality of the region. Of course we 
cannot impose on the big powers although we can initiate dialogues 
with them .1 (25)
It was further reported that one of the highlights of the meeting was the 
discussion on relations between the countries to be included in the zone of 
neutrality and the Great Powers outside the region. Another important issue 
that this meeting considered was the obvious necessity of creating a regional 
machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes among neighbouring Southeast 
Asian countries. It was agreed that certain measures could be undertaken by 
parties to a dispute to achieve a peaceful settlement prior to the establishment 
of the proposed zone. The relevance of this issue was re-inforced at the time 
by the tension existing between the Philippines and M alaysia; this was due 
to Philippine insistence that the Sabah Government was backing Moslem rebels 
in the Southern Philippines and Mindanao. (26) The Philippines itself, along 
with Singapore, took up the suggestion, with the Singaporean Foreign M inister, 
M r. Rajaratnam, proposing an intra-ASEAN  non-aggression pact which it was 
claimed would 'neutralize internally the potentialities for conflict within the 
group1. W hile Manila was not adverse to the idea it evidently won little
(24) Bangkok Post, 18 A p ril, 1973.
(25) Straits Times,  23 June, 1973.
(26) Straits Times, 23 June 1973
Djakarta Times, 23 June, 1973
(24)
enthusiastic support from other members. However, on a Philippine
proposal to establish effective procedures to settle conflicts among ASEAN
members, the Foreign Ministers at the Seventh A SEA N  Summit Meeting in
May 1974, gave unanimous approval in principle and referred the question
to the Neutralization Committee for further study. (27)
At the latter's previous meeting, in March 1974, while 'Steady'
progress towards the establishment of Southeast Asia as a zone of 'peace,
freedom and neutrality' was reported, one delegate claimed that 'idealistic objectives'
were discussed at length; Malaysian o ffic ia ls , on the other hand, said that
the meeting helped to clarify some of the problems and doubts that a few A SEA N
members had on the proposal. Indonesia's 'national resilience1 concept -  that
there should be strong, self-reliant national defence forces to promote regional
stability -  was raised at this meetirgbut not accepted; however, after much
argument it was replaced on the agenda for another meeting. (28) Further
consideration of this issue and related ones would appear to be necessary.
Thenat Khoman -  former Thai Foreign M inister, and now, Special Adviser to
the Thai Government -  wrote, for example, th a t:-
"Armed neutrality seems to be the type most like ly to succeed in the 
present international conditions. The neutral countries do not have 
to go nuclear, but if they are sufficiently well equipped to protect 
themselves at least for the initial period of a conventional armed attack, 
they may have a better chance of being left alone than if they are 
depleted of the means of defence". (29)
D r. Khoman also recognized economic strength as being perhaps 'an even more 
effective guarantee for the preservation of neutrality'.
Nevertheless, despite having their own importance, such matters are 
the nuts and bolts of the scheme that has yet to gain a general acceptance from 
the external powers. It is clear that apart from playing the role that it has 
slipped into -  of clearing up misconceptions and apprehensions about the whole 
concept -  there is little more the N eutralization Committee can achieve until the 
realities of Great Power politics are brought to bear on the whole neutralization  
proposal: this again returns us to the sphere of extra-regional relations. With
(27) Far Eastern Economic Review -  Asia 1975 Yearbook, p. 69 
The New Standard, 13 M ay, 1974 .
The A ge, 8 M ay, 1974 .
(28) Straits T imes, 18 M arch, 19/4. Far Eastern Economic Review, I A p ril, 1974
(29) Japan Times, 22 A p ril, 1973.
(25)
regard to the latter, four of the five A SEA N  countries do not yet have 
formal diplomatic relations with thePeop'es1 Republic of C h ina .
Equally , four of the five have defense arrangements either with the United 
States, or with Britain, Australia and New Zealand; while a number of 
these countries still provide base facilities for external powers. The 
general attitude prevailing, however, is that rectification of this situation 
w ill come with time, and to hasten the realization of the zone of neutrality 
might only serve to wreck the proposal. In his closing address at the 1971 
Kuala Lumpur meeting, the Malaysian Prime Minister said :-
"We have no illusions about the long and d ifficult road ahead of us............
We shall proceed with caution as well as with imagination." (3 0 )
It remains to examine whether the imagination and/or interests of the elephants 
w ill favour the realization of this dream of the mousedeer.
(3 0 ) N . Sopiee -  O p . C it .  -  p . 24.
(26)
W E IG H IN G  UP THE ELEPHANTS :
Interested and active in Southeast Asia are a number of 
external powers, each with its own favoured prescription for the future 
of the region and the role that it w ill play therein«, Limiting the 
realization of such prescriptions, however, are the interactions of the 
powers themselves, and the leeway thus given to Southeast Asian countries 
to utilize  such Great Power rivalries in furthering their own interests. 
Hence it can be seen that Great Power relations among themselves create 
a certain framework of policy options for the smaller powers -  with 
particular reference to those policies which relate the small to the G reat  
Powers.
G reat Power relationships have long been conceived as a 
'balance1 -  the balance of power -  whish serves to maintain a certain 
international equilibrium . Although many exponents of the concept 
have tended to present idealized versions of rea lity , history bears witness 
to small power sacrifices in the interests of maintaining, first a European, 
and later a global balance of power -  examples of a partitioned Poland 
and later non-European colonial acquisitions come to mind. Hence the 
concept would appear to operate most satisfactorily on the basis of 
G reat Power interests. Nevertheless, far from disqualifying it from use, 
it makes it more rea listic .
It is true that the concept of the balance of power has lost 
some of its rigour since the days of its acclaim  during the European 
Congress System - the restoration period after the Napoleonic Wars -  
when certain principles were accepted, in theory at any rate, by the 
major powers. The most important for the maintenance of a multiple 
balance of power was that each Great Power was prepared to go to war
CHAPTER TWO:
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to defend not only its own, but also other states' integrity. (I) In 
point of fact, however, this was generally a realistic gesture in terms of 
one's own Interests, as the gains of an aggressor would increase its pov/er 
in relation to one's own, thus presenting a long-term threat that might have 
to be dealt w ith . As the states-system expanded outwards from its original 
European core, accepted principles became undermined, although it 
was argued that a balance of power was still feasib le. George Canning 
declared that:-
" . . . .W h i le  the balance of power continued in principle the same, the 
means of adjusting it became more varied and enlarged. They became 
enlarged, in proportion to the Increased number of considerable states -  
in proportion, I may say, to the number of weights which might be 
shifted into the one or the other sca le ."  (2)
In fact Canning's description -  while fitting, of course, in his own time -
fits the present international situation rather better than that of a decade
or so ago when the means of adjusting the balance of power were concentrated
In the nuclear armaments race .
There has been a certain shift in the Great Power balance from 
the bi-polarity of the Cold War years to the multi-polarity of the era of 
detente. It is true that the international system still has a central balance 
of two nuclear super-powers (3) of roughly similar standing. By enlarging 
the means of adjusting the balance, however, and bringing into consideration 
such factors as economic and strategic power, a broader balance of power 
has been achieved on a different level - with Japan, China and Western 
Europe each playing a ro le . Besides which a convincing case can be 
argued for the existence of regional balances.
(1) 'The Complex Triangle", C .  Holbraad. C h . 7 of an as yet unpublished 
work. (Dept, of International Relations, A .N . U .  Canberra).
(2) House of Commons, 12 December, 1826. Cited in 'The Balance of Power 
and International O rder', M . W ight. 'The Bases of International Order' 
(Oxford University Press, 1973) p . 109 .
(3) The term 'super-power' has been explained as - 'What the term super 
power essentially recognizes is the appearance since the end of World 
War II of a new class of p o w e r... alone capable of undertaking the 
central managerial role in international p o litics'. *World Order and 
the Super Powers®, H . Bu ll. Super Powers and World Order,
C c Holbraad, ed* (A .N ^ U *, 1971) p . 142«,
Hence 'super powerhood1 should not be defined in terms of military 
nuclear capacity alone, although such a capacity is a necessary 
prerequisite of that status*
(28)
It has been suggested by the American Secretary of State, D r.
Henry Kissinger, that:-
"Polycentrism does not reflect so much the emergence of new centres 
of actual power as the attempt by a llies to establish new centres of 
decision. Polycentrism is virulent not because the world has ceased 
to be bipolar, but because it essentially remains so” 0 (4)
W hile this is basically true, the interdependence of military and 
economic power gives these 'new centres of decision1 the right to be 
considered 1 centres of actual power** that play a role in the multilateral 
balance. It is open to one of these centres to change their a lleg iance  
as between nuclear super-powers. Furthermore, the new balance serves 
another purpose, for resort to nuclear weapons cannot be regarded as a 
desirable balancing technique in the present international system, one of 
whose prime objectives is to avoid such occurences. Even given the 
careful calculation of 'acceptable losses', there is much to be said for 
what Stanley Hoffmann terms-«« 'the adjournment sine die of the moment 
of nuclear truth1. (5) That the multiple balance w ill ,  for some tim e, be 
largely subject to the acquiescence of the super-powers need not m ilitate  
against its operation. It is clear that a nuclear confrontation does not 
figure in either of the latter's range of national interests.
The concept of a new multilateral balance of power was articulated
by Richard Nixon as a conceptual basis for his foreign policy doctrine.
He also acknowledged that the threat of nuclear war could no longer be
allowed to act as balancer: hence, new factors must be brought into p lay :-
" . . . I t  is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation  
to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So , I believe  
in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it w ill be 
a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United 
States, Europe, Soviet Union, C h in a , Japan, each balancing the 
other, not playing one against the other, an even b a lan ce ."  (6)
(4) 'Coalition Diplomacy in a N uclear A ge1,  H . Kissinger. Dynamics pf" 
of World Politics . L .  M ille r, ed . (Prentice-H alI, 1968). p . 48 .
(5) ‘Weighing the Balance of Power', S . Hoffmann. Foreign A ffa irs ,
V o l. 5 0 ,  N o . 4 , Ju ly  1972. p . 621. “ ^
(6) Richard Nixon quoted in Time, 3 Jan u ary , 1972. C ited  in 
'The Complex Triangle', C .  Holbraad. O p . C it .
In ¡-his statement President Nixon would appear to interpret the operation 
of the balance of power in a similar manner to that which in an earlier work. 
D r. Kissinger has ascribed to Castlereagh -  'the equilibrium was a 
mechanical expression of the balance of forces'. This, however, is not 
the way that it appears to a l l ,  particularly to some small powers that may 
be sacrificed in its interests. The balance of power might be described by 
the latter as the balance of interests between those who have the power 
to fight for their interests. Sometimes, as in the case of Belgium for many 
years, this can involve the protection of small powers.
Turning to Asia a distinct triangular power balance, between C h in a , 
the United States and the Soviet Union, has emerged.in recent years. The 
structure of this balance has been solidified by the season of detente which 
occurred f c  tuVn^f^tfiQ cde)o. It is in China's interest to prevent U .S .  
isolationism, as it is equally in the interests of the Soviet Union to avert 
an over-close Sino-American collusion. With regard to the United States -  
who at present is in the enviable position of 'tertius gaudens1 (7) -  it 
must maintain its role as 'balancer1 in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
THE STATE OF RELA TIO N S:
Detente between the United States and the Soviet Union predated 
the triangular balance as their fear of direct military confrontation with 
each other became increasingly obvious, and bilateral negotiations between 
the two intensified. A certain mutual understanding resulted from the common 
interests of avoiding nuclear w ar, and from the extensive network of negot­
iations which covered the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Berlin, 
the Middle East and other contentious issues. The fact that they have more 
to fear from each other than anybody else does put a certain strain on the 
relationship -  nevertheless, the latter has survived. Indeed, along with the 
initial SALT agreement reached in Moscow, in 1972, there has been a 
psychological easing of attitudes - with the Cold War outlook becoming 
increasingly unfashionable in the United States, and the Soviet Union 
busying itself in pursuing commercial benefits from Am erica. In November,
(7) Category defined by G „ Simmel - the deciding agent In a coalition
of two members of a triad against the third. Two against One:
Coalitions in Triads, T . Cap'ow . (Prentice- H a ll, 1968). p .  6 .
(29)
(3 0 )
1974, the Siberian Summit, between President Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, 
restored momentum to SALT which after 1972 had run down somewhat.
The Soviet explanation for detente with Washington follows the 
logic that:-
"In today's world events are determined not by the arithmetic of 
the traditional political game of the Great Powers, but by the algebra 
of the complex sociopolitical struggle that has engulfed our planet.
This is why, for all the complexities and contradictions of the historical 
process, the net balance has proved not at all to favour imperialism". (8)
To make this explanation realistic one might add the calculus of national 
interest -  and it would appear to be in the Soviet interest to maintain good 
relations with the United States as long as the Sino-Soviet fued continues.
Their response to the SinoAmerican rapprochement was, not surprisingly, 
cool; as, in fact, was their general acceptance of the emerging triangular 
system. It has been suggested that the recognition by the United States 
of the special status of the Soviet-Am erican dialogues on certain mainstream 
issues was the promise that Moscow evoked from Washington in return for 
Soviet compliance in the 'Kissinger system'. (9) However, there were 
the inevitable warnings that the United States should not attempt to exploit 
Sino-Soviet d ifficu lties, while the Soviet media played up the threat of 
Sino-American collusion in Southeast A s ia . (IO)
Sim ilar accusations were prominent in the Chinese redefinition of
the relations of the two super-powers, which followed the invasion of
Czechoslovakia and the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (II):-
"While both colluding and struggling with each other, the U .S .  imperialists 
and the Soviet revisionists are trying in vain to redivide the world.
In their war of aggression against Vietnam , the U .S . imperialists enjoy 
the tacit consent and support of the Soviet revisionists, while in turn the 
Soviet revisionist renegade clique enjoys the tacit consent and support 
of the U .S . imperialists in openly despatching troops to occupy C zecho-
(8) 'U .S . -  Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the I9 7 0 's , G . A .  Arbatov,
Orb is ,  V o l. X V , N o . I ,  Spring 1971. p . 142.
(9) 'Sino-American Relations in Soviet Perspec tiv e ', I .  C la rk . O rb is ,
V o l. X V II ,  N o . 2. Summer 1973. p. 492.
(10) Tass report of Pravda a rt ic le , 9 August, 1971. Cited in C lark -  Ibid -  
p. 487.
(11) The Brezhnev Doctrine claimed for the Soviet Union the right to intervene in 
communist countries to preserve the "socialist system".
However* the fact that the super-powers were seen as 'colluding' and 
'struggling' simultaneously, implied that a third party could exploit the 
differences.
On top of a decade of suspicion and antagonism, the combination of the
invasion of C zechoslovakia , the Brezhnev Doctrine, intensified Soviet
patrolling of the Sino-Soviet border and Peking's fear of a Soviet attack ,
sparked off border clashes in Spring 1969. Although the fighting was to
die down all was not well and neither side indicated a willingness to
compromise on any of the specific major points at issue between the two.
Among the many contentious matters which perpetuate, the antagonism,
the growing Soviet interest in Southeast A sia , as articulated in their
'co llective security1 system, is not the least important.
G iven  the state of Sino-Soviet relations the receptiveness of China
to American advances can be largely explained by the tactics set out by
Mao Tse-tung himself:-
"Oppose the strategy of striking with two 'fists' in two directions at the 
same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one 'fist' in one 
direction at one tim e. " (13)
If , as the Chinese feared, a Soviet preemptive attack was planned against
Chinese nuclear fa c ilit ie s , then the SinoAmerican agreement was not only
useful, but v ita l. Nonetheless, even without such a drastic threat the
detente was undoubtedly of benefit to the Chinese who could use it to
prevent over-close super-power collusion. Even if contention between the
two super-powers was claimed to be inevitable, there would appear to be
little reason why it should not be helped along.
1969 inaugurated a decisive change in the scenario with the increased
Sino-Soviet tension, the Guam Doctrine of the recently elected President
(12) Communique of the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of C h ina , 31 O ctober, 1968.
Cited in 'China's Place in Nixon's New World O rder', D . Armstrong. 
Work-in-Progress Paper, Dept, of International Relations, A . N . U . ,  
Canberra. 6 September, 1973.
(13) Mao Tse-tung Selected Works (Peking), Vol „ IV , p. 199. Cited in 
'The G reat Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign P o licy ', J .G it t in g s .  
China Q uarterly , N o . 39 . July/September, 1969.
(31)
Slovakia". (12)
Nixon and, in short* greater moderation being displayed by both sides. 
Although the American administration made it clear that the United 
States was not trying to cap italize on the Sino-Soviet dispute (14) ; 
in its position as 'tertius gaudens' it was d ifficu lt for it not to. A 
rapid train of events saw Dr. Kissinger in Peking in Ju ly 1971 r and 
President Nixon making the trip the following February. The Nixon 
visit went wall with the essence of the new understanding being summarized 
in the Shanghai comminque, which was signed by President Nixon and 
Chou E n - la i. Both sides agreed that:-
" . . .  It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for 
any major country to collude with another against other countries* 
or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest«,11
Applied to the regional level it was stated that China and the United States 
would not ’seek hegemony in the A sia -P ac ific  region* and that they would 
oppose 'the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish 
such hegemony1. This clause came to be rather pointedly aimed at the 
Soviet Union as President Nixon undermined Chou En-la i's  application  
of it to Japan by stating that:-
"Tne United States placed the highest value on its friendly relations 
with Japan; it w ill continue to develop the existing close bonds". 
Accord was, however* within certain limits and such issues as that of 
Taiwan remained unsettled. (15)
With the succession of Gerald Ford to the Presidency, the American 
administration would appear to be content for tiie moment with the limited 
scope of S in o -U .S . relations. There have* in fact* been complaints 
that D r. Kissinger is no longer sufficiently interested in China now that 
his attention has been distracted elsewhere. One ambassador remarked 
that Chou thinks that Kissinger's problem is that he has not understood 
that 'it is easy to destroy one louse with one finger* but very hard to get 
five lice  under five fingers at the same tim e'. (16) However,, after the
(32)
(14) New York Times, 2 0  December, 1969.
(15) Japan Timesg 21 Ju ly , 1972
(16) Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 M ayf 1974
Siberian Summit in November 1974, Dr. Kissinger travelled to Peking 
to give the Chinese a post-summit briefing.
Although China continues to speak in terms of the colonialism,, 
imperialism and, particu larly , hegemonism of the two super-powers, and 
their temporary collusion, Soviet apprehensions about Sino- American 
collusion in Southeast Asia may well have been given good grounds for 
belief by the reports of Chinese suggestions that a continued American 
presence in the region would be far from unwelcome. Despite the fact 
that categorical denials of any such suggestions were made in Ju ly , 1972,
(17) it was reported again, In December 1973, that in a private conversation 
with the Australian Prime M inister, Gough W hitlam, in Peking,Chou En -la i 
nat only said that the United States should not withdraw its armed forces 
hurriedly from Southeast Asia and the West P acific , but went so far as to 
warn that the United States would bear a heavy responsibility for the 
consequences of a precipitate disengagement. (18) It is obvious thata soolole-n
China fears that ««-American withdrawal et-pr-esent might cause a power 
vacuum that would be too inviting to the Soviet Union and to whatever 
designs the latter might have on the region.
THE BALANCE A N D  SOUTHEAST A SIA :
Hence the establishment of a triangular power balcnce, a development
encouraged by Washington but frowned on by Moscow. According to one
Russian commentator:-
"Peking's key strategic concept is based on the idea of using all kinds of 
political combinations and bloc arrangements* above all with the imperialist 
circles* to convert China into a special and independent centre of power 
and pole of attraction capable of exerting a considerable, if not a d ecisive , 
influence on the development of the international situation." (19)
Not only is this rather like the case of the pot calling the kettle b lack , but it 
is merely ascribing to Peking the pragmatism displayed by all major powers in
(17) New York Times, 18 Ju ly , 1972. Concerns reports made by U *S e 
Congressional leaders -  Congressmen Haie and Ford*
(18) The Age* 6 December, 1973
(19) T ao ism 's  Foreign Policy Platform** N„ Kapchenko* Internationa! 
A ffairs, February 1972. p. 37. Cited in Clark -  O p . C 51. -  p . 489.
(33)
the pursuit of their national interests. Until it achieves full nuclear 
status China needs to counter Soviet superiority and antagonism by rapprochement 
with A m erica, As the United States also needs a counter balance to the Soviet 
Union* there is at present a coincidence of interests between the two countries.
At the end of the Se-eeJe 'the Asian balance may be further complicated
. 1  r . r t ^ n r ,n H-k carlu wears cf Hnc
by the emergence of Japan as a fourth G reat row er, tven a t the mofagnt cje.cx<cie
it is an economic power that cannot be discounted* and along with Western
Europe* was mentioned as a participant in the proposed quintuple global
balance. In early 1972* Prime Minister Sato of Japan reiterated President
Nixon's suggestion:-
"Japan* together with the United States* China* Russia and the European
Community, make up the concept of a five power balance seeking to
maintain world peace and order. As a member of this balance, Japan
must play a considerable ro le" . (2 0 )
Despite the fact that other Japanese politicians have echoed this sentiment*
Japan appears to be in two minds as to how it must play this role -  and how
it can play it with the least number of risks and commitments. Western
Europe would appear to be in a similar position with regard to the global
scene; w hilst, it has been reduced to such a minimal role in the Asian region
that it w ill not be considered at length.
G iven the establishment of a multiple balance of power both on the 
global level -  and even more effectively -  on the regional Asian stage, the 
possible effect of the latter on Southeast Asia must now be ca lcu lated . From 
what has been observed o f balance of power situations in the past, no large 
state is allowed to become an aggressor to the point where its expansionism 
becomes a threat to the other participants in the balance of power. In the 
raTntfvoly .^ c » ni  past, under the bipolar system, Southeast Asia was a 
convenient cockpit of Great Power riva lry , because it had no effectively  
strong neighbour to protest* and the United States gained a vested interest 
in preventing the development of such a power* Southeast Asia* successfully 
weakened by colonialism and internally po litica lly  fragmented* was opan 
to intervention. A nominal interference by the major Communist Powers 
became more substantive -  largely for prestige reasons* although not totally
(34)
(2 0 ) The Australian, 4 January, 1972. Cited in *The Complex Triangle1,  
C .  Holbraad. O p . C i t .  p* 139.
so -  due to their mutual antagonism and to their support for national oppositions 
to American interventionc Interference by the latter was premised on the 
containment of the expansion of both communist power and ideology -  the two 
being viewed as mutually supporting„
The sixties saw the Sino-Soviet dispute, and added to this, the waging 
by the United States of a far from successful war in Indo C h ina . Among the 
consequences of the latter was the Nixon Doctrine and the recognition by 
the United States of the new international structure -  the multiple balance 
of power0 Nevertheless, the emergence of such a power structure had been 
developing long before American recognition. In evidence of this the growth 
of Chinese military force and Japanese economic power can be cited« Although 
fear of losing the nuclear in itiative in a bipolar situation encouraged the 
United States to redefine power in a broader manner.
That a certain triangular balance of forces has been established in 
the v icin ity  of Southeast Asia does mean that there is a premium to be paid 
by anyone who disturbs this balance. Particularly as the two most important 
external Powers to the region -  the United States and China -  have a
Seine hme nl"
vested interest, for t.he present,  in the maintenance of the existing balance 
of power«, Although the Soviet Union has been articulating an interest in 
Southeast Asian affairs, this is not its prime area of concern. With regard 
to Japan, concentrating as it is on its economic strength, it is all in favour 
of maintaining stability in an area of trade and investment«, Granted such 
a situation it is arguable that the Great Powers could support a scheme for 
mutual noninvolvement -  m ilita rily , at least -  in Southeast Asia-; or indeed, 
support the declaration of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and 
neutrality . It is in the interests of each of the Great Powers to preserve the 
region from the hegemony of either one of their rivals, or of a collusion of 
the latter. It is true, however, that much would depend on whether the 
Great Power could be convinced that a plan of neutrality is a feasible one.
Much time may pass and many changes may have to take place before 
the dream of the mousedeer may be realized with the blessings of the elephants -  
and it is not like ly  to be realized without such blessings. At least with 
the shift in the balance of power a first step has been taken, with the elephants*
(35)
(36)
attention being channelled into the less destructive area of inter-Power 
diplom acy. If the latter is successful, the mousedeer may yet be granted 
a breathing space c
(37)
CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST ELEPHANT -  THE UNITED STATES OF A M ER IC A :
Despite the fact that over the last few decades no external power
has played a more prominent role in Southeast Asian affairs than the Unitedhadsee^ t change by the seve/ibes »
States, American concern with the region has seen c howge in re cent yeors.
The factors leading to this change are similar to those that have encouraged
the evolution of the Nixon Doctrine -  internal unrest in the United States;
failure to make decisive progress in Indo China; a reconsideration of the
principles that led America into that quagmire and a general reassessment
of American interests. With regard to the latter it has been pointed out 
J]pS
that Southeast Asia+«-of little direct importance to the United States-today; 
whilst the geopolitical argument -  that the region 'dominates the gateway 
between the Pacific and Indian O ceans1 (I) -  is open to dispute, given 
that the closing of the Suez Canal has shown that formerly 'v ita l' waterways 
are no longer quite so necessary in the day of the supertanker. (2)
A broader reassessmant of American interests was registered in the 
Nixon Doctrine, the nub of which was contained in one brief paragraph of the
4 0 , 0 0 0  word ‘State of the World Message', delivered to Congress on the 
15th February, 1970:-
"We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we 
have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape
(1) Statement made by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, August, 1965. Cited in 'East A sia ', R.Clo>ugh. 
The Next Phase in Foreign P o licy , H . Owen, Ed , (Brookings Institution, 
1973) pp. 55/6 .
(2) Arguing in favour of this view -  Ib id . Arguing against it 'United 
States Policy in Southeast A sia: Permanency and Change1,  F .  D arling . 
Asian Survey, V o l. X IV , N o . 7 , Ju ly 1974. p. 6 0 9 .
(38)
Three principles were laid down as guidelines for future American policy  
towards A sia :-
(i) The United States w ill keep all of its treaty commitments.
(ii) It w ill provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom 
of a nation allied  with it or of a nation whose survival it considers 
vital to its security.
(¡ii) In cases involving other types of aggression, it w ill furnish military 
and economic aid when requested in accordance with its treaty 
commitments. But it w ill look to the nation d irectly  threatened to 
assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defence. (4)
These principles are still far from clear and as guidelines are extremsly 
flex ib le , whilst the fundamental issues of interests and commitments are left 
open to diverse interpretations. The generality of the doctrine was underlined 
by President Nixon himself when he admitted that beyond the general guide­
lines 'the specific circumstances of each case require careful study1. It 
was, however, made clear that the United States was still a Pacific power 
and as such W e have learned that peace for us is much less like ly  if there 
is no peace in Asia 1.
To summarize these points derived from the Nixon Doctrine -  m ilitarily  
the cry goes out ‘not much change1; deterrence (the maintenance of the 
nuclear 'shield'), co llective  security (the honouring of treaties) and flexible  
response (a readiness on the part of U .S .  forces to take defensive military 
action as necessary, ranging from a show of force to a major co n flict). (5)
(3) First Annual Report to the Congress on U .S .  Foreign Policy for the 7 O 's . 
18 February, 1970 -  Presidential Papers of Richard N ixon, 1970 . p .! !9 c 
Hereafter cited as 'Nixon Speech -  18 February, 1970*.
(4) Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam , 3 November, 1969 -  
Presidential Papers of Richard N ixon, 1969. p .  9 0 5 .
our commitments rather than the other way around." (3)
(5) 'M ilitary Assistance and the Nixon Doctrine', R„ Wood. Orbls, 
V o l. X V , N o . I ,  Spring 1971. p . 247.
P o lit ica lly , the concept of the United States as the universal guardian of 
the 'free world' has given way to 'enlightened self-interest'. Where the 
political and military coincide there is the new emphasis on partnership 
and ‘shared responsibilities'.
Translating theory into practice , American activ ity  in Southeast 
Asia since the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine is worthy of consideration.
A vital extension of the Doctrine dealt with the specific circumstances of 
the Vietnam situation which resulted in a dual approach being proposed for 
resolving the conflict -  ‘Negotiations and V ietnam ization'. The latter
I f
consisted of two elements, support for the South Vietnamese forces in numbers, 
equipment, leadership and overall cap acity , and the implementation of the 
pacification programme in South Vietnam . W hile it can be argued that 
successful Vietnamization may pave the way for a strategic American 
withdrawal from the area, there is the fear that in supporting the Thieu 
Government, not only does Vietnamization preserve an American foothold 
on the Asian mainland, but it presents the danger that by being applied 
elsewhere it might sustain, by economic and military aid -  the continuation 
of 'regressive' regimes dominated by U .S  .-oriented e lite s. (6) Both 
alternatives remain open with much depending on the eventual fate of South 
Vietnam and the nature of the American administration.
On a more general level the inevitable problems of the interpretation 
of the doctrine occurred on the diplomatic front. The U .S . Senate Majority 
Leader, M ansfield, hailed the new policy statement as meaning that 'The only 
way we would ever become involved again ', in an Asian war, ‘ would be when our 
security was at stake and a nuclear showdown appeared to be in the offing. In 
other words when there was no possible c h o ic e .1 However, the then Thai 
Foreign M inister, Khoman^ was able to say after his talks with the then 
American V ice-President, Spiro Agnew, that the latter had ‘Strongly asserted 
that there would be no change in American policy and no lessening of United 
States commitments to Thailand and Southeast A sia1. (7) These assurances 
to Southeast Asian statesmen jostled others such as that made by Secretary of 
S ta te W ill ia m  Rogers, when he told the Japanese Prime M inister, some six
(6) 'War and Peace in Indo C hina*, M . Thee. Journal of Peace Research,
N o . 1 -  2 , 1973 p . 63 .
(7) New York Tim es, 6 January, 1970 .
(39)
months later* that American troops would remain in Southeast Asia to keep 
treaty commitments* but that the United States would not 1 overly burden 
itself as it did in South Vietnam®« (8)
What was evidently considered burdensome was the continuation 
of a large-scale loss of American lives in the Indo China co n flict. The 
acceptable consisted of some $76*410 million being earmarked for Indo China 
during the years of the first Nixon Administration (1969-72), and despite 
the fact that American ground forces were withdrawn from Vietnam and reduced 
in numbers in many areas* the maintenance of formidable military power in the 
region«, Furthermore* reductions in American military personnel in Asia 
have been remedied by the substitution of indigenous forces* financed and 
equipped through enlarged U .S .  military assistance. The case for expanded 
military aid was stated by Defence Secretary* Melvin Laird* in preparation for 
vastly increased M ilitary Assistance Program (MAP) budget requests for 1972 
and succeeding financial years«, Secretary Laird characterized AAAP as:-  
" . . .T h e  essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honour our 
obligations* support our a llies* and yet reduce the likelihood of having 
to commit American ground combat un its."  (9)
This substitution of aid for American soldiers has been repeated in subsequent 
Defence Department Reports. It is such a substitution that is one of the pillars 
upon which the Nixon Doctrine rests* with present military aid programmes 
being expected to maintain armed forces in South Vietnam at approximately 
8 0 0 * 0 0 0  to 9 0 0 , 0 0 0  troops* Cambodia dt 1 0 0 * 0 0 0  troops and 
Thailand at 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  troops. (10)
Besides military aid a large portion of American economic aid in Southeast 
Asia is 5444-1- administered on a bilateral basis for essentially m ilitary-related  
purposes -  although there have been efforts to distinguish the two. However* 
the concentration of U .S .  economic aid in South Vietnam* Laos, Cambodia 
and Thailand, illustrates the fact that the distinction has not been very successful. 
There have also been more unorthodox methods for the Asianlzation of Southeast 
Asian problems -  such as the role played by the American C . I . A . *  particularly
(8) New York Times* lO J u ly ^  1970 .
(9) Defense Program and Budget FY  1971 r M . Laird . (Washington D .C .
U .S .  G o v t. Printing O ffice* March 2 , 1970).
(1 O) F .  D ar I ing -  O p . C it .  -  p . 616.
(40)
their activities in Laos and Cambodia. In 1971, the Nixon Administration 
acknowledged that the C J . A .  was maintaining a 3 0 , 0 0 0  man ‘irregular1 force which 
was fighting throughout most of Laos; w h ile , despite an amendment to the Dept, 
of Defence Authorization Bill for 1971 specifica lly  forbidding the funding of 
foreign mercenaries in Laos, it was again admitted in 1973, that the United 
States was financing some 1 5 , 0 0 0  to 2 0 , 0 0 0  Thai ‘ irregular1 troops in 
Laos, (II) With regard to Cambodia there was the alleged C J . A ,  involvement 
in the overthrow of the Head of State, Prince Sihanouk, and the U .S .  Administrat­
ion's concealed bombing which the Pentagon had falsified by claiming that the 
bombing targets were located in South Vietnam , (12) It is little  wonder that 
a certain degree of confusion exists among Southeast Asian statesmen as to what 
the United States’ true intentions might be. If a fundamental premise of the 
Nixon Doctrine would appear to be a ‘de-ideologization® of policies and 
diplomacy; when applied to Indo C h in a , the former would appear to have been 
replaced by covert intervention, while diplomacy took very much second place -  
a fact that Averell Harriman, Johnson's ch ief negotiator at the Paris peace 
ta lks, was to complain about, (13)
THE UNITED STATES A N D  THE R EG IO N  :
I ,  Both the Nixon Doctrine and the underlying causes that gave rise to it
have inevitably had an effect on Southeast Asian states. Even Thailand, 
whose position of diplomatic weathercock of the region was undermined 
for some time due to its over-close American associations, has been 
reflecting rocon t changes. Immediately after President Nixon's Address 
to Congress in February 1970 , Thanat Khoman, then Thai Foreign 
M inister, said that the small nations of the area could no longer rely on 
the United States and other big powers for protection, that they must
(11) New York Times, 3 August, 1971
(12) New York Times, 15 M ay, 1973
(13) 'The Changing Role of the United States in Southeast A s ia ', J ,  G ir lin g .
New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast A sia ,
Lau Teik Soon, ed , (Singapore University Press, 1973) p . 9 0 ,
(41)
(42)
"The nations on the spot by Joining to g eth er« ,m ay  present a worthwhile 
persuasive opportunity to Peking to alter its militant inclinations and 
follow a more peaceful course of co-existence with fellow Asian and 
Pacific nations1«, (14)
Aid from the United States being described in the process as maybe not
only ineffective 'but (it) may even become a lia b ility 8«,
In the couple of years following this message was to be modified,
but the rapidly turning wheel of Thai political fortune soon favoured
the Government of Sanya Dharmasakti (October 1973), whose special
adviser on Foreign Affairs is none other than D r, Thanat Khoman himself.
In an important policy statement. Foreign M inister, Charunphan
Isarangkun said -  ‘Thailand's future relations with the United States w ill
have to be modified and adapted to changing circumstances. During the
past d e c a d e .,,«,«,(there) has been an over-emphasis on military cooperation.
This needs to be adjusted in order to achieve a more truly balanced
relationship and I am glad that both sides now realise this need8, (15)
Alongside this attitude of the new Government, there has been a swelling
of public hostility toward the United States, particularly over the reported
intrigues of the C .1 .A ,  (16)
(14) Bangkok World,  25 February, 1970
(15) Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 Ju n e, 1974
(16) T ,D . Allman in Bangkok Post, 2 0  January, 1974
Not only did this mention the American bombing of Indo China from Thai bases, 
but the reports that American agents used Thailand for forays into Burma and 
C h in a . The question of Thai troops being paid by the C , I , A ,  to fight in Laos 
was also raised. Concerning these reports that have been circulating for some 
years now, Mr #G ,  McMurtrie G o d ley , then U .S .  Ambassador in V ientiane, 
was quoted as having maintained to a closed session of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, on 22 J u ly , 1971, that the C , I , A .  action in Laos was 
consistent with the Nixon D octrine. This view was seconded by the U .S .
Under secretary of State for Political A ffairs, A lexis Johnson. A sia Research 
B u lle tin , V o l. 1/5, October, 1971, p . 3 5 0  C .  The then Thai Government 
deplored the disclosure of such official secrets. New York Timas,  13 J u ly , 1971
Further allegations concerning C . l . A .  activities in Thailand were reported in 
the SW 3, 12 January, 1974. Radio Peace and Progress in English, 1 0 .3 0  G M T ,,  
10/1/1974. SU /4498/A 3/3 . Also in Canberra Times, 6 February, 1970 .
cooperate amongst themselves* Furthermore he added:-
American involvement in Thailand, however, is extensive and
- al- ^ose of <974 - 
relations between the two ere stil-l c lose0 Thailand has provided bases
for the United States; some well paid troops to fight in Indo China -  giving
the United States the privilege of being able to tell the world that an Asian
country is fighting with it -  ; is still a rromber of the Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and has been the recipient of considerable
economic and military aid from the United States, Besides which,the
American Government was for quite some time, the largest single
employer in Thailand -  excluding the Thai Government itself«, Over the
last decade the two countries have worked closely together in devising
strategies and programmes regarding the security of Thailand's Mekong
frontier«, W hile the total value of American military aid to Thailand
has declined since 1969, it remains substantial, and Secretary Laird has
reportedly assured Bangkok that it can continue to count on U .S .  support
for the next decade, (17) M ilitary assistance for Thailand under the
Nixon Administration entailed equipment grants and sales to modernize
the 1 2 5 ,0 0 0  -  man Thai army, subsidization of Thai Involvement in
Laos and Cambodia, and support for the Thai counter-insurgency
programme with both funds and advisers.
Along with an overall reduction in a id , the years since the Nixon 
Doctrine have seen, at first an increase, and then a reduction in the 
American presence in Thailand. In 1971 the figure stood at 3 2 , 0 0 0 ,  
but 1972-73 witnessed a restoration of U .S . force levels to some 4 5 , 0 0 0 ,  
Besides which the removal of the American headquarters from Saigon to 
Nakhon Phanom -  3 3 0  miles north-east of Bangkok- was realized by A p ril, 
1973, Toward the middle of 1973, the gradual withdrawal of American 
troops was announced -  partly in an effort to mollify Thai public 
opinion which had become increasingly critical of the American military
presence, and partly as a cost-effective economy move by the U ,S .  A ir
In o ooreemenr Hie (Jntfed States 
Force , Thp most, recent agreement is that the United Ste tos has agrooe
to reduce its military strength in Thailand by almost a quarter, commencing
(43)
(17) New York Times, 8 January, 1971
including some B-52 strategic bombers -  the first time that B-52's have
been withdrawn -  and reducing the U .S .  troop level to some 2 7 , 0 0 0 ,
the lowest since 1966. (18)
The reactions of successive Thai Governments to these American
moves have been varied. Between 1968 and 1973 opinions have fluctuated
with Thanat Khoman taking a strong line against American military presence
in Thailand after the end of the Vietnam War; but the then Prime M inister,
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, claiming that a continued American
presence would act as a guarantee to ensure that there would be no violation
of the Indo Chinese ceasefire by the communists. (19) This was a sentiment
that was echoed by the U .S . Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger. (2 0 )
With the removal of the Thanom-Prapas military regime in October 1973,
there were open ca lls  for a reappraisal of the relationship between Thailand
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and the United States. Both these demands and the la test  American with­
drawals come at a time when the Thai Government is making an effort to 
improve relations with a number of communist countries, including North 
Vietnam . (21) The general reaction of the latter to Thai advances has 
been understandably cool due to the fact that American troops are &*+U 
based in Thailand.
The more realistic objections to a total American withdrawal from 
Thailand include the point that even if the U .S . A ir Force decided to use 
Clark  A ir base (Philippines) as its forward base in Southeast A sia , it would 
still be eager to retain landing rights in Thailand - this because without such 
rights there is no place between the Philippines and Iran where the United 
States could land a military plane. However, General John M eyer, head 
of the Strategic A ir Command, has been quoted as saying that it would take 
only 72 hours to return the B-52's, now stationed at U Tapac, if it was 
finally decided to withdraw them a l l .  (22) Furthermore, if can be argued
(18) Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 A p ril, 1973 
Canberra Times,  3 0  M arch, 1974
(19) Bulletin Today,  19 December, 1972. And Australian Financial Review,9th M ay, 
1973, for Thanat Khoman’s stand. New York Times, II M.ay, 1973. And 
Australian Financial Review,  21 January, 1973, for K ittikachorn's.
(2 0 ) Australian Financial Review, 9 M ay, 1973
(21) Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 June, 1974.
(44)
in May 1974, and in addition to despatch home a number of aircraft,
(22) Australian Financial Review, IO  Ju ly , 1974.
that there is little need for the presence of 271 C O O  troops to maintain 
such landing rights. Another sensitive, and possibly the most important 
'residual interest1 the United States would seek to retain in Thailand is 
one that is rarely mentioned -  a key electronic intelligence station in 
Ramasun ( N .E .  Thailand) -  about five miles south of a major air base 
at Udon Thani. A four sentence statement made available by a military 
spokesman said that Ramasun is involved in 'electronic research projects' 
and 'communications research and development1,  and that it provides 
'rapid radio relay and service communications for the defence of the 
United States and the free world'. (23) This may be translated as 
attributing a dual function to the base -  (a) electronic intelligence and 
communications with regard to C h in a , North Vietnam and the U .S .S .R .   ^
Broadcasts and military orders being intercepted; and (b) the other 
function is that of microbarographs -  the attainment of seismic data 
which can track nuclear testing, e tc . As location is a vital factor in 
both these functions, Ramasun is not a base that could easily be dispensed 
w ith. (24)
No written agreement assures the American tenancy at Ramasun
or any of the other air bases; nevertheless, there is some truth in the
American claim that Thailand has been well paid for the use of these
six hcs.
facilities through the $ 6 4 0 . million in military aid over the last doeecte-. 
This assistance has been justified to Congress as support to the Thais 
to enable them to resist communist insurgency in the north-east -  a 
rather far-fetched justification given the relatively limited nature of 
this insurgency. However, such involvement is being scaled down, 
for the first time in thirteen years there are no American special forces 
units in Thailand -  the last Green Berets left in March 1974. By the end 
of 1974 the last U .S . officer serving as an adviser to the Thai army wi44 had 
also havo departed. Moreover, f-iio  yoars ago the U .S .  Embassy in
(23) Ibid.
(24) Information courtesy of Dr. D . B a ll, Strategic Studies & Defence Centre 
A . N . U . ,  October, 1974. The U .S . Embassy in Canberra refused to comment 
on this matter, because 'as a matter of policy (it) does not discuss the details 
of the equipment positioned at U .S . and allied  defense fac ilit ie s , nor the 
operating characteristics of this equipment1. January 31, 1975.
(45)
Bangkok had more than thirty officials who were studying the insurgency
in/974 . . .
problem, but rqw the number is said to be down to three. As in the Phil­
ippines, American officials tend to explain military assistance to Thailand 
as a form of payment for base fac ilit ie s . Nevertheless, Congress has been 
cutting military aid grants at every opportunity, and those to Thailand 
are clearly  on the d ec lin e . To compensate for the cuts the Thais have been 
offered credits for military sales, but have yet to accept any. (25)
With some sections complaining that American withdrawal from 
Thailand is too rapid, such moves do not seem to have impressed the pro- 
Peking 'Voice of the People of Thailand1 Radio, which has commented that:-
"The fictitious pull-out of American troops can't fool Thais but w ill only 
but w iii only aggravate them to protest more v io le n t ly .. . . .  A long as 
a reactionary government, representing imperialism, feudalism, and 
bureaucratic capitalism , r u le s . . .  no matter what changes of leadership 
take place -  nation-selling policies w ill always be employed." (26)
However, changes have taken p lace , and not least is the noticeable change
in the attitude of the Thai Government. There is a growing nationalistic
flavour in foreign policy and an increasing exasperation at the unpredictability
and clumsiness of American diplom acy. There are also the costs of the
American presence to be reckoned - certain costs that one might argue could
not be covered by monetary compensation -  such as the toll exacted from
Thai society and the curtailment of her diplomatic options. As a master of
the diplomatic art of manoeuvring, the Thai Government has increasingly
iii • , . * . . expanded these options w+frhm rocont months, at the same time making its
independence from the United States politely p lain . Following U .S .
Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger's statement that B-52‘s based in 
Thailand might be employed to patrol the Indian O cean , the Thai Foreign 
Ministry issued a statement saying that any activities over the Indian Ocean  
by U .S .  air power based on Thai soil must first receive approval from the 
Thai Government. Some three months later it was announced that the 
Thai Government had informed the United States that it would not grant such 
approval, thus causing a set back to American plans to monitor the move­
ments of Russian vessels in the O cean . (27)
(25) Australian Financial Review , lO J u ly ,  1974
(26) Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 June, 1974
(27) Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 A pril, 1974
(46)
Despite such assertions of independence Thai diplomacy is
limited by both domestic restraints and a not very extensive range of
external options. Its proclaimed contingency plan of regionalism is
as yet somewhat embryonic and is overshadowed by a m ultiplicity of
question marks. However, pending a clarification of the attidues
and relationships of the Great Powers, Thailand is seeking to position
itself so that it w ill be free to use all its diplomatic arts in the further-
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ance of its national interests. For the moment that diplomatic posture
is on the borderline of conservatism -  a position historically suited to
Thailand c
2 . O f all Southeast Asian countries the Philippines has had the closest
association with the United States, the latter acquiring the archipelago  
in 1898p which marked the end of the Spanish-American W ar. Even after 
independence had been granted to the Philippines, some four decades 
later*, close relations continued with American bases being sited there and 
a Mutual Defence Treaty being concluded in 1951. Neither this Treaty 
nor subsequent membership of SEATO apparently satisfied the Philippine 
fear of abandonment -  a fear derived from the Second World War -  and 
successive Heads of State have demanded repeated reassurances from 
American Presidents and Secretaries-of-State. In 1968, it was clear that 
the matter was far from settled as the Malaysian Philippine dispute once 
again raised the question of whether the United States would be obliged 
to aid the Philippines if an attack did involve an attack on American 
installations in the Philippines. It was suggesteddu ring the U .S .Fore ig n  
Relations hearings on American commitments in the Philippines, in 1969, 
that such obligations did not exist. (28)
Despite the pressure for American reassurances, the U .S . bases 
in the Philippines have been a frequent source of friction. Much of the 
trouble would appear to stem from the fact that the 1947 agreement gave 
the U .S . Government virtual extra-territorial jurisdiction over U .S .  
military personnel -  with the Philippine Government only exercising
(28) Philippine Policy toward Regional Cooperation in.Southeast A sia , 1961-1969, 
R. A b e ll, ( A .N .U .  Dept, of International Relations PhD. Thesis),pp 38/9.
(47)
(48)
jurisdiction in cases involving crimes against Filipinos by U .S .  servicemen 
who were off base and off duty. (29) Arising out of the latter dis­
content has been shown through the columns of at least two Filip ino  
in 197+
newspapers POGontly -  ‘Bulletin Today' and ‘Orient News' -  complaints 
were registered about1 the cavalier attitude of American authorities towards 
this country' ; and the "Orient News' editorialized that 'In any future 
treaty on U .S . bases here, we must make sure that the rules and laws of 
the land w ill be observed by the U .S .  military brass'. (3 0 ) The fact 
that one of the newspapers is owned by President Marcos' former security 
ch ie f, General Hans M enzi, would suggest that such U .S .-b a it in g  is 
Government inspired -  not an unlikely hypothesis in a situation where 
the Philippines is trying to improve its standing with Peking, and is also 
in the process of re-negotiating the bases agreement.
The continued use of base facilities at C lark A ir base and Subic 
Bay Naval base is considered important by Washington. At Subic the 
naval magazine occupies an area of 18 sq . m iles, containing some 9 5 , 0 0 0  
tons of munitions -  in 1964, 1 5 ,0 0 0  tons being deemed am ple. The base 
also has important repair fac ilit ie s . The C lark A ir Base in Central Luzon, 
is the A ir Force's largest base on foreign soil and the second largest in the 
world (only Vandenberg A ir Force base in California is bigger). Between 
these two key bases it has been calculated that there are some 1 4 ,0 0 0  -
1 6 ,0 0 0  mititary personnel plus their fam ilies. Under existing agreements, 
U .S .  forces can continue to use what military planners like to call their 
pied-à-terre in the Philippines on a rent-free basis until 1991. (31)
It might be noted also that the Philippines houses American radar systems, 
while there is a Satellite Ground Station at C lark F ie ld , Furthermore, it 
is reported that a similar station to the Ramasun base (Thailand) is located 
in the Philippines; however, this has not been confirmed. (32)
(29) Ib id . pp. 3 9 /4 0
(3 0 ) Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 November, 1974
(31) Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. 2 , N o . 12, April 1973, p . 1772 B.
Australian Financial Review, 5 Ju ly , 1974
(32) D r. D . Ball -  O p . C it .
Existing base installations in the Philippines are reckoned to be
worth more than $1. b illio n . Considering this President Marcos claims
that the American aid provided in compensation is far too sm all. While
he places its annual value at some $12. m illion, the United States
calculates that it comes to some $ 2 0 . m illion. Even accepting the
latter figure, the Philippines receives less military aid than Indonesia .(33)
This is now being felt in the Philippines as the latter has one of the smallest
military establishments in Asia in proportion to population, although it has
in ("he se v cn h e s .
been rapidly increasea w-ithin the last couple of y ears-, It is now being
confronted with not only endemic rural insurgency, but also with the rather
more serious threat of Moslem guerrillas in the South. Manila would be
grateful for more mortars, helicopters and recoilless rifles -  according to
President Miarcos:-
"We feel the United States hasn't given us the support of an a lly  which
promised assistance, especially  in time of crisis . We could understand
a shortage during the Vietnam w ar. But we certainly would like access
now to what has been declared surplus m aterial."  (34)
There is only so much that President Marcos can do in endeavouring to prise 
more aid out of the United States, as he himself does not wish to provoke 
too great an anti-Am erican reaction as this would both discourage American 
investment and annoy the Philippine military establishment. Besides w hich, 
as one who has in the past been accused of being anti-American by the 
Liberal Party, he does not wish to be stereotyped as such, when he and 
his country are still in a position of considerable dependence on the 
United States.
Besides being tied m ilitarily to the United States, the Philippines 
is also attached (although more loosely) econom ically. This chiefly  
through the terms of the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1956. (35)
(33) Australian Financial Review, 13 A pril, 1973
Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. 2 , N o . 12, April 1973. p. 1772 B.
(34) Australian Financial Review, 13 A p ril, 1973
(35) The Laurel-Langley Agreement gave the Philippines unfettered control of its 
currency; the 'parity rights' clause of a 1946 Act (which had contained provisions 
granting parity rights to Americans in the exploitation of Philippine natural 
resources) was made reciprocal; tariff preferences for U .S . goods entering the 
Philippines were increased; and it was agreed that customs duties were to be 
applied gradually over the period 1956 - 1974.
(49)
Since that date the American share of Philippine total trade, although
d eclin ing, has remained high - however, whereas the Philippines used
to be dependent on the United States to take 7 0 %  of its exports, some* ' 
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frwonfylyoars ago, this market now-aeGoun4< for only just over 3 0 % .  
Sim ilarly with imports, Japan has flew become the Philippines' main 
supplier, only some 3 0 %  of its needs being imported from Am erica. The 
Laurel-Langley Agreement was o ffic ia lly  terminated on 3 Ju ly , 1974, and 
the situation is f»ow open for another agreement to be concluded.
It is interesting to note that even before the Nixon Doctrine,
President Marcos was already envisaging a Nixon Doctrine type situation.
As early as November 1968, in an address to the M anila Overseas Press
C lub , Marcos pointed out that:-
"The possible shift of American intentions from Asia to Europe and the
Middle East acquired a sudden new force when, recently, the logic of
Asian self-reliance was voiced in recent statements of the newly elected
U .S .  President." (36)
Rather like D r. Khoman in Thailand, refuge was taken in the concept of an
'Asian community'. Despite assurances by M r. Agnew and others that the
United States would live up to its commitments to its Asian a llie s , (37)
it is clear that the Philippines was not convinced. Nor was it particularly
flattered when Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the U .S . Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, commented that the participation of the Philippines
in the Vietnam War - which was at most little more than a gesture -  was
the work of mercenaries. Hence, when Foreign M inister, Carlos Romulo,
assumed office in January 1969, he claimed that:-
"Events are beginning to show the diminishing value of reliance on 
one's 'friends', and as a corollary, the growing need to be self-reliant 
even in such matters as security and military preparedness. It w ill be 
increasingly d ifficult to justify the continuing presence of military bases 
and military assistance programs and mutual defense arrangements when 
these are found to be inflexible in the face of changing needs«,«,„It may 
then be found necessary to shorten the life of these agreements^ or do 
away with them as expeditiously as we can set up the adjustments made 
necessary by their termination". (38)
(5°)
(36) Rc Abell -  O p . C it .  -  p . 374
(37) New York Times, 1st Januaryv 1970
(38) R. Abell -  O p . C it .  -  pp. 375/6.
and how quickly can they be realized ?  Steps have been taken by the
Marcos . . . . . .  r . .
eu front Administration to widen the range of options that are open to
the Philippines. Exports to European socialist countries have been 
authorized, gestures have been made towards Peking, and President 
Marcos even went so far as to suggest that if the United States withdrew 
from A sia , the Soviet Union 'might replace the United States as the 
counterfoil to communist C h in a1. (39) G iven such moves and suggestions -  
although the latter could merely have been a covert threat to the United 
States rather than litera lly  intended -  it is little wonder that U .S .
Secretary of State, W illiam  Rogers, in his annual Foreign Policy Message 
to Congress in 1973, admitted that the Philippines had been moving away 
from its former special relationship with the United States and was streng­
thening other bilateral and multilateral ties. At the same time, he said, 
the United States would continue to contribute to the Philippines' develop­
ment and security proqrammes. (40 )
~arssee.n at“ the cíese, cf l97+~
There is little chance in the immQdiqte- fajare that the Philippines
w ill totally reject its relationship with the United States, as President Marcos 
would appear to threaten from time to time. Although the Philippines is 
becoming increasingly independent in attitude, it is s t ill, like Thailand, 
a member of SEAT Of and it w ill take some years yet before its relations 
with Moscow and Peking are established on a satisfactory basis. Until 
such time the Philippines has to keep an eye on security, and although the 
U .S .  Ambassador in M anila , W illiam  Sullivan, has pointed out that 
American a llies must bear the sole responsibility on the ground and that 
this w ill not involve the commitment of American ground forces, it was also 
made clear that the nuclear shield and naval and air support would continue 
to be provided. (41) Furthermore, American forces would be loath to 
withdraw from their bases in the Philippines, as the latter are of vital 
interest to the United States which has given no indication that it wishes 
to withdraw from the Western P acific , as distinct from the mainland of
(51)
The problem is the adjustments that are made necessary -  what are they
(39) M anila Bulletin, 29 Ju ly , 1969
(4 0 ) Australian Financial Review, 21 A pril, 1973
(41) Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 0  M ay, 1974
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Southeast A sia . A continued presence which, at fVio moment, would appear
to be welcomed by most administrations, excluding those in Hanoi and 
\ *■ Pyongyang.
3 . The United States has experienced severe fluctucations in its relations 
with Indonesia. It has varied from editorials in the New York 
Herald-Tribune referring to the Indonesian President Sukarno, as that 
‘pipsqueak Caesar of the Pacific' (42), to a situation where relations 
with Indonesia can be taken as epitomizing the new kind of relationship  
that Washington hopes to develop with Asian states. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that Indonesia may have demonstrated to a significant extent a 
prototype of this new relationship even before the Guam pronouncement which 
heralded the Nixon Doctrine. (43)
The stabilization of Indonesian-American relations occurred due 
to the dramatic change in the Indonesian political climate after the 
elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with the failure of 
the 1965 Coup attempt. Washington became a strong supporter of General 
Suharto and with relatively little hesitation, the United States, along with 
several European countries and Japan, undertook the backing of Suharto's 
Indonesia by first agreeing to a postponement of the repayment of long­
standing and substantial debts incurred by Sukarno's 'O ld  O rder', and then 
by formally constituting the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (1GG1).
By 1967 this group granted some $ 2 0 0  million to Indonesia -  with the 
United States and Japan supplying approximately one-third of the amount 
each c By 1969 the figure had risen to $ 5 0 0  million«, The United States 
also provided some unpublicized military aid and a m ilitary training programme 
which touched all branches of Indonesia's sprawling armed forces. (44)
In 1966, President Johnson had resumed American economic aid to Indonesia.
The development of world events was to cause anxiety amongst 
the guardians of Indonesia's 'New Order' -  even before the Nixon Doctr ine, 
President Suharto was displaying anxiety:-
(42) The N ation, 7 November, 1963
(43) Indonesia's Future and Southeast A sia , P. Polomka. Adelphi Paper, No 104 . 
p. 17.
(44) Japan Times, II A p ril, 1967.
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"The encouraging situation in Indonesia -  stability in politics, 
economics and the military - is ironic now that the American 
people are tending to withdraw their assistance. It is unfortunate 
that now Indonesia has the opportunities-to to grow and the American
people want to decrease their overseas aid,," (45)
in the e a r ly  seventies
Such comments became sharper in rocoftfc years wit
changes in American foreign economic policies and attempts by the U .S .
Congress to curtail foreign aid* However, such dissent is carefully
controlled and there is acute awareness in Government circles of Indonesia's
continuing economic needs. The American Administration^ awareness of
these needs is heightened by the fact that -  according to U CS . Secretary
of State,, W illiam  Rogers -  'with half the population and more than 4 0 %
of the territory of Southeast A sia , Indonesia's success or failure w ill be a
potent factor in the future of the entire region'. Hence it was suggested
in M r. Roger's annual Foreign Policy Message to Congress -
"In view of Indonesia's s ize , strategic importance and constructive 
leadership within the region, it is very much in the U .S . interest 
that we join Japan, Australia and the Western European countries 
in continuing efforts to provide assistance for Indonesia's long-term 
development." (46)
And indeed the United States has continued to be a prime aid giver through
the Inter-Governmental Group -  which provided some $ 7 6 0 . million in
1973 -  and also through bilateral m ilitary a id , the programme of which
includes the handing over of an U .S . destroyer to the Indonesian N avy ,
the provision of twenty-one Dakota aircraft, twelve helicopters and a
squadron of T-33 jet trainers - in all amounting to some $18. m illion. (47)
Although there have been protests from students and others about
the degree to which Indonesia is in the U .S . economic orbit, President
Suharto has made his position on this matter c lea r:-
"For the moment, there are only two alternatives to exploit Indonesia's 
natural w ealth. We can keep it idle u n t i l . . .  Indonesians, have 
enough cap ita l, skill and technogoly to exploit it , or we can be aware 
of (Indonesian) shortcomings and cooperate with other people who are 
capable on the basis of mutual profit. For me. .  . the second alternative
_______________is c learly  preferable . " (48)._____________________________________________________________
(45) New York Times, 23 Ju ly , 1969
(46) Australian Financial Review, 21 A p ril, 1973
(47) Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 Ju ly , 1973. Indonesian Newsletter, 14 M ay, 1973 ) 
 ! ------------------------------ i—  19/73)
(48) 'Indonesia's Response to Changing Big Power Alignments', R. Horn. Pacific  
Affairs, Vol 46, N o . 4 , Winter 1973-4. p. 5 2 0 .  Citing Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 4th November, 1972.
American multi-national corporations accepted the offer and ae£92w  
scouring Indonesia for natural resources. These include the exploitation
of bauxite, oil and a $ 1 , 0 0 0 .  million investment in a Iiquid-natural-gas
plant. Indeed the latter has been predicted to have enough potential to
become Indonesia's most important export commodity to the United States,
from 1977. (49)
P o litically  Indonesia has attempted to articulate a more independent 
line in foreign policy than many another Asian state. Even after the under­
mining of President Sukarno in 1965, Indonesia spoke out against the American  
bombings in Vietnam; w hilst. President Suharto was in later years to 
critic ize  American activ ity  in Cambodia. (5 0 ) Furthermore, apart from 
the grants of a id , Indonesia kept clear of any formal political or military 
links with the United States. Concerning the continued U .S . m ilitary 
presence in A sia , Indonesia has been cautious -  one might even say ambiguous -  
in its position. Foreign Minister Adam M alik , told Vice-President Spiro 
Agnew, that Indonesia would accept a continued American presence in 
Thailand and the Philippines, but only on a stricfly temporary basis.
He said that the presence of foreign military bases in Southeast Asian 
countries would only increase those countries* dependency on foreign powers, 
and more important, would invite other powers to move in to influence the 
balance of power in the region. It is also true that President Suharto told 
a luncheon meeting of the National Press Club in Washington that major 
world powers should keep their troops out of Asia and permit the countries 
of the region to solve their own problems without outside Interference 
At the same time he said that steps must be taken to prevent other foreign 
troops from replacing the withdrawing American forces, and that aid to 
Asia in the future must take the form of economic assistance granted without 
political conditions. (51) As is the case with many other Southeast 
statesmen, it is clear that Indonesian leaders are worried about the consequences
(49) Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 Ju ly , 1973 
Australian Financial Review,, 27 June, 1974
(5 0 ) Indonesian Herald, 9 February, 1966; 7 February, 1966 
Straits Times, 28 M ay, 1970
(51) Djakarta Times, 29 M ay, 1970 - for President Suharto.
Indonesian Newsletter, 29 January, 1973. 4/73 K  Ada.-r, M alik's position. 
Straits Times, IO  February, 1973 )
(54).
of an over-hasty American withdrawal from their region, yet they fear
that to protest too loudly about the latter may only serve to align them
with a force whose presence, strength and interest may be diminishing.
This attitude was reflected in Indonesian embarrassment over public appeals
by Lee Kuan Yew - Prime Minister of Singapore -  for a continuation of the
U .S . m ilitary presence in Southeast A sia , which he made in Bangkok early
in 1973; as one high-ranking Indonesian official was reported as commenting,
'We may agree with him but it does not help to shout about it . That only
b y  ¡974- voqs
alarms the other side1. (52) W hile Indonesia is now making cautious 
gestures to the 'other side1 there is little doubt that there is still a large 
obstacle of mistrust to be surmounted before it w ill feel free to dismiss the 
American presence com pletely.
4 . Both Singapore and M alaysia have a heritage of closer relations with 
the United Kingdom than the United States. Under the Five Power 
Agreement,which came into force on 31 October, 1971, a collection of 
British, Australian and New Zealand forces were stationed in M alaysia and 
Singapore, although events were to prove correct the reluctance shown by 
the Asian participants to rely on this force for their security. A couple of 
years was to see the announcement of an Australian withdrawal and an 
agreement being reached by New Zealand and the United Kingdom to 
establish separate military forces in Singapore to replace the A N Z U K  
presence« W hile Malaysian spokesmen tended to emphasize that they 
considered multilateral defence arrangements in the region as merely 
'short-term expedients', the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Y ew , was 
to tell British leaders that the Five-Power force had only token value, and 
was 'irrelevant' to the real security of the area. According to Lee Kuan Y ew , 
what was essential was to keep the U .S . bomber force in Thailand and the 
Seventh Fleet in the Far East, after the Vietnam w ar. (53)
Such public expressions of dependence for security on the United 
States presence is a phenomenon that would appear to have been wrought 
by force of circumstances rather than by ideological conviction„ Indeed 
when Lee Kuan Yew assumed power in Singapore he proved himself to be
(55)
(52) Re Horn -  O p . C it„  - p . 5 2 0
(53) The A ge, 15 December, 1972
anything but a malleable personality, or one that could be accused 
of acting as an American 'puppet1. Not only did he support ca lls for 
an end of the bombing of Vietnam , but he accused President Johnson of 
too much interference in the Southeast Asian region and successfully 
embarrassed both the President and the United States State Department, 
by publicizing a bribery bid over uncovered C . I . A .  activ ities in Singapore 
in the early sixties„ (54) However, by 1967 Lee Kuan Yew  made it clear 
that Singapore would not reject American protection, making the point 
that Singapore was even then being defended by the United States as the 
latter was fighting in V ietnam . (55) Within the next half decade or so 
this conviction became stronger, despite Singapore's nominal support for 
the A SEA N  proposal of 1971 -  declaring the region a 'zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality '.
With the advent of the Nixon Doctrine, Lee Kuan Yew  indulged 
in some 'crystal-gazing' -  suggesting that Japan might play a greater role 
in the region in future years. Despite this, it was made clear that the 
continuation of American activ ity was preferable. G iv ing  an University 
Address in Bethleham, Pennsylvania, Lee Kuan Yew declared that 'the 
security and stability of the region, without which development cannot take 
p lace , can , for the time being, be provided only by an U .S .  presence1. (56)
Arguing that the withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia is 
an act of selfdemotion that w ill not only reduce the United States from a 
global to a regional power, but w ill also create difficulties for non-communist 
Southeast Asian countries, the Singaporean Foreign M inister, Mr .Rajaratnam, 
urged that America should remain in Asia as at least an economic power.
He claimed that even if the United States withdrew as a power in the region, 
three other contenders -  C h in a , Japan and the Soviet Union -  neither could 
nor would, as they were geographically a part of A s ia . This suggestion of 
the inevitable involvement of certain Great Powers in the region led to the
(54) The Australian, 13 August, 1965
Straits Times, 2 September, 1965; 3 September, 1965
(55) Straits Times, 3 0  June, 1967
(56) Straits Times, 3 0  October, 1970 
The A ge, 5 A p ril, 1973
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Singaporean interpretation of neutralization -  that the best of 'neutralizing1 
Southeast Asia and adjacent waters is to draw outside powers into a mutual 
balance and not to try to exclude their military presence altogether. Thus 
working on the premise that counterbalancing force w ill result in the 
maintenance of a certain degree of equilibrium. (57) On this basis -  
besides the economic considerations -  Singapore is welcoming destroyers, 
frigates and supply ships of the U .S . Seventh Fleet into its harbour, while 
the Fleet is finding Singapore a 'convenient centre1 for docking and 
maintenance. (58)
G iven  the extreme sensitivity in Singaporean relations with 
Peking -  despite Lee Kuan Yew 's claims that if there were favourable 
Chinese developments, Southeast Asian nations would be delighted to see 
their large neighbour participate in the economic and political life of 
Southeast Asia -  the former has proved itself capable of at least theoretically  
extending its options through imaginative alternatives. This is demanded 
by circumstances, according to Lee Kuan Yew :-
"It's as if a long freeze suddenly thawed and the ice crack e d . . .  We've 
got to live with these changes which flow from the breaking of the ic e . 
New balances must be found." (59)
On the assumption that the pragmatic Prime Minister does not envisage 
regional balances without the intervention of a couple of major powers, 
he would appear, as a result, to favour the intervention of at least the three 
G reat Powers; nor would it seem likely that this would be disputed by the 
economic interests in Singaporean society.
5 . M alaysia, on the other hand, has continued to espouse the more
orthodox interpretation of the neutralization of the region. Even 
before the adoption of the proposal by A SEA N , the then Prime Minister of 
M alaysia, Tengku Abdul Rahman, told the visiting U .S .  V ice-President, 
Spiro Agnew, that while it was most reassuring to know that the United 
States had the w ill and the capacity to defend the region, that all M alaysia  
asked was that it be left alone to pursue a policy of peace and prosperity 
at home, and the promotion of goodwill, understanding and friendship with
(57) Straits Times,  29 August, 1973. National Times, 23 - 28 Ju ly , 1973
(58) Straits Times, 25 September, 1972
(59) Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 Ju ly , 1974
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its neighbours and other countries. (6 0 ) In earlier years, however, guided 
by the same anti-communist Prime M inister, M alaysia v/as one of the few 
countries in the entire region to have come out in open support of the United 
States in the Vietnam w ar. Despite this, along with Indonesia and Singapore, 
it refused to allow itself to become a member of such organizations as S EA T O .
Relations between M alaysia and the United States have been low- 
keyed since the formation of the former. In itia lly  it was Britain that played 
the major reo le , and by the time that it began to cut back on its 'East of 
Suez1 commitments, M alaysia was committed to the neutralization of the 
region. It is true that in the mid-sixties the United States provided loans 
to enable M alaysia to buy American military equipment, and it was also a 
member of the 'Aid M alaysia Club' which sought to fund development 
projects, (61) but by 1970, the Malaysian Deputy Prime M inister, Tun Ism ail, 
addressing the American Council on Foreign Relations, was suggesting that 
relations between the two countries ‘could have been more mutually meaningful1,  
and that the United States could manifest more concretely its 'willingness to 
help us econom ically to build a stronger, more prosperous country and a more 
viable Southeast Asian balance'. It was made p la in , however, that M alaysia  
did not ask the United States *to fight for us'* (62)
This low-keyed relationship suits both the United Stales and 
M alaysia, according to U .S ., Secretary of State, Mr«, Rogers, in his annual 
Foreign Policy Message to Congress:-
" M alaysia's non-aligned foreign p o licy , its role in A sia , its self-reliant 
drive to develop its economy while combating two communist insurgency 
movements, and its participation in the five-power defence arrangement 
are consonant with the Nixon Doctrine and form a solid basis for U .S . -  
M alaysian friendship". (63)
W hile America may consider the Malaysians under their energetic Prime
Minister a little  over daring in making foreign policy advances; M alaysia,
working as it is for the neutralization of the region, realizes the necessity
to maintain diplomatic relations with all three of the G reat Powers, and at
the same time is calling on Japan to 'abandon its low posture foreign p o licy1.
(6Q) Straits Times, 9 January, 1970
(61) The A ge, 8 M arch, 1965
(62) Straits Times, 29 October, 1970
(63) Canberra Times, 21 A p ril, 1973
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TH OUGH TS ABOUT THE FIRST ELEPH ANT:
From this brief glance at bilateral relations between the United 
States and Southeast Asian countries, it can be seen that the Nixon Doctrine 
has in fact made its mark - not only from the point of view of American 
actions rooted in the Doctrine, but even more due to Southeast Asian 
reactions to their perceptions of the American role in their region in the 
future. The emphasis has been shifted from military to economic a id , and 
to -  at least verbal -  se lf-su fficiency . _ af. ^  c(ose ^  m
Despite the latter, however, American forces are still present/in 
considerable numbers on mainland Southeast Asia (Thailand), there are 
American bases on the Philippines, and virtually a rim of bases and/or 
installations are located in Japan, Guam , Australia and in the Indian O cean .
It is clear that the Philippines is a link in this chain , while the giant naval 
base that the United States built at Sattahip, in the G u lf of Thailand, w ill 
have a role to play in any future Indian Ocean moves. Such moves have 
already taken place in behind-the-scenes manoeuvring which has ringed 
the Indian Ocean with American naval a llies -  Iran, Pakistan, Thailand 
and A ustralia. Furthermore, Washington is processing information from 
a secret South African ship-tracking station. Although many littoral 
states -  India, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), M alaysia, Indonesia, Australia and 
New Zealand -  have proposed that the big powers should minimize their 
presence in the Indian Ocean and create a 'zone of peace'; the United 
States has tended to discount such demands -  Admiral Elmo Zum walt, C h ief  
of U .S .  Naval Operations, terming the 'zone' proposal as a 'very dangerous 
concept1. Despite an U .S . Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the 
Soviet Union's Indian Ocean strength, which concluded that the Soviets 
would like to limit their presence in the area, but fear U .S . naval in itiatives, 
much American reaction to regional protests is that it is simply 'posturing', 
and that most of the countries of the area would welcome a greater military 
presence. Although there is a certain amount of truth in this c la im , it 
is unlikely that the countries of the area want an arms race between America 
and the Soviet Union on their door step; particularly now that the nuclear 
balance with the Soviet Union is primarily operated by missile carrying sub­
marines. It is likely that a more limited subdued presence would be the most
welcom e, and failing that, a neutral zone. (64)
A continued American presence in the Western Pacific -  and there
are even negotiations for a new base on Tinian in the latter - together with
the build-up in the Indian Ocean area, may mark a shift in emphasis from
a territorial to a maritime m ilitary strategy, the latter being able to provide
the promised nuclear 'shield1. Indeed, America's Southeast Asian naval
bases would appear at present to be less vulnerable than the continued
presence of troops in the region, and moreover, less subject to domestic
criticism  in the United States. However, the chances are still there that
the stability of the new American alliance system in the Indian O cean ,
with its older rim of Western Pacific bases, may yet meet revolutionary
challenges coming from the land. How such challenges w ill be met is
Ah Hie close <>f 1974 
a question for the future. At present American efforts to maintain a
favourable internal situation in the countries of the region would appear
to take the dual format of aid-giving and the encouragement of a regionalism
that would preferably be linked in some way to the United States.
The United States has provided economic assistance at various times 
to all nine non-Communist nations in Southeast A sia . As can be seen from 
the accounts above amounts have varied considerably, with countries such 
as Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos receiving substantial aid; other 
nations such as M alaysia and Singapore receiving rather modest quantities; 
whilst Burma has not received any American economic aid for almost a decade. 
Significant changes can be traced in rec ent yeare in the official administration 
of such a id , including the separation of economic assistance programmes 
managed by AID (Agency for International Development) and military 
assistance programmes, managed by the Dept, of Defence, the increasing 
use of multilateral assistance through the United Nations and the regional 
monetary institution, the Asian Development Bank, and the creation in 1971 
of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Yet in spite of these reforms 
a large portion of American economic aid in Southeast Asia is $44U administered 
on a bilateral basis for essentially m ilitary-related purposes. (65)
(6 0 )
(64) Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 M ay, 1974
(65) F .  Darling -  O p . C it .  - pp. 617/8
The reluctance of the U „S . Congress, however, to grant such aid in large 
quantities may yet undermine the use of this tool by the American 
Administration.
The encouragement of regionalism in Southeast Asia may be 
attributed to two main aims -  the expectation that regional cooperation can 
aid economic development, and that it w ill speed the development of a power 
centre, preferably including Japanese participation, which w ill be able to 
withstand Communist influence. Both of these aspects -  economic and 
political -  are interconnected, as it is hoped that the development and 
stability that regional cooperation may foster w ill also make Asian states 
less susceptible to subversion and able to bear more of their own defence 
costs.
As early as 1965, President Johnson announced a $1. billion  
programme to encourage regional development in Southeast A s ia .
Furthermore, the Administration included in the Foreign Assistance A ct  
of 1967 a specific provision authorizing expenditure in support of this 
goal. (66) American support was given the Asian Development Bank -  as 
mentioned above -  and also to indigenous in itiatives, such as A S E A N „
Richard Nixon was long an outspoken supporter of regional security 
cooperation claiming that an a ll-A sian  multilateral appeal to U .S .  
assistance would be the most desirable way in the future to 'ensure that 
a U .S .  response w ill be forthcoming if n e e d e d ...*  -  even if this was at the 
time envisaged 1 as a counterforce to the designs of C h in a1. (67) This 
concept was later to be included in the Nixon Doctrone -  but there not 
couched specifica lly  in terms of the containment of C h in a .
Despite the ambiguities of the Nixon Doctrine, the continued 
activ ities of the C . l  .A # in mainland Southeast Asia and American actions 
in Laos and Cambodia, it seems clear tbat from the adoption of regionalism  
and economic aid as the two preferred tools, that there is an American 
desire to reduce their Southeast Asian commitments. Such commitments have 
proved to be injurious to the United States not only abroad but at home as 
w e ll. However, even given this desire there is continued adherence to
(66) Toward Disengagement In A sia , B .K . Gordon, (Prenti ce -H a ll, 1969),pp 60/1
(67) ‘Asia After Vietnam ', R. N ixon. Foreign Affairs, V o l. 46 , N o . I .
October, 1967. p. 124.
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President Johnson's dictum, that 'No single nation can or should be 
permitted to dominate the Pacific Region'. (68) It may be claimed by 
some that this dictum is based on the old 'dog in the manger' principle -  
'if we can't then nobody else can' -  but this may be unfair to the United 
States. If the United States was content with a situation in which Southeast 
Asia was free from dominance by any one power, then It is more than like ly  
that some variety of neutrality for the region would be supported, if it was 
convinced that it would be effective and was capable of being maintained. 
There is obviously some confusion however, amongst American officia ls  
whether such a situation is possible -  nor is this helped by the confusion 
existing among Southeast Asian leaders and statesmen themselves about what 
they mean when they speak about the neutralization of their region. (69) 
Much ye* depends on the outcome of the Indo Chinese conflict and upon the 
success of the American switch from a territorial to a naval based strategy; 
however, even given such variables it is clear that the states of Southeast 
Asia are preparing themselves to confront a new situation -  one with a 
reduced American presence and commitment -  and that having taken this 
step, they w ill not be content to return to an era of American dominance. 
W hile many of them w ill be happy to have America continuing to patrol 
the area outside their region, and w ill be happy to continue accepting a id , 
they would prefer not to invite the intervention and subversion of other 
G reat Powers by having a closer relationship with the United States, It is 
this that leads them to emphasize the fact that the American m ilitary presence 
cannot be a permanent feature in their region.
(¿2)
(68) Dept, of State Bulletin, 28 November, 1966. pp. 812/6
(69) Confusion between Malaysian and Singaporean interpretations of 
neutral iza tio n .
Indonesian Newsletter, 6 J u ly , 1972. 24/72 ) For American an itudes. 
Straits Times, I J u ly , 1972 )
CHAPTER FOUR :
THE S EC O N D  ELEPHANT -  C H IN A
The Chinese world view can be seen as being cast in the mould 
of one of Mao Tse-tung's observations on revolutionary tactics -  that laid down 
for when the enemy is over-extended, the territory being subdivided into three 
zones: 'our base area, his base area and an intermediate region'. This, in turn 
can be translated to fit the international context:-
(a) Chinese base area -  the Third World;
(b) Second Intermediate Zone -  the Developed countries such as Japan and 
European countries.
(c) Enemy base area -  the two Super Powers, U .S .A  and U .S .S .R .
Concerning the two Super-powers there is little one need add except perhaps to 
emphasize Chinese dislike at being classed in this category. The Second Inter­
mediate Zone is an interesting distinction. It consists of developed countries 
whether formerly belonging to the socialist or capitalist camps, and its function 
is to counterbalance the two Super Powers. The Third W orld, to which China  
belongs, consists of the developing countries of A sia , A frica and Latin A m erica. 
This may be seen as the Chinese base zone and Chinese influence and interests 
must, therefore, be carefully fostered.
On a more dynamic level the basic internal conflict between the 
two Super Powers is pointed out. Not only is there a contradiction between the 
Super Powers, but they have created their own antithesis in the opposition of those 
peoples that they have suppressed. This is ch iefly the Third W orld, but also 
applies to those countries of the Second Intermediate Zone; while the latterfs 
opposition may not be shown by outright revolution it can fake the form of a 
smouldering resentment. There has been an increase in the emphasis placed on the 
Second Intermediate Zone of 'small and medium sized 1 countries, who 'having 
enlarged their union and co-ordinated their common stand, unfolded a tit-for-tat
(64)
struggle in various fields against the super-powers, hegemonism and power 
p o litics '. (I) The members of the European Economic Community fall into 
this category and the expansion of the latter was greeted with ¡oy in Peking. (2) 
Between the powers of the Second Intermediate Zone and the Third 
World there is the basic antagonism of economic inequality and 'exploitation1.
At the same time in order to secure their victory it is 'possible and even compulsory1 
for the A sian , African and Latin American epoples to unite with the developed 
countries (in many cases their former colonisers) to establish 'the broadest possible 
united front* against the 'common enemies of the Third World' -  the U .S .A .  and 
the U .S .S .R .  (3) It is the Third World however, that holds the key to the 
future, and it is to this zone that China belongs:-
"China is still an econom ically backward country as well as a developing 
country. Like the overwhelming majority of the A sian , African and Latin 
American countries, China belongs to the Third W orld". (4)
Rather resembling an onion in many ways, Chinese doctrine tends 
to disclose further theories and explanations as each layer is peeled off. Three 
such theories worth mentioning to add to our dynamic model are:-  
(i) The irreconcilable contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoise 
in capitalist and revisionist countries ( i .e .  between any discontented and disruptive 
forces and the 'establishment' in developed countries, including Eastern Europe 
and the U .S .S .R .)  (5)
(IS) Between socialist countries, on the one hand, and social-im perial ism, on the 
other ( i .e .  between C h ina, Korea, Vietnam , Albania and possibly Rumania, on 
the one side and the U .S .S .R . ,  on the other).
(1) Peking Review, 4 January, 1974
(2) New York Tim es, 7 January, 1973. Cited a headline from the Chinese Communist 
Party newspaper -  "Western European countries strengthen their alignment to 
counterbalance the two superpowers".
(3) 'Peking's Revolutionary Diplomatic L in e ', W . A d ie . Pacific Community, V o l. 4
N o . 3 , April 1973. p. 359 ~
(4) Irrestible Historical Trends, Speech by Chiao Kuan-Hua at the 26th Session of 
U .N .  General Assembly, 15 November, 1971. (Foreign Language Press, Peking, 
1971) p. 12.
(5) Adie -  Op. C if . - p. 359.
(ii¡) In a world divided info the 'powerful-becoming-weaker' and the 'weaker- 
becoming-stronger1. Not even power being static . (6)
So stands the world in Chinese eyes, a perspective not merely shaped 
by its perception of current international rea lity , but also as a result of its 
past experiences with its fellow powers, and filtered through the medium of 
its particular interpretation of M arxist-Leninist theory.
O f China itself, however, some more. According to one writer 
on the subject - C .P .  F itzG era ld  -  the Chinese world view has been adapted to 
international developments, rather than undergoing fundamental change. 
Confucian teaching, which was found inadequate, was replaced by a doctrine 
which a substantial section of the Western world had repudiated. Nor was 
the latter left in its received form, but was remoulded by Mao Tse-tung to 
become ‘purer1 than that which was accepted in the U .S .S .R .  Despite these 
changes the central continuity of China's continued importance on the world 
stage remains; with China now becoming -  in its own eyes at any rate -  the 
‘centre of world revolution1 after the failure of the Soviet Union to occupy 
this role in a satisfactory manner.
To justify its occupation of this position the vital factor is seen 
as the maintenance of internal ideological purity. Hence the meaning of 
Chinese communist statements such as ‘Foreign policy is the continuation of 
domestic p o licy1. (7) If the latter falls into the trap of revisionism then the 
former w ill follow accordingly. If , on the other hand, the domestic ideology 
is above reproach then foreign policy may be adapted without fear to fit the 
needs of the situation; for the centre has not only to be pure, but must also 
be strong and secure. Thus it is, that ideologically cleansed by the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1969), the Chinese people can now afford to go so far as to 
flirt with an imperialist Super Power, not to mention its ‘lackeys’ . The 
reasons for such a flirtation are basically national interests -  the fear of threats 
to national survival - although it may be argued that such national interests 
are internationalized by China's adopted role as the centre of world revolution; 
that its continued security is of more than national importance.
(6) ‘The strategies of Peking', M . Oksenberg. Foreign A ffairs, V o l. 5 0 .  N o . I, 
October 1971. p. 26.
(7) 'China's Place in Nixon's New World Order', D . Armstrong. Work-in-Progress
Paper, Dept, of International Relations, A . N . U . ,  6 September, 1973.
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China's relations with Southeast A sia , over which it looms large 
both geographically and h istorically , date back some two thousand years.
In these relations China has a heritage of subtle power and influence, if not 
control. As Sir Richard A llen -  a former British Ambassador to Burma -  wrote 
from an obviously not totally unbiased point of v iew :-
"The Chinese, even as communists, are far more subtle, devious and 
intelligent in their procedures than the Russians, as befits the heirs of 
the greatest civ ilization  of the O rient". (8) It is this very subtlety 
that has troubled the minds of many Southeast Asian political leaders.
W hilst on ideological grounds there is a fear that China may consider that the 
'inevitable' could well use a little  contemporary assistance. However, although 
the Cultural Revolution shattered many of the links built up by the careful 
diplomacy of the then Foreign M inister, Chen Y i ,  the Chinese approach to 
Southeast A sia , since 1969, would appear to have been modified, but despite 
this the legacies of previous policies have proved to be d ifficult to shake off.
I .  The changing Chinese foreign policy is well illustrated by Sino-Burmese 
relations -  the latter a strictly neutralist state bordering on C h in a , whose 
position was well summed up by the former Burmese Premier, U N u , as a 
'tender gourd among cactus1. Burma*s historic concern for tension-free 
relations with C h ina, particularly in view of the volnerability of the over 
1 ,3 5 0  mile long border, caused it to seek good relations with China in 
spite of the persistence of ethnic and communist rebellions in 
Burma, including those whose leaders had links with Peking. In I9 6 0  a 
boundary settlement was agreed to and a friendship and mutual non-aggression 
treaty was signed, with these negotiations being followed up by an aid 
agreement. By mid-1967, however, cordial relations had fallen victim  
to the fury of Cultural R volution passions with denunciations and riot’s occurring 
in both countries. Full diplomatic relations were not restored until November,
1970 (9); these being underlined in August 1971 when Ne Win -  the Burmese 
Premier -  visited China at Chou En -la i's  invitation. Peking also agreed to 
resume economic aid to Burma, laying down that the aid was to be used to
expand trade between the two nations 'by all possible means'.
(8) The Task of Western Diplomacy in Southeast A sia , Sir R. A llen (Center forthe study 
of U .S . Foreign Policy, Paper 3 . Dept, of Political Sc ien ce . U n iv . of C incinnati, 
1964) p. 16.
(9) Times of India, 23 November, 1970
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CHINA AND THE R EG IO N :
Prior to the reopening of diplomatic relations a sizeable number of 
border clashes occurred along the Sino-Burmese border. (IO) Despite the 
fact that a direct Chinese threat along the border area would appear to have 
diminished significantly, the inter-connection of the Chinese and Burmese 
insurgents is still open to question. Although the early seventies saw a 
considerable improvement in Sino-Burmese relations, the Chinese Government 
did not cease all support for anti-government forces in Burma. In A p ril, 1971, 
the Burmese Communist 'Voice of the People of Burma1 began to broadcast with 
Chinese support. It has, however, been suggested that by giving the CPB 
(Communist Party of Burma) its own radio outlet, Chinese leaders can now 
avoid having to identify with Burmese Communist propaganda attacks on the 
Government of Burma that were formerly carried over Radio Peking. (II)
Sino-Burmese relations reflect the Janus-like approach that China  
has been accused of following with many Southeast Asian countries -  fostering 
friendly relations with the government in power, while providing financial 
and propaganda aid for insurgents. With regard to Burma, on the one hand 
trade showed signs of flourishing, with imports from China rising from Kyats 
57 .4  million in 1970-71 to Kyats 7 8 .8  million in 1972-73. Exports to China 
stood at only Kyats 3 .4  million in 1970-71, but Jumped to Kyats 5 6 .7  million 
in 1972-73. (12) On the other hand, however, the 'Peking Review ', of 
23 August, 1974, printed greetings on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the 
founding of the Communist Party of Burma.
It is difficult to ascertain precisely how accurate a reflection are
the statements by the Burmese Communist Party of prevailing Peking attitudes.
On the occasion of Tun Razak's visit to Burma in February 1972, the ‘Voice
of the People of Burma' declared :-
"Razak said he came to discuss the neutralization of Southeast Asia with 
Ne W in . Ne Win and Razak got together to cover up their imperialist 
running dog nature with words such as 'noninterference and 'Justice'. ..N oth ing  
w ill result from the Ne W in-Razak talks except the neutralization plot to 
destroy the liberation movements of the Southeast Asian peoples1. (13)
(10) Times of India, 8 November, 1969
(11) China and Southeast Asia -  The Politics of Survival,  M .G u rto v . (Studies in 
International Development & Economics, Heath Lexington Books, 1971) .p . 153 n .
(12) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974
(13) SWB. 25 February, 1972. 'Voice of the People of Burma', 1 2 .0 0  G M T .,  
20/2/72, FE/39 24/A 3/I.
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This outlook has also been reflected by other Southeast A sian, Peking- 
oriented, Communist Parties, but not by Peking itself.
(68)
2 . Although four of the five A SEA N  countries have not yet established
gene.t'-arl
formal diplomatic relations with C h in a , the prevailing, attitude would 
appear to be that it is only a matter of time. (14) It did not go unnoticed 
that when Chou En -la i spoke at the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in August 1973, he talked in general terms about the just struggle of the 
Third W orld, with Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia alone receiving specific  
mention. (15) Hence, the 'ping-pong1 diplomacy proceeds apace, in many 
cases being consolidated by trade links. (16)
M alaysia was the first A SEA N  member to establish diplomatic 
relations with C h in a , causing the editor of the 'Straits Times' to w rite :-  
"One step by M alaysia's Prime M inister, one long stride towards 
M alaysia's goal of a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast A s ia '. (17) 
This step was for M alaysia a logical realization of declared foreign po licy , 
which pointed out the necessity for Malaysia to have diplomatic relations 
with C h in a , the United States and the Soviet Union, among others. (18) 
Sino-M al aysian relations have followed the same tortuous route 
and have entailed the same ambiguities as experienced by many another. 
There was a long history of Chinese support for both internal and external 
opposition to the Malaysian state to be overcome; however, immense changes 
have taken place since the People's Republic of China was billed as public 
enemy N o . I by Tun Razak himself. (19) Two contradictory views were to 
persist:-
(14) Speech by President Marcos -  Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. 4 , N o . I ,J u n e ,1974 
p. 1799 C .  Concerning Thailand -  Straits Times, 18 January, ¡974.
(15) Aslan A nalysis, December 1973. p. 3 .
(16) Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 0  August, 1973
(17) Far Eastern Economic Review, IO  June, 1974
(18) Straits Times, 27 Ju ly , 1971. Speech by Tun Razak
(19) Straits Times, 22 January, 1965; 19 A p ril, 1967.
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(a) That closer contact with China might strengthen divisive or subversive 
pro-China sentiment amongst the Malaysian Chinese;
(b) That better relations would encourage the integration of the Malaysian 
Chinese into the Malaysian society, as the latter would no longer be 
hostile to Chinese in general. An initial anti-China policy was gradually 
modified as the Malaysian state became increasingly secure, and Communist 
insurgency remained scattered and numerically lim ited. Furthermore, 
M alaysia's freedom from alliance  ties with the United States and the 
absence of diplomatic relations with Nationalist C h in a , aided a change
in p o licy . (2 0 )
Early signs of a thaw were apparent in January 1971 when the
Peking Red Cross made a surprise offer of some $ 6 2 5 ,0 0 0  worth of food and clothinc
to Malaysian flood victim s. (21) At the same time Tun Razak welcomed unofficial
Chinese enquiries about the Malaysian proposal for neutralization. (22)
Such tentative approaches were not reflected in the pro-Peking 'Voice of the
Malayan Revolution1:-
Mln view of the repeated, disastrous defeats suffered by U .S .  imperialism 
on the battlefields of Indo China in the past few months, the Razak clique  
has intensified its efforts in calling for the neutralization of Southeast 
A sia , guaranteed by the big p o w e rs ... Your so-called guarantee of 
neutrality in Southeast Asia by the big powers is , to put it b luntly, only 
a by-product of the Nixon Doctrine. Your policy of non-alignment is 
only a cover for your service to imperialism in opposing communism, 
the people and C h in a .” (23)
As against this, however, Tengku Razaleigh returned from a trip to China  
which included a meeting with Chou E n - la i, during which Razaleigh put 
forward M alaysia's neutralization po licy :-
(2 0 ) 'China's Policy in Southeast A s ia 1,  F„ Langdon. Conflict and Stability in 
Southeast A s ia , Zacher & M ilne , eds. (Anchor/Doubleday, New York, 1974). 
p. 314.
(21) Straits Times, II February, 1971. This aid figure has elsewhere been reported 
as $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  (Japan Times, 14 A p ril, 1971)
(22) This occurred as the Malaysian Prime Minister was commenting on reports that 
Peking embassy officials in London had approached Malaysian diplomats there 
seeking clarification of the proposals to neutralize Southeast A sia .
Pakistan Times,  18 January, 1971.
(23) SW 8. 18 A p ril, 1971. 'Voice of the Malayan Revolution1, in Standard Chinese, 
0 5 .1 5  G M T ., 17/4/1971. FE/3 6 6 6 /A 3 /I.
"He (Chou En-lai)told  us that he followed closely the statement made by 
Tun Abdul Razak on the concept of neutrality and that it was also the 
policy of China to maintain a policy of non-interference and mutual 
respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity. I could only feel 
or think that this reaction to neutrality was quite favourable. He 
said that no big powers should interfere in the affairs of other 
nations". (24)
In earnest of the more cordial Sino-M alaysian diplomatic relations, trade 
was also increased -  the emphasis being placed on rubber, palm oil and 
timber.
The ambiguities interwoven in the Sino-M alaysian relationship
did little to make things easier for the Malaysians in their efforts to feVhe-r
Chinese intentions (25); nevertheless, a Malaysian Foreign Affairs Ministry
statement on 2 0  M ay, 1974, announced that Chou En-la i had invited Tun
Razak to pay an official visit to China in order to formalise the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Speaking at a banquet
given in Tun Razak's honour on May 28, Chou En-la i said that:-
"The Malaysian Government's position for the establishment of a zone of 
peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia has given expression to the desire 
of the Southeast Asian peoples to shake off foreign interference and control, 
and has won support from many Third World countries. . .  .The realities of 
Southeast Asia show that super-power aggression and expansion are the 
main sort of danger to peace and security in this region. We are convinced 
that so long as the Southeast Asian peoples strengthen their unity and persist 
in their struggle they w ill certainly be able to frustrate super-power schemes 
and safeguard their own Independence and sovereignty. The Chinese 
people consistently support the just struggles of all oppressed nations and 
people". (26)
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Straits Times, 19 M ay, 1971
On the one hand Tun Razak declared in Parliament that M alaysia was in no 
rush to enter into diplomatic relations with C h ina , noting that -  ' the 
Chinese clandestine radio station is still carrying out hostile propaganda 
toward M alaysia, and the so-called Mtalayan Liberation Front is still based 
in Peking1. -  Foreign Broadcast Information Service D aily  Report (A sia , 
Pacific) 16 August, 1972. Cited in Current Scene, V o l. X ,  N o . 12.
On the other hand, there was the growing feeling that the smaller 
countries of Southeast Asia could not afford to miss out on relations with 
a major power in the neighbourhood, such as C h ina .
Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. 4, No. 1, June 1974. pp. 2762/4
Both Governments also considered all forms of aggression, interference, 
control and subversion to be non-permissible, and were opposed to any 
attempt by any country, or group of countries, to establish hegemony or 
create spheres of influence in any part of the world. (27) Since M alaysia  
was the first of the ASEAN  nations to establish such diplomatic relations, 
the Sino-M alaysian agreement and joint communique could well act as 
a format whereby other Southeast Asian countries could come to satisfactory 
terms with Peking.
After the initial euphoria over the establishment of official ties .
-ah to e ,c lo se  o f *974- 
with China certain realities have now to be faced. M alaysia is/Still a
country in which the Little Red Book is banned, and although it was assumed
at first that links with Peking would reduce the effectiveness of the clandestine
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in its efforts to undermine the Malaysian
Government, such hopes have yet to be rea lized . It is disturbing for the
Malaysian Government that, if anything, the 'Voice of the Malayan
Revolution1 (VOMR) has stepped up its attacks, dismissing the recent diplomatic
initiative as an 'inevitable consequence of history', stressing that it was a
'victory for the Malayan and Chinese psople'. W hile officials in Kuala
Lumpur point out that the VOM R tends to lean toward a position which
distinguishes the Chinese Government from the MCP itself, they still believe
that the VOM R's radio transmitter is based in China's Southern Yunnan
Province. Despite this the Chinese denials of any official aid to the MCP
were adamant. (28) One certain thing is that should such Chinese aid be
uncovered not all the efforts of this pacesetter of ASEA N  will convince the
other four members to establish the necessary ties with C h in a .
3 . China for its part has endorsed the ASEAN  neutralization proposals
in principle, pending more friendly relations with the majority of the 
member states. Liao C h 'eng -Ch ih , a senior adviser to the Chinest Foreign 
M inistry, told visiting Japanese newsmen:-
"China supported the principle of neutrality featuring national 
independence, democracy and peace with the Philippines, Indonesia, 
M.alaysia, Singapore and Thailand have worked out. These countries, 
however, sometimes say that they want to improve relations with C h ina,
(7!)
(27) Chinese Embassy News Bulletin, (Canberra), 12 June, 1974. 7 4 0 3 .
(28) Far Ecstern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974
but at other times they step back, saying thay are afraid . We do not 
fret, rush, or threaten, and we w ill watch the developments in regard 
to this situation". (29)
Despite the fears it is true that there have been developments, in some cases 
forced by the perceived implications of the Nixon Doctrine. In this category 
s+t+4 are countries such as Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.
O f all the member countries of A S EA N , the Philippines has perhaps had 
the least contact with C h in a . Nevertheless, as early as January 1969, in 
his State of the Nation Address before the Philippine Congress, President Marcos 
stressed the need for peaceful coexistence with China in preparation for eventual 
American withdrawal from A sia , and with the foresight that:-
"Before long Communist China will have increased its striking power a 
thousand-fold with a sophisticated delivery system for its nuclear 
weapons". (3 0 )
As with M alaysia , China made its gesture by sending donations to Filip ino  
flood victim s, through the Chinese Red Cross Society . (31)
The Philippines sent its first trade mission to China early in 1971 -  which 
arranged the exchange of Filip ino coconut oil for Chinese rice -  and this was 
followed by a series of reciprocal visits. The latter included that of President 
Marcos's personal and 'unofficia l1 emissary, his brother-in-law , Governor 
Benjamin Romualdez of Leyte, to Peking to talk with Chou En -la i; w hilst, the 
Chinese Minister of A griculture, Sha Feng, came to Manila to attend a 
conference on rice research in April 1972. In 1971 the ban on all trade with 
socialist countries was lifted, and it was decided that the semi-state National 
Export Trading Corporation should oversee the Chinese trade. Since the first 
exchange of goods in 1971, two-way trade is estimated to have exceeded 
$68. m illion , of which some $42. million was in Philippine exports to China, 
and $26. million imports from the Peoples1 Republic. Although China's biggest 
imports from the Philippines so far have been in coconut o il, with the termination 
of special trade relations with the United States under the Laurel-Langley  
Agreement, and the curtailment of Japanese and American purchases of Filip ino  
timber, the Philippines has been eyeing China as a possible market for more of
(29) Cited by F .  Langdon -  O p . C it .  -  p. 31 O c
(3 0 ) Japan Times, 28 January, 1969
(31) Ta Kung Pao, 12 November, 1970.
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its traditional exports such as sugar, wood products and, possibly, 
mineral ores and concentrates. The Philippines has also been sounding 
out the Chinese on the prospects of securing crude oil from C h in a .
Furthermore, in anticipation of an upsurge in the China trade, the Government- 
owned Philippine National Bank established financial connections with 
Peking in 1973, by formalizing a correspondent agreement with the Bank of 
C h in a . (32)
Diplomatic relations with China have yet to be established. President 
Marcos claimed that the Philippines w ill have to solve its problem of 
foreign support for leftist insurgents before it can draw up a timetable to 
establish such relations. China was quoted as being one of the countries which 
was alleged to be supporting Filip ino insurgents, although contrary arguments 
claim that, at most, such support consisted of verbal endorsement of the New  
People's Arm y, and that this would probably be restricted if the Philippines 
were w illing  to cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and transfer them 
to Peking. (33) It would appear that such a move is like ly  to occur.
President Marcos, in June 1974, said that establishing diplomatic relations 
with China w ill be a definite step by the Government in the future, but 
the timing has not been set ye t. (34) The following September saw Madame 
Marcos -  as a ‘special representative of President Marcos' -  in Peking.
In her speech at a banquet given in her honour, Madame Marcos said :- 
"It is my hope that in the course of this goodwill v is it, we can explore 
with the leaders of the People's Republic of China the possibilities for 
closer and stable relations between our peoples based on equality and 
mutual respect." (35)
Diplomatic relations with the Chinese -  who for their part appear to be 
placing a genuine emphasis on conventional links with the Philippines -  
would appear to be but a matter of time,
(32) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974
(33) F„ Langdon -  O p . C it .  -  p . 323.
(34) Asia Research Bulletin, V o l. 4 , N o . I .  June 1974, p . 2799 C .
(35) Peking Review, 27 September, 1974
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4 . U nlike the Philippines, Thailand is acutely aware that it is separated 
from China by only a relatively narrow strip of Burmese and Laotian 
territory; despite this location, however, there has rarely been a 
threat of land invasion. Nevertheless, Sino-Thai antagonism has been 
very marked since the establishment of the People's Republic, with the 
latter acting as a refuge for Thai political ex ile s , and giving, at the 
very least, verbal support for Thai insurgents. Thailand, on the other 
hand, became closely aligned with the United States, acting as a base 
for the heavy bombing raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and North 
Vietnam , and even involving Thai troops in the Vietnamese war on the 
side of Saigon. (36) Two other underlying factors have been suggested; 
the fact that Cambodia -  a traditional enemy of Thailand -  under 
Sihanouk, was a neutral favoured by Peking; and a basic age-old  
anti-Chinese sentiment. (37) The logic of a changing international 
context is, however, demanding a reassessment of both attitudes and 
al ignments.
Chinese support for Thai insurgents was noticeable throughout 
the sixties, and with the passing of time the ethnic minorities in Thailand 
received greater attention from both China and the Thai front groups as 
a potential revolutionary element. The pro-Peking radio station -  the 
'Voice of the People of Thailand1 (VPT) -  broadcasts in White Meo (Mung) 
dialect and Isan Lao . (38) Insurgency continues in Thailand with
the VPT being easily and clearly  picked up in Bangkok. The radio station 
is located in Southern China*, and although Thai officials concede that 
this is only 'an irritant1,  it is not guaranteed to improve Sino-Thai 
relations. (39) Nonetheless, apart from providing such propaganda 
aid and moral support, it has been admitted that the Chinese commitment 
has been fundamentally cautious, with Peking being careful not to 
e x p lic itly  endorse, at Government le v e l, any of the Thai front organizations.
(36) The Thai forces have now been withdrawn from South Vietnam , but it has
been alleged that Thai military advisers pay, train and recruit Lao 
living in Thailand for fighting in Laos as ‘Volunteers'. F .  Langdon -  
O p . C it .  - p. 311.
(37) China and Southeast Asia since 1945,  C .P .  F itzG e ra ld . (Longman,
Australia L td .,  1973) p . 64.
(38) China and the "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969, D . Lovelace (Berkeley, 
Centre for Chinese Studies, U niv. of C a lifo rn ia , 1971). pp 54 and 62.
(39) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974
Such support as was, and is, shown comes from the Chinese Communist 
Party. (4 0 )
Addressing representatives of the student council of the National 
Institute of Development Administration, on January 4 , 1974, the A ir  Ch ief  
Marshal Thawi Chunlasap, then Minister of Defence, told his audience 
that 'Chinese leaders had given assurances that the PRC Government had given 
no support to communist terrorists in Thailand1. Whilst dealing with the 
withdrawal of American forces from the country, Thawi said that once 
political stability was restored to South Vietnam and Cambodia, 'all U .S .  
troops must be withdrawn1. (41) Commenting on the new political 
emphasis in Thailand the editorial of the 'Straits Times' -  18 January, 1974 -  
pointed out that
" . . .  The Thai Deputy Foreign Minister led a trade mission to Peking only 
last month and has referred to Sino-Thai ties as "only a matter of tim e"1. 
Reconciliation took the form of ‘ping-pong diplomacy, which was in turn, 
consolidated by trade links. (42) Despite the fact that the Thai Government 
has so  far been unable to repeal Revolutionary Party Decree N o . 53, which 
bans trade with C h in a , the decree has been twice amsnded so that merchants 
who obtain a government licence can now legally conduct trade with C h in a . 
Indeed, the Deputy Foreign M inister, Chatichai Choonhavan, visited 
Peking in December 1973, with a resulting contract for the delivery of 
5 0 ^ 0 0 0  tons of diesel oil at 'friendship p rice1,  and an agreement on the 
general principles of future trade. (43)
Concerning the Chinese attitude toward the American bases in Thailand, 
the situation is far from c le a r . When Marshall Green -  representing the 
U .S .  State Department -  went to Bangkok to report on the Kissinger and 
Nixon talks in Peking, he claimed that the Chinese had not raised the 
question of the American bases in Thailand as an obstacle to better relations. 
(44) As has been suggested above, China may prefer a temporary continuation
(4 0 ) D . Lovelace -  O p . C it .  -  p . 68
(41) SWB. 8 January, 1974. Bangkok Home Serv ice , 0 0 . 0 !  G M T ., 5/1/1974, 
F E/4 4 9 4 /A 3 /II.
(42) SWB. 2 January, 1974. Bangkok Home Serv ice , O O .O i  G M T ., 19/12/1973, 
FE/W 756/A /I5 .
(43) Peking Review, 4 January, 1974; Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974.
(44) F .  Langdon -  O p . C it .  -  p. 312.
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of the American presence to an uncertain vacuum in the area. The one 
fact that has emerged is that on this issue -  as with a number of others -  
there is little  hope for the clarification of existing ambiguities until peace 
is reached in Indo C h in a . Sino-Thai relations have seen an undoubted 
improvement but they still have a considerable way yet to go.
5 . As early as May 1970, M r. S . Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign M inister,
pointed out that although a Western withdrawal from Southeast Asia could
enhance prospects for communist revolutions in the region, he did not
believe that they would result from Chinese aggression. He said that:-
"Communist uprisings have invariably been in d ig e n o u s .... The Chinese may 
give moral, ideological and even material support, but the armed forces 
of China have never intervened, except in Korea, for clearly  defensive 
purposes. 11 (45)
The following year, the Prime M inister, Lee Kuan Y ew , during a visit to 
Rumania, claimed that Singapore strove like Rumania for friendship in all 
regions:-
"We are friends of the Soviet Union, with the U .S .A .  You are friends 
with the People's Republic of China too. Maybe sometime we too shall 
be friends with the People's Republic of C h in a" . (46)
Despite this Singapore has proved reticent in its relations with C h in a . There
are a number of reasons to explain this reticence -  the consciousness that the
majority of the Singaporean population are regarded as 'overseas Chinese'
(78% in 1970) by the rest of Southeast Asia; a general suspicion of Chinese
motives in the region and the old ambiguity of the dual governmental and
Party relations. China endorsed opposition to the Government by the
indigenous Malayan Communist Party, which in 1968 called  for a Maoist
armsd struggle against the 'puppet regimes' of both Singapore and M alaysia
in order to establish a 'People's Republic of M alaya '. (47) Lee Kuan Yew
proved that he recognized the distinction when he said at a rally on 27
August, 1974:-
"We should not make the mistake of confusing the PRC with the CPM , 
the Communist Party of M alaya, as they call themselves -  Peninsular 
M alaya together with Singapore. They demonstrated it quite c lea rly ,
(7<3
(45) Times of India, 19 M ay, 1970
(46) Straits Times, 13 November, 1971
(47) F .  Langdon - O p . C it .  -  p. 316.
the PRC may, for their own national interests, have government to 
government correct relations -  government to government. But the 
local communist party is a separate m atter." (48)
W hile the distinction is recognized, and even to a limited extent, accepted
by the pragmatic Singaporeans, it does little to establish a climate conducive
to developing common interests.
Singapore has made it clear more than once that it w ill not be either 
the first or second of the ASEAN  countries to establish diplomatic relations 
with C h in a . According to the Prime Minister -  *When our immediate 
neighbours, M alaysia , Indonesia have diplomatic relations, we w ill have 
diplomatic relations'. (49) Although M alaysia has opened such relations 
it would appear to be some time before sim ilar moves are like ly  to be made 
on the Sino-lndonesian front -  a delay that does not seem to worry the 
Singaporean Government.
Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, this does not 
prevent contact with C h ina . Dialogue is carried on in the United N ations, 
and at different points of contact, like London or Tokyo -  the Chinese 
Ambassador in London accepted an invitation to attend Singapore's celebration  
of its National D ay. As with other Southeast Asian countries, sport and 
trade links have been utilized in the place of formal diplom acy. There are 
two banks in Singapore -  the Bank of China and the Kwantung Provincial 
Bank -  which are owned by the Chinese Government, as well as two insurance 
companies. The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce sent a delegation  
to China in October 1971 at a Chinese invitation; whilst China offered to 
have up to ten ships per month stop at Singapore, en route to Europe, to 
pick up shipments at freight rates 4 0 %  below those of the Far East Freight 
Conference, which otherwise monopolized shipping rates. (5 0 ) The 
Sino-Singaporean trade balance has always been in China's favour, but 
as Lee Kuan Yew said -  *We don't object to this so long as o vera ll, there 
is a credit balance'. In 1973, Singapore's imports from China were 
$573.2 m illion , exports $128.4 m illion, compared with $399.2 million  
in imports and $57.6 million exports for 1972, even excluding imported
(48) The M irror (Singapore), 9 September, 1974. Speech by Lee Kuan Yew at 
the National Day Rally , 18 August, 1974
(49) Ib id .
(5 0 ) F .  Langdon -  O p . C it -  p . 317.
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re-export goods from Hong Kong, which totalled $ 5 0 . million in 1972. (51)
The Singaporean attitude toward China can , perhaps,, be summed up 
as flex ib le . Within Lee |<uan Yew's interpretation of a 'neutralized' Southeast 
Asia all three G reat Powers would continue to be involved in the region, 
however, it would appear that there have been few concrete moves made 
to realize this interpretation. With regard to China's attitude it seems 
that it is in little hurry and is prepared to wait until Singapore considers 
that the time is ripe to establish formal relations.
6 . Sino-lndonesian relations have experienced considerable fluctuations 
within the past two decades. From being in a pre-September 1965 
position of re lian ce , if not dependence, on C h ina , diplomatic relations between 
the two countries were effectively severed in October 1967 -  on the basis 
that China was guilty of ignoring the normal traditions amongst 'c iv ilized  
nations' (52) -  whilst by December 1970, the Indonesian Foreign M inister, 
Adam M alik , said that the concept of a neutral Southeast Asia guaranteed 
by the big powers, including C h ina , could only m aterialize if Peking restored 
relations with D jakarta. (53) These ties have not proved easy to restore, 
the allegedinvolvement of the Chinese in the 1965 Gestapu coup attempt 
providing a haunting memory in many minds. In 1972, while asserting 
in his Independence Day Address that Indonesia wanted friendly relations 
and cooperation with all countries, including C h ina, President Suharto 
emphasized that the initiative had to come from C h in a . At the same time it 
became known that Indonesia had rejected a possible Chinese initiative -  
the Government had turned down an invitation to send a table tennis team 
to the Asian Table Tennis Union Championships in Peking, in 1972 (as it had 
also done in 1971). (54)
Somewhat less cautious than his President, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister asked the Foreign Ministers of Yugoslavia (M r. Mirko Tepavac) 
and of Rumania (M r. Corneliu Manescu) to sound out Peking on the normalization 
of relations with China -  this in mid 1971. M r. M alik then reported back a
(51) Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1974
(52) The Age, IO  October, 1967
(53) Pakistan Times, 23 December, 1970
(54) 'Indonesia's Response to Changing Great Power Alignments', R. Horn.
Pacific Affairs , V o l. 46, N o . 4 , Winter 1973-74. p . 529.
(78)
favourable  response to these in it ia t iv e s . (55) By September and O ctober 
1972, Adam M a lik  was arguing tha t Chinese p o licy  was indeed undergoing 
a change fo r the b e tte r. A number o f factors were c ited  in evidence -  the 
attendance o f Peking's U .N .  Ambassador, Huang Hua, a t the Indonesian 
Ambassador's Independence Day reception in New  Y ork , and the rec ip roca tion  
by the Indonesian Ambassador on C hina 's N a tio na l D ay. M r. M a lik  cla im ed 
tha t Radio Peking had become less m ilita n t and abusive; w h ile  i t  was also noted 
as encouraging tha t the Chinese had continued to extend 'p ing-pong  d ip lom acy ' 
toward Indonesia, even in the face o f previous reLuf-^ iT&> Furtherm ore, i t  
was pointed out tha t China's communiques w ith  the United States and Japan 
promised non -in te rfe ren ce , and tha t a ll ind ications showed tha t such a 
provision would also apply to Indonesia. (56) Despite a ll th is , in A p r il o f 
the same yea r, i t  was also Adam M a lik  who had to protest a t the con tinua tion  
o f Chinese support for in terna l subversion in Indonesia -  even since its admission 
in to  the United N a tio ns . (57)
Indonesia's approach to the restoration o f re lations w ith  China has been 
very much a matter o f two steps fo rw ard , one step backwards, and v ice  versa, 
depending on the in terna l Indonesian p o lit ic a l s ituation  a t the tim e . I t  would 
appear tha t the in it ia t iv e  toward restoring re la tions is being taken by Adam 
M a lik ,  w ith  President Suharto and his group showing less enthusiasm. H ow ever, 
this in its e lf could also be a c leve r Indonesian p loy to provide themselves w ith  
a safety catch -  tha t in terna l obstacles prevent the hastening o f the necessary 
re h a b ilita tio n  of re la tions .
By ea rly  1973, M r. M a lik  reported tha t a 5 0 %  thaw had a lready taken 
place in S ino-lndonesian re la tions -  w ith  the fin a l restoration being dependent 
on the security  s ituation  in Indonesia. M r. M a lik  cla im ed tha t China had 
ceased its subversive a c tiv it ie s  in Indonesia, dismissing in the process the 
opposing v iew  as 'accusations or assumptions*. (58) I t  was disclosed la te r 
in the year that Adam M a lik  had met his Chinese counterpart -  M r. Chi Peng-fe i -  
in N ew York and Paris, and that they had discussed the restoration o f the 
suspended D jaka rta -P eking  re la tion s . (59)
(55) The G uardian (Burma), 8 J u ly ,  1971
(56) R. Horn -  O p . C it .  -  p . 529
(57) D jakarta  Timgs, 18 A p r i l ,  1972
(58) A n ta ra f  17 January, 1973. C ited  in R. Horn -  O p . C it .  -  p . 5 3 0 .
(59) Indonesian N ew s le tte r, 9 J u ly 7 , 1973. 27/73
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Two very real impediments to a close S ino-Indonesian re la tionsh ip  
s t i l l  ex is t -  on top o f the suspicion tha t exists concerning the in ten tions o f 
C h in a :-
(a) The fac t that the fee ling  against the Indonesian Chinese m ino rity  s t il l 
runs h ig h , as re flec ted  in pe riod ic  eruptions o f v io le n ce .
(b) The reported a c tiv it ie s  o f the m a in ly  Saraw aklan, Chinese g u e rr illa  
forces, operating along the border o f Sarawak and West K a lim an tan .
N everthe less, signs o f change can be registered; in January 1974, Adam M a lik  
stated that in the present s itua tion  the thaw ing o f d ip lo m a tic  re la tions w ith  
China depended on Indonesia, as China had fu lf i l le d  a ll the necessary 
precond itions, w h ich  had inc luded -  among other things -  a cessation o f 
h o s til ity  toward the Governm ent o f President Suharto. (6 0 )  W h ils t in 
M arch an Indonesian Foreign O ffic e  spokesman disclosed to  reporters tha t the 
Chinese Foreign M in is te r gave an assurance to Adam M a lik  in Paris, a t the 
time o f the Peace Conference on V ie tnam , tha t China would no t support or 
encourage any communist re b e llio n  in Indonesia. (61)
One o f the c h ie f reasons fo r the le tha rg ic  a ttitu d e  o f the Indonesians
toward d ip lom a tic  re la tions w ith  China may be a general lack o f in terest s in c e
The e arly  Seven he.s, . . .  . , , . ,
r-ooon tly  in fore ign p o lic y  issues, la rge ly  due to a concen tra tion  on the
problems o f the in ferna l p o lit ic a l s itu a tio n . The 'G u id e line s  o f the State
P o lic y ',  solemnly stipu la ted by the People's Assembly, on 23 M a rch , 1973,
refers to fore ign p o lic y  in a few sentences o n ly . (62) Despite this apparent
lack  o f in terest in norm a liz ing  formal re la tions , S ino-Indonesian trade has
proceeded apace w ith  the current trade balance h ea v ily  favouring  C h in a .
Chinese exports to Indonesia increased from U .S . $27 .6  m illio n  in 1971,
to $54 .7  m illio n  in 1973. These figures can be Increased somewhat by
the add ition  o f imports that coma through a th ird  country -  c h ie fly  Hong
Kong or S ingapore. On the o ther hand, trade statistics show few Indonesian
exports going to C h ina . There is l i t t le  agreement on the e ffe c t o f closer
S ino-Indonesian ties on trade . (63)
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Sino-Indonesian re la tions ofo^'now very much a m atter o f tim ing ; the 
la tte r , how ever, is im portant in the sensitive Indonesian s itu a tio n . For some e ig h t 
years the an ti-P ek ing  sentim ent has been used as a basis o f le g itim a cy  fo r the 
Suharto G overnm ent. The la tte r now , in the President's words, wish to :-  
"Be able to create such social conditions that w il l  make i t  impossible for 
communist ideas and po ten tia l to grow and develop in Indonesis".
U n til this is accomplished there w il l  undoubtedly be elements in the Indonesian 
governing e lite  who w il l  argue against norm a liz ing  re la tions w ith  C hina on the 
grounds that this could encourage the growth o f communist ideas and in flu e n c e .
As against th is , however, in te rna tiona l events w il l  not w a it on in terna l 
developments and Indonesia may ye t be hastened in to  tak ing  those f in a l steps.
7 . A  fac to r in China's re la tions w ith  Southeast Asia that does not a llo w  
its e lf to be overlooked is the ro le played by the Overseas Chinese -  
e th n ic  Chinese outside C hina; fo r my purposes, Nanyang (or Southeast Asian) 
Chinese, These em igrant Chinese have been entering Southeast Asia  through­
out the centuries, the volume o f the flo w  being determ ined la rg e ly  by the
By/974rhey composed 
in te rna l s itua tion  in South C h in a . Htcy now-'eompaoc some 5% o f the popu l­
a tion  o f Southeast A s ia , and due to th e ir numbers and association w ith  C h in a , 
w e i^ ^ n  the minds o f Southeast Asian fore ign p o lic y  makers.
The d is tr ib u tio n o f the Nanyang Chinese is scattered, w ith  the percentage 
in most countries being re a lly  rather lo w . However, there is another group 
(those countries that now compose M alaysia) where the percentage is from 
about o n e -f if th  to one -th ird  o f the w h o le . W h ile  in Singapore i t  was th ree - 
quarters o f the tota l -  w ith  reports in d ica tin g  a rise on th is .
The fate o f the Nanyang Chinese, and the ir e ffe c t on fore ign p o lic y  is 
la rg e ly  determ ined by three factors -  the a ttitu d e  o f the country invo lved  to 
its Chinese m inority  (m a jo rity  in the case o f S ingapore, but both this and 
M alaysia  are in excep tiona l circumstances); the current a ttitu d e  o f the Peking 
G overnm ent to the Nanyang Chinese; and the leve l o f the re la tions between 
the Peking Government and the Southeast Asian country in question . Under­
ly in g  these factors is tha t v ita l e lem ent -  the rate o f assim ilation o f the 
Nanyang Chinese in to  the ir adopted country and c u ltu re .
(81)
( 8 ?
Policies adopted by Southeast Asian countries fo r th e ir Chinese 
popu la tion  have tended to va ry . In Thailand the problem has been reduced 
due to the interm arriage that has taken place between Thais and Chinese.
In Indonesia and the Philippines the acqu is ition  o f loca l n a tio n a lity , 
whether by b irth  or na tu ra liza tion ,, s t i l l  leaves the Chinese under p o lit ic a l 
and often econom ic d is a b ilit ie s . (64) N o t a s itua tion  conducive to successful 
ass im ila tion . However, w ith  regard to the P h ilipp ines, the more moderate 
approach taken by China would appear to be re flec ted  in greater attempts to 
'F ilip in iz e *  the country 's Chinese. These developments co in c ide d , ea rly  
in 1972, w ith  moves being made to restore re la tions w ith  Peking. For th e ir 
part the Chinese -  in the person o f Chou E n -la i speaking to G eneral N e W in 
o f Burm , in August 1971 -  repeated tha t overseas Chinese should obey the laws 
o f the country in which they reside, and tha t i t  was the p o lic y  o f the Chinese 
Governm ent to see tha t this p rin c ip le  was observed. (65)
In M alaysia  and S ingapore, Nanyang Chinese are present in such 
numbers tha t they can pa rtic ipa te  in a s ig n ifica n t manner in the in terna l 
p o lit ic a l workings o f these countries. However, a ll is not calm  in M alaysian 
race re la tion s , w ith  th e A llia n c e  Party V ic to ry  in the 1969 G enera l E lection  
being fo llow ed  by racia l r io ts . Concerning the a ttitu d e  o f C h in a , the 
fo llo w in g  was included in the jo in t communique issued during the v is it  o f Tun 
Abdul Razak to C h ina , in June 1974:-
" ccoThe Chinese Government considers anyone o f Chinese o rig in  who has 
taken up o f his own w il l  or has acquired M alaysian n a tio n a lity  as 
a u to m a tica lly  fo rfe itin g  Chinese n a tio n a lity . As fo r those residents who 
re ta in  Chinese n a tio n a lity  o f th e ir  own w i l l ,  the Chinese G overnm ent, 
ac ting  in accordance w ith  its consistent p o lic y , w i l l  e n jo in  them to abide 
by the law o f the G overnm ent o f M a lays ia , respect the customs and habits 
o f the people there and liv e  in am ity w ith  them . And th e ir  proper 
rights and interests w il l  be protected by the G overnm ent o f China and 
respected by the Government o f M .a lays ia ." (66)
As this in a ll poss ib ility  w il l  be the format o f fu ture agreements on this
question w ith  other Southeast Asian governments, the la tte r are w atch ing
w ith  in terest to see how it  w il l  work out in M a lays ia .
(64) C .P . F itzG e ra ld  -  O p . C it .  -  p . 85
(65) 'The In fluence  on Foreign Policy o f E thnic M in o ritie s  w ith  Externa! T ie s ',
R .S . M iln e .  C o n flic t and S ta b ility  in Southeast A s ia , Zacher & M iln e , eds. 
O p . C it .  p . 106 .
(66) Chinese Embassy News B u lle tin , 12 June, 1974. 7 4 0 3 .
(83)
S ingapore, even more than M a la ys ia , is acu te ly  conscious o f the 
problems w hich the Nanyang Chinese create in Southeast A s ia . Here 
they are in such proportions tha t the constant fear would appear to be the 
submergence o f a Singaporean id e n tity  under a Chinese one . That Lee 
Kuan Yew is sensitive lest other Southeast Asian countries regard Singapore 
as C h ina 's f if th  column in the re g ion , is c le a r. This indeed is one o f his 
declared reasons for tak ing  S ino-Singaporean d ip lom a tic  re la tions s lo w ly . (67) 
I t  must undeoubtedly w orry Lee Kuan Yew tha t closer lin ks  w ith  China would 
encourage an upsurge o f Chinese sympathy among his Singaporeans. H ow ever, 
against this he can hope tha t the interests o f the two countries may d iverge  
somewhat, and tha t the a lleg iance  o f the younger generations w i l l  be g iven 
to S ingapore .
W ith  regard to the a ttitu d e  o f the overseas Chinese themselves i t  is 
d i f f ic u l t  to categorize the com bination o f diverse p o lit ic a l a lleg iances 
and the nebulous cu ltu ra l a ttachm ent to Chinese he ritag e . In cases where 
they were subjected to a second class c itize n sh ip  the Chinese a ttachm ent must 
in e v ita b ly  have been incorporated in to  an a lte rna tive  sense o f id e n t ity .  
Feelings lik e  tha t o f a D utch-educated  Chinese in Indonesia are not common:- 
" I f  you ask me what Chinese cu ltu re  is, I cannot say. We cannot define  
i t  e x a c t ly ,  but we know tha t we like  i t  and want to keep i t . . .  We want 
(our ch ild ren ) to be loya l to Indonesia as th e ir co un try , but we hope tha t 
they w il l  not forget Chinese c u ltu re " .  (68)
There are two d if f ic u lt ie s  here, how ever, tha t o f expecting  second class 
c itizens  to assim ilate to ta lly  in to  a cu ltu re  whose members p a rtly  re je c t 
them; and tha t o f hoping tha t n a tion -bu ilde rs  (and many o f the Southeast 
Asian nations are re la tiv e ly  modern states) w il l  to le ra te  the existence o f a 
sub-cu ltu re  w h ich  owes a lleg iance  to an e x tra -re g io n a l g ia n t.  The resu lt is 
tha t the overseas Chinese can o ften end up as p o lit ic a l scapegoats -  thereby 
g iv in g  the v ic ious c irc le  o f separateness another sp in . H ow ever, in teg ra tion  
o f any such e thn ic  m ino rity  group, i f  i t  is ache ivab le  a t a l l ,  is on ly  so by 
means o f tim e .
(67) The M irro r (S ingapore^, 9 September, 1974
(68) R .S . M iln e  -  O p . C it .  -  p . 9 0 .
(S4)
THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SECOND ELEPHANT
C hina is a major w orld  power -  i t  has been so fo r some tim e , but on 
25 O c tob e r, 197!, it  at last obta ined the legal trappings o f such, when the 
Peking G overnm snt received a m a jo rity  vote in the United N ations Assembly 
w h ich  recognised it  as the leg itim a te  regime and e n tit le d  toC hina 's U .N .  
seat. So much for its position on the g lobal stage. W ith  regard to Southeast 
Asia there is the added ing red ien t o f a long history o f association and in flu e n ce , 
together w ith  the hints o f tha t G rea t Power p re roga tive , spheres o f in flu e n ce . 
Aware o f the la tte r , tha Southeast Asian states are b a ttlin g  fo r a position o f 
compromise where a ll the externa l powers invo lved  in the region would show 
mutual s e lf-re s tra in t. Such a step would undoubtedly be in China*s interest 
i f  i t  could  re ly  on the good fa ith  o f the U nited States and Russia. N o t on ly  
would i f  remove the threat o f enc irc lem ent by opposing powers, but should 
the region become s tab ilized  -  and the prospects fo r e ffe c tive  subversion 
dim inished -  then the Chinese in fluence  could s t il l be established, but 
through more orthodox channels. It  is ce rta in , g iven the h is to rica l and 
geographica l re la tionsh ip  o f China to Southeast A s ia , tha t irrespective  o f 
what long-te rm  arrangements are reached, Chinese in fluence on the region 
w il l  be s ig n if ic a n t.
W hatever may be true o f the G rea t Powers, Southeast Asian nations 
have long recognized this fa c t .  In the ea rly  s ix tie s , in an in te rv iew  w ith  
the French newspaper, 'Le M onde1,  Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk commented 
th a t:-
" The Chinese know very w e ll tha t the a lignm ent o f Bangkok on the U .S . 
side is temporary and tha t i t  may reverse its e lf to m o rro w ... Perhaps I 
shall astonish you by saying that I never go to Peking w ith o u t being 
contacted by some s e m i-o ffic ia l emissary o f B angkok.. The U nited States 
p ro tes t. A fte r the ir return the emissaries are arrested. They spend a 
few  pampered days in prison, just long enough to calm the Am ericans.
Then they are re leased". (69)
It is not d if f ic u l t  to imagine such occurrences, set, as they a re , in the
con tex t o f centuries o f d e lica te  d ip lo m a tic  manoeuvrings -  in such a
setting Western in terven tion  must take on the appearance o f a crude abe rra tion .
D ip lom a tic  re a litie s  have proved, and are p rov ing , stronger than ideo log ica l
antagonisms; and despite the small number o f Southeast Asian countries that
(69) D . Lovelace -  O p . C it .  -  p . 13 n . C itin g  'Le M onde1, June, 1964.
a c tu a lly  have d ip lom a tic  re la tions w ith  C h ina , the stage has been w e ll 
set for others to make this move when they consider i f  to be in the ir 
na tiona l in te rest.
I t  is true that the am bigu ities o f C hina's two leve l approach -  
governm ent-to -governm ent and p a rty - to -p a rty  -  do not make the s itua tion  
easier for the members o f the re g ion . However, i t  is becoming increas ing ly  
accepted tha t outside the insurgent movements in Indo C h ina , support fo r 
the Southeast Asian lib e ra tion  movements c h ie fly  takes the form o f verbal 
encouragem ent, and that coming m a in ly  from the Chinese Communist Party, 
ra ther than from G overnm ent sources. The Chinese emphasis is now very 
dec ided ly  on the governmental le v e l,  although p a rty - to -p a rty  communications 
are kept open perhaps pa rtly  in the form o f leverage and pa rtly  as an ideo­
lo g ica l ju s t if ic a tio n . The need fo r the la tte r has been eased somewhat by the 
stance tha t each country must generate its own revo lu tiona ry  s p ir it .  I t  is 
in teresting  to note tha t the two countries tha t have been c ited  in rooor>t 1974 
as suffering from Chinese media support for the ir insurgents -  Burma 
and Thailand -  are two where the elem ent o f threat may be in vo lve d , so as 
to prevent Burma from establish ing close links w ith  the Soviet Union w h ich  has 
been courting  It ,  and in T ha iland , to encourage the reduction o f the overt 
Am erican presence. (7 0 )  W ith  regard to many o f the Southeast Asian 
insurgent movements,however ac tion  is not necessarily taken or stopped a t 
the behest o f Peking -  a lthough it  may have certa in  in fluences a t times in 
the m atter -  but may continue in spite o f the la tte r, being m otivated by 
indigenous grievances. Hence, a fte r the S ino-M alaysian  d ip lom a tic  accords 
were signed in June 1974, Tun Razak was assured by Chinese leaders tha t the 
communist guerrillas  in M a laysia  were an in ferna l M alaysian problem . A  
s im ila r a ttitu d e  to tha t taken as app ly ing  to the Nanyang Chinese.
C hina's a ttitude  to the proposal to neu tra lize  Southeast Asia has been 
somewhat c ircum spect. There would appear to be invo lved in this an elem ent 
o f not w ishing to support a scheme open ly , a course o f whose future is as ye t 
u nce rta in . In M ay 1971, Tunku Razale igh, who was heading a M alaysian 
trade mission in Peking, reported a favourable response from Chou E n - la i.
The fo llo w in g  year a more d e fin ite  statement o f support for the proposal was
(85 )
(7 0 )  The A ge , 21 August, 1974
made by the Chinese Foreign M in is te r, Chi P eng -fe i, who stated in 
August 1972 tha t Peking supported the po lic ies  o f peace, n e u tra liza tio n  
and nonallgnm ent proposed by A s ian , A fr ica n  and Latin  Am erican 
coun tries. (71) On this issue, as on many others, Peking would appear 
to be indu lg ing  in its two leve l approach -  w ith  the Governm ent supporting 
the n e u tra liza tio n  suggestion, in the abstract at any ra te , and the Party having 
its doubts. L it t le  can be gleaned from previous Chinese reactions to n e u tra l­
iza tio n  proposals as they depended to a great exten t on Chinese in terest a t 
the tim e ra ther than on any id e o log ica l stand on the concep t. Hence, the 
Chinese support for President de G a u lle 's  proposal in the e a rly  s ix ties (72), 
w h ils t a descrip tion  o f A ve ra ll Harriman's e fforts to neu tra lize  Laos described :- 
"This smooth foxy p lu to c ra t . . .  try ing  to argue the Conference (G eneva) 
in to  subordinating the sovereignty o f Laos to a new k ind  o f in te rna tio na l 
trus teesh ip". (73)
Chinese alignm ents and in terests, how ever, have come a long way since 1961.
As se lf-nom inated champion o f the Third W o rld , the fa c t tha t the
present n eu tra liza tion  proposals come from M a lays ia , a Third W orld  coun try ,
w il l  undoubtedly make them tha t much more savoury to the Chinese, a po in t
brought out by Chang W e n -c h in , the Assistant Foreign M in is te r in June , 1973:-
" N ow  the Southeast Asian states have raised this s logan. O ur understanding 
is that no big power should in te rfe re  in the ir a ffa irs  so tha t th e ir 
independence and sovereign rights can be respected. We are in favour 
o f this approach. There is s t i l l  a U .S . m ilita ry  presence in both Thailand 
and the P hilipp ines, this is contrary to n e u tra liz a tio n . I t  is not an easy 
job  fo r the United States to w ithdraw  at once because the S ovie t Union 
tries to invo lve  its e lf there so there must be a process (o f w ith d ra w a l).
O f course we try  to invo lve  ourselves but we are not very strong. We 
can o n ly  say empty w o rd s ." (74)
And so we return to the in te rp la y  o f the 'e lephants' -  the decis ive  fac to r
in the Issue -  and here alignm ents are s t i l l  in a state o f f lu x .  A d m itte d ly
(71) Straits Times, 15 August, 1972
(72) Communist China in W orld P o litics , H . H in ton . (Houghton M if f l in  C o . , 1960 ), 
p . 150
(73) Laos in the M irro r o f Geneva , I . Epstein & E. F a irfa x -C h o lm e le y , (N ew  
W orld  Press, Peking, 1961). pp 3 /4 .
(74) In te rv iew  w ith  Chang W e n -ch in , Assistant Foreign M in is te r. In te rna tiona l C lu b , 
Peking^ |4 June, 1973. Answer to a question asked by Ian W ilson ( A . N  . U .) 
Courtesy o f David Armstrong ( A . N . U . ) .
(86)
S ino-A m erican  interests in re la tion  to Southeast Asia would appear to be 
c o - in c id e n t a t° th o ’moment,  but in Novem ber 1974, the Chinese despatched 
a somewhat c o n c ilia to ry  message to Moscow on the anniversary o f the Russian 
R evo lu tion , w h ile  a certa in  anx ie ty  was shown over the S ovie t-A m erican  
summit m eeting . (75) Despite ce rta in  given factors in China's re la tions 
w ith  Southeast A s ia , the ro le tha t i f  w i l l  p lay w ith  regard to the la tte r w i l l  
la rg e ly  be dependent on the configura tions tha t w il l  emerge from the in te r­
actions o f the G rea t Powers -  and concerning these, as the Chinese themselves 
say, *The Y e llow  River has many Bends*.
(87)
(75) The Economist,  16 N ovem ber, 1974. Discussion concerning this
message w hich w h ile  demanding a mutual pu ll back o f forces dropped 
the long standing insistence tha t the Tsarist treaties were 'u n e q u a l', and 
therefore m ora lly  in v a lid .  This message, may, how ever, be merely 
a facade o f a peace o ffe r , as a week p rev ious ly , in a speech, Teng 
H s iao-p ing  was s t il l re ferring  to the Russians as 'despicable and v ic io u s '.
(88)
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE THIRD ELEPHANT -  THE SOVIET U N IO N
A lthough  some 75% o f the te rr ito ry  o f the Soviet Union is in A s ia , 
the country is m ain ly Europe-oriented as evidenced by the fa c t tha t some 71.1% 
o f the S ovie t popu la tion  liv e  in European U .S .S .R ., most o f the industria l 
production  takes place the re , and w h ils t s tra te g ica lly  Russian h istory has seen 
expansion eastwards and southwards in to  A s ia , ta c t ic a lly  the Sovie t Union has 
tended to look westwards -  both w ith  regard to p o lit ic s  and commerce. In one o f 
his e a rlie s t pamphlets (1898) Lenin described Russia as 's e m i-A s ia tic 1,  ye t he 
also re fle c te d  E u ro c e n tr ic ity .
Despite this background, the c lim ate  o f increasing tension between 
China and the Soviet Union has prompted the la tte r to engage in a more a c tiv e  
d ip lom acy aimed a t acqu iring  friends in the Asian reg ion . In this task i t  was 
aided by the extremism o f the People's Republic its e lf ,  w ith  Peking losing ground 
by being c lose ly id e n tifie d  w ith  the 1965 Gestapu Coup attem pt in Indonesia, 
and w ith  the disruptions occasioned by the G rea t Proletarian C u ltu ra l R evo lu tion . 
Chinese fo re ign  p o lic y  has been presented to Asia by Sovie t commentators as 
'the G rea t S tra teg ic Plan o f Mao T se -tung ', w h ich  aims at no less than 'the 
establishm ent o f a sort o f superstate em bracing not on ly  eastern and centra l 
Asia but la te r even western A s ia . . 1 in several stages Peking's sway would 
thus be extended over thousands o f m iles. Furtherm ore, accord ing  to the 
S ovie t U n ion , the long-term  plan 'is not restricted to the M ao iza tion  o f 
A s ia ',  but A fr ic a  and Latin  Am erica  are part o f its targets besides. (I)
W h ile  i t  may be true tha t China would not re je c t the o ffe r o f having in fluence  
in these Third W orld regions, i t  is rather rhe to rica l to describe its am bitions 
in terms o f the establishment o f a 'supersta te '. However, a s im ila r exaggeration 
is d isp layed by the Chinese when describ ing Soviet am bitions.
(I) 'The USSR and W orld Communism', A .  D a llin .  The Soviet Union under
Brezhnev and Kosygin, J .  S trong, e d . (Van Nostrand Reinhold C o . 1971) p . 2 0 2 .
To what exten t the Soviet Union believes its own rhe to ric  is 
d i f f ic u l t  to say, i t  is nevertheless c lear tha t i t  hopes for an invo lvem ent 
in Southeast Asia tha t can be presented to the ia tte r as ra tio n a l, pragm atic 
and constructive  beside the am bigu ities o f Chinese a c tiv it ie s . One such 
approach is tha t o f the Soviet Union se tting its e lf forward as a dependable 
a id g ive r -  as opposed to the Chinese -  making it  c le a r, besides tha t such 
a id  does not e n ta il pressure on, and in terfe rence in the in terna l a ffa irs  o f 
re c ip ie n t countries as it  is a lleged  Chinese a id  has done in the past.
In exam ining Soviet po lic ies  towards ind iv id ua l Southeast Asian 
countries the e lem ent o f com petition  w ith  the Chinese is never fa r from the 
surface. Perhaps most obvious in this regard are Indonesia and Burma -  
e xc lud ing  the Indo Chinese countries -  the respective arenas in w h ich  
Moscow and Peking have invested th e ir most s ig n ifica n t e ffo rts , w h ich  the 
other in turn attempted to underm ine.
THE SOVIET U N IO N  A N D  THE REGION
I . S ov ie t compliments to Burma -  described by M r. Brezhnev as being the
on ly  country in Asia proper w hich was 'on the n o n -c a p ita lis t road o f deve lopm ent1
(2) -  have been unusually profuse and continuous. W h ile  i t  has been 
suggested that these could be rooted in Soviet ignorance o f Burmese conditions
(3 ), i t  is more lik e ly  tha t Moscow wishes to underline its good re la tions w ith  
a state close to the southern fla nk  o f C h ina . Indeed, this close p rox im ity  to 
China has a lready hindered Soviet in it ia t iv e s  in the coun try , as Burmese 
leaders are fearfu l o f ge tting  invo lved  in anyth ing that m ight antagonize 
th e ir powerful ne ighbour. Hence, for exam ple, to ta l foreign a id  has
been rem arkably low -  some 1/2%  o f the Burmese Gross N a tio n a l Product -  
and on ly  about one-s ix teenth  o f tha t is o f Soviet o r ig in . (4)
The Soviet Union has made every e ffo rt to e x p lo it the am bigu ities in 
Sino-Burmese re la tions . In a rather typ ica l broadcast, 'Radio Peace and
(2) Brezhnev -  Report o f the C entra l Committee o f the 24th Congress o f the CPSU,
3 0  M arch , 1971. C ited  in The Soviet Union in A s ia , G . Jukes (Angus & 
Robertson, 1973) p . 139.
(3) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 139.
(89)
(4) Ib id .
Progress' reported th a t:-
"The most te rrib le  crimes are committed againsh the Burmese State 
by pro-Peking units from among c itizens o f Chinese o rig in "  (5)
I t  has been fu rther a lleged tha t Peking is g u ilty  o f conspiring w ith  the 
W h ite  Flag Communists to overthrow  the ex is ting  governm ent. W h ile , 
on the other hand, appeals are made to the Burmese Communist Party 
to bring to an end the ir M aoist c o n tro l. Soviet writers refer to the 
d isorgan iza tion  o f the Communist movement in Burma in recent years 
as an example for a ll those who are in danger o f fa llin g  under M aoist 
in fluence  -  ‘They show tha t the Maoists com plete ly disregard the nationa l 
interests o f any country they wish to ensnare in the ir ten tac les ' (6)
S ovie t denunciations o f the American C . I . A .  invo lvem ent in Burma 
have also played on the Burmese Governm ent's fears o f subversion.
These linked  the existence o f the ex ile d  ex-P rem ier U Nu and his 
entourage in Thailand w ith  the Karen separatists in Burma, w h ile  i t  
was cla im ed that C . I . A ,  m achinations were behind both . (7) The 
A m erican disregard o f the n e u tra lity  o f Cambodia was c ited  as an 
uncom fortab ly close example o f Am erican a c tiv ity  and po ten tia l in the 
re g ion . Such reporting o f both American and Chinese attempts to subvert 
the Burmese Government a t a glance could result in an in te rp re ta tion  
tha t perceived a linkage between the two -  Soviet commentators d id not 
exe rt themselves to dispel such an unwarranted in te rp re ta tio n .
M eanw hile  Moscow's e fforts to foster Soviet-Burmese ties proceeded 
apace . The r i f f  between Burma and China in 1967 was used by the Soviet 
Union who offered to step in to  the 'v o id ' by o ffe ring  m ilita ry  and econom ic 
support. (8) In O ctober 1971, Soviet President Podgorny paid a v is it  to
(5) SW 3. 21 January, 1974. Radio Peace and Progress in English. 0 3 . 0 0  G M T ., 
18 /1 /74 . S U /4 5 0 5 /A 3 /2 .
(6) ‘ Burma’,  V . V a s ilye v . Southeast A s ia , (Progress Publishers, M oscow, 1972 )p . 146
(7) SWB. 6 A p r i l ,  1970 . Moscow in Burmese, 1 2 .3 0  G M T ., 1 4 /4 /1 9 7 0 .
S U /3 3 4 5 /A 3 /2 .  SWB. 27 J u ly ,  1970 . Moscow in Burmese, 1 2 .3 0  G M T .,  
2 3 /7 /1 9 7 0 . S U /3 4 4 0 /A 3 /2 .
SWB. 15 January , 1971. Radio Peace and Progress in English for A s ia , 1 5 .3 0  GMT 
13/1/1971. S U /3 5 8 4 /A 3 /I .
It m ight be noted here tha t the Thai Government have since requested U N u to 
leave Thailand w h ich  he has du ly  done.
(8) 'Changing Soviet Policies and S ino -S ov ie t C om petition in Southeast A s ia ',R .H o rn  
O rb is ,  V o l.  X V II ,  N o . 2, Summer 1973. p. 5 0 5 .
Burma, and in February o f the fo llo w in g  year, the Soviet C u ltu ra l 
M in is te r, Furtseva. Besides th is , verbal support is e v id e n t, Moscow 
commentators have noted tha t the 'C onstitu tion  o f Burma is very s im ila r 
to tha t o f the Soviet U n ion1 and are constantly praising General N e W in 's  
R evo lu tionary C o u n c il. (9)
A lthough  such statements are f la tte r in g  i t  is ra ther u n lik e ly  tha t they
Firne.
w il l  persuade General Ne W in , for tnc present a t any ra te , to abandon
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his neu tra lis t p o lic y . Burma has in r-econt months undoubtedly been showing 
signs o f a thaw in its iso la tion ism , but the econom ic assistance tha t i t  has 
been accep ting  has come from e ithe r Japan or an in te rna tiona l agency -  
the Asian Developm ent Bank, the In te rna tiona l M onetary Fund and the 
U n ited  N ations Development Programme. In terms o f d ip lom a tic  contact 
i t  has been most open to its reg ional members. I f  i t  is determ ined to shed 
its iso la tion ism  com plete ly  in the fu tu re , i t  is c le a r tha t Burma has ye t to 
deve lop  a strategy o f ba lancing  the G rea t Powers.
2 . W ith  Indonesia, on the o ther hand, Soviet invo lvem ent has been open
and concrete -  no res tric tion  to verbal encouragement here. In the 
Sukarno era there was considerable Soviet a id channelled  in to  Indonesia, 
but th is was cu rta iled  when D jakarta  showed signs o f a P e k in g -o rie n ta tio n . 
There was l i t t le  Soviet sorrow at the overthrow  o f President Sukarno; indeed 
th e ir  in it ia l reaction  to the upheaval was marked by its mildness. However, 
a change in mood was occasioned by the fe ro c ity  o f the crackdov/n on 
Indonesian communists; the return o f Western assets to the ir owners; the 
e ffo rts  o f the Indonesian G overnm ent to a ttrac t Western ca p ita l; and 
f in a l ly ,  the d is tin c t lack o f enthusiasm by the Indonesian G overnm snt to 
pay o ff its large debts to the Sovie t U n ion . By O ctobe r, 1966, the 
S ovie t Governm ent was demanding tha t Indonesia should repay its debts (IO ) 
(w h ich  according to Adam M a lid  stood at US $931. m il lio n ) ,  and although 
rescheduling was agreed to , i t  was not ra tif ie d  u n til May 1968. As fo r the 
a llo c a tio n  o f g u ilt  in this de te rio ra tion  o f re la tions , the u ltim a te  blame was 
always placed on Chinese ‘adventurism ’ . On the other hand, Moscow 
repeated ly reminded Indonesia o f the treachery tha t had been practised against
(91.)
(9) Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February, 1974
(10) The A g e , 23 Novem ber, 1966
i t  -  and was to be expected from -  the W est, espec ia lly  in terms o f Dutch 
c o lo n ia lis m  and efforts by the U nited States to finance revolts and support 
reactionaries against the Indonesian G overnm ent.
One o f the c h ie f areas o f Soviet concern eas the increasing econom ic 
re la tions  between Indonesia and the W est. N o t that econom ica lly  the 
S ovie t Union d id  much to fo resta ll such a move, it  chose not to p a rtic ipa te  
in the 'Tokyo C lu b 1 o f e ig h t o f Indonesia's c red ito rs , and was more hesitant 
about agreeing to reschedule debts.
Despite the fa c t tha t Sovie t pub lica tions continued u n til 1968 to 
p rin t Indonesian statements o f a ttachm ent to a non-a lignm ent p o lic y  
w ith o u t comment, they were obviously increas ing ly  w orried b y :-
(a) Indonesia's p a rtic ip a tio n  in the Association o f Southeast Asian
N ations (ASEAN) w h ich  the Soviet Union cla im ed was in danger o f turn ing  
in to  an an ti-com m un ist, m il i ta ry -p o li t ic a l a llia n ce  under Am erican c o n tro l.
(b) Indonesia's a ttitude  towards the V ietnam  c o n f l ic t .  Speculation in the 
Indonesian press, espec ia lly  in the Armed Forces' newspaper -  ‘Angkatan 
Bersendjata1 -  o f the need fo r a rev iew  o f Indonesia's p o lic y  concerning 
the w a r, rather w orried the Russians. (II)
1968 would appear to have been the breaking p o in t. Radio Moscow 
as i t  closed that year adm itted tha t 'R egrettab ly 1968 has not been the best 
year fo r re la tions between the Sovie t Union and Indonesia '. It has been 
suggested tha t the increased antagonism was due to the Soviet need to prove 
themselves 'good communists' in the eyes o f the Communist w o rld , in order 
to be in a position to defend th e ir actions over Czechoslovakia  to a potent­
ia l ly  hostile  Communist movement. (12) I f  this was so then Indonesia 
was an easy target -  in 1968 there were Indonesian demonstrations over the 
C zech -c ris is  and the con tinua tion  o f a n ti-P K I campaigns. As a result a 
S ovie t mission scheduled for a v is it to Indonesia in August 1968 to discuss 
'unsettled  matters' was cance lled ; w h ile  protests over the treatm ent o f 
PKI suspects referred ever more b it te r ly  to Indonesia's ' reactionary 
c irc le s '.  (13)
(11) Pravda, 3 N ovem ber, 1967. C ited  in 'S ovie t-lndonesian Relations since 1965', 
R. H orn. Survey, V o l.  16, N o . I ,  W in te r 1971. p. 223.
(12) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . I72„
(13) Statement by CPSU Central C om m ittee . C ited in 'Sovie t-lndonesian  
Relat ions since 1965', R. Horn -  O p . C it .  -  p . 226.
(92)
Concerning support fo r the PK! a p ro -S ov ie t group had been formed 
in Moscow a fte r the 1965 coup from an amalgam o f pro-Sukarno d ip lom ats, 
students and Army officers who were tra in ing  in the Soviet Union at tha t 
t im s . Furtherm ore, Soviet reports attempted to re h ab ilita te  the PK1 by 
po in ting  out tha t on ly  a narrow section o f the PKI membership had taken 
part in the Gestapu and that 'the broad masses o f communists and members 
o f o ther dem ocratic progressive organ iza tions had noth ing to do w ith  it.®
(14) However,. Soviet support for the movement would appear to have gone 
l i t t le  beyond the p u b lic iz in g  o f a congra tu la to ry  message from ‘underground 
Indonesian communists1 to the CPSU on the F ift ie th  anniversary o f the 
O ctober Revolution -  this general verbal encouragement and sympathy, 
w ith  numerous warnings against Maoism thrown in for good measure.
Despite lack  o f overt support, Soviet e fforts regarding the regenerated PKI 
have been s ig n ifica n t enough to have earned strong Chinese a tta cks .(15)
The Indonesian reaction was fo r President Suharto to state po in ted ly  
in A p r il 1969 that Indonesia would not in terfe re  in the in terna l a ffa irs  o f 
any fo re ign  country that may subscribe to the communist id e o lo g y , and at 
the same time no country had the r ig h t to in te rfe re  in Indonesia^ domestic 
a ffa irs . Equally the fee ling  p reva iled  in Indonesia th a t:-
"W ith  a ll the d if f ic u ltie s  and problems which face i t ,  Indonesia is 
s u ff ic ie n tly  aware o f the importance o f her position in this part o f 
the w o r ld . . .  Big nations, such as the United States and the Sovie t 
Union very g rea tly  need Indonesia's support in m a in ta in ing  peace 
and s ta b ility  in Southeast A s ia ."  (16)
N everthe less, in M ay 1970 , Suharto was s t il l stressing tha t a 'good 
re la tio n sh ip ' between D jakarta  and Mtoscow did not ex is t as the S ovie t Union 
lacked 'understanding about developments in Indones ia ." (17)
(14) Pravda, lo  February, 1966. C ited  in 'Sovie t-lndonesian Relations since 1965', 
R. Horn -  O p . C it .  -  p . 227.
(15) Radio Peking in Indonesian, to Indonesia. 4 June, 1969. C ited  in 'S o v ie t- 
lndonesian Relations since 1965', R. Horn -  O p . C it  -  p . 228.
(16) Harian Operasi Indonesian, 7 O ctobe r, 1969
(17) N ew  York Times, 24 M ay, 1970
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By mid-1969 the Soviet media began to tone down the ir comments w h ich  
were d irected  at Indonesia, and in August, the new ly a rrived  Russian 
ambassador assured the Indonesian Government tha t the U .S .S .R . stood 
for non -in te rfe rence  in the in terna l a ffa irs  o f o ther states. An o ffe r o f a 
small scale resumption o f econom ic aid was made, and in August 1 970 , 
the Foreign M in is te r reported that the Russians had agreed 'in  p r in c ip le 1 
to extend new economic assistance to Indonesia. That same month saw a 
fu rthe r rescheduling o f the Indonesian debt to the Soviet U n io n . (18)
H owever, Adam M a lik  stressed tha t such agreements were ‘not lin ked  to 
any p o lit ic a l questions'. (19)
Nonetheless, increas ing ly  am iable re la tions appeared to  progress w ith  
the seventies. By 1972 -  in his Independence Day Address -  Suharto 
ca lle d  s p e c ific a lly  for good re la tions w ith  the U .S .S .R .,  and added tha t 
h o s tility  to  communism w ith in  Indonesia d id not msan tha t the G overnm ent 
opposed establish ing fr ie n d ly  re la tions w ith  countries o f communist id e o lo g y . 
(2 0 )  Despite such ca lls fo r bette r re la tions and more trade w ith  the U .S .S .R .-  
and they were to continue -  a certa in  tenseness s t i l l  characte rized  the re la tio n ­
sh ip . N o r was this helped by Indonesia's sens itiv ity  to communism and 
c r it ic is m , and Moscow's lin g e rin g  sympathy fo r Indonesian communism -  no 
m atter how passive such sympathy may have been. The eagerness w ith  w hich 
S ovie t assurances o f non -in te rve n tio n  in Indonesian a ffa irs  was rece ived  was 
an in d ica tio n  o f the la tte r's  fears. Adam M a lik  reported tha t he had been 
assured that the Soviet Governm ent ‘had never indulged and never w ould 
indulge in subversive a c tiv it ie s  against Indonesia1. (21) Moscow cla im ed 
tha t Peking, on the other hand, could not be so trusted.
A lthough it  is c lea r tha t a thaw has «ew set in in S ov le t-lndones ian  
re la tions there is l i t t le  lik e lih o o d  o f the ' eternal peoples' frie n dsh ip ' 
tha t marked the early  s ix tie s . The w illingness o f the S oc ia lis t b loc to 
aid Indonesian developm ent has been welcomed (22) but there is l i t t le
(18) D jakarta  Times, 29 August, 1970
(19) A n ta ra , 31 August, 1970 . C ited  in 'Sovie t-lndonesian Relations since 1965',
R. Horn -  O p . C it .  p . 232.
(2 0 )  'Indonesia's Response to Changing Big Power A lignm en ts ', R. H orn . P ac ific  A ffa irs  
V o l.  46 , N o . 4 , W in te r 1973-74. p . 522. Hereafter c ited  as Horn (C ).
(21) Indonesian N e w s le tte r, 15 January, 1973. N o . 73 /2
(22) Indonesian N ew s le tte r, 17 J u ly ,  1974. N o . 74/19.
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co n v ic tio n  tha t the la tte r w il l  be able to provide the massive econom ic 
assistance sought. For this approaches have been made -  and rec ip rocated  -  
to the West and Japan. However, w h ile  President Suharto is u n w illin g  to 
move too q u ic k ly  in establishing concrete ties w ith  the U .S .S .R .,  a t the 
same time he is keen to m ainta in  fr ie n d ly  re la tions w ith  the S oc ia lis t 
coun tries, in the interests o f Indonesia's non-a ligned  pos ition . This is a 
s itua tion  tha t the Russians understand, w h ile  nevertheless making i t  c le a r 
tha t they are always prepared for a closer re la tionsh ip .
A t the o ther extreme o f Soviet a c t iv ity  in Southeast Asia is the Philipp ines 
w h ich  has not been blessed w ith  intense Soviet interest or a tten tion  -  
a lthough this is chang ing. Changes may also be perceived on the F ilip in o  
side despite the fa c t tha t the b ip o la r v iew  o f in te rna tiona l re la tions was for 
a long tim e deeply engrained in F ilip in o  foreign p o lic y . Indeed so strong 
has the p ro -A m erican , anti-C om m unist o rien ta tion  been that for many years 
no d ip lo m a tic  re la tions existed between the Philippines and any communist 
coun tries. In reconY^oarc-, how ever, not on ly has F ilip in o  fore ign  p o lic y  
re fle c te d  in te rna tiona l changes but in it ia t iv e  has been shown by some 
sections o f P hilipp ine  socie ty to bring pressure on the Governm ent to seek 
a new , more independent modus v ivend i w ith  the United States.
One aspect o f such change has been an increased openness to countries 
o f the S ocia lis t b lo c . Early in 1972 President Marcos announced tha t 
agreements had been reached w ith  several soc ia lis t countries and by M arch , 
d ip lo m a tic  re la tions had been established w ith  Rumania and Y ugos lav ia .
The norm a liza tion  o f re la tions w ith  the Soviet Union was commenced through 
a v is it by Imelda Marcos -  the President’s w ife  -  as a priva te  c it iz e n  to 
Mioscow.
One o f the reasons for the lack o f extensive Soviet in terest in the 
Philipp ines was the fee ling  tha t the country was too close ly a llie d  w ith  
the United States, and consequently, tha t the e ffo rt required appeared 
out o f proportion to the reward -  should there even tua lly  be one a t a l l .
N o t even the attempts a t revo lu tion  in the Philippines rece ived much Soviet 
a tte n tio n . Accord ing to the Deputy C h ie f o f the U .S . M iss ion , in 1969:-
"The various factions in the fie ld  and the dissident Communist groups 
in the c itie s  have operated on an essentia lly  independent, na tiona l 
basis. Ties w ith  o ther Communist countries, inc lud ing  p a rtic u la r ly  
the Soviet Union and C h in a , have not been s ig n if ic a n t. " (23)
Despite such independence the communist movement in the Philippines is w e ll
d iv ided  in to  M aoist and Soviet camps. I t  is the former that would now appear
to be bearing the brunt o f m a in ta in ing  revo lu tion  in the P h ilip p ine s ; -
"The most s ig n ifica n t developm ent so far in the P h ilipp ine  revo lu tion  is 
the re-establishm ent o f the Communist Party o f the Philippines under 
the supreme guidance o f M arx ism -Len ln ism -M ao Tse-tung T h o u g h t." (24)
This re-established Communist Party has denounced the Soviet Union as being
g u ilty  o f 'so c ia l- im p e ria lism 1 and 're a c tio n ',  w h ile  seeking a close re la tionsh ip
w ith  the People’s Republic o f China and the People's Republic o f A lb a n ia .(25)
N everthe less, the pro-M oscow section o f the PKP (P h ilipp ine  Communist
Party) remains in ex is tence , sending a message to the 24th CPSU Congress
c r it ic iz in g  the PKP (re-established) as being 'guided by the co u n te r-re v o lu t-
Ionary concept serving the M aoist leaders' aspiration to dom inate in Southeast
A s ia '.  (26)
M e a nw h ile , e ffo rts  by the Sovie t Government to establish bette r 
re la tions w ith  the Philippines have increased since the v ic to ry  o f President 
Marcos and the N a tio n a lis t Party in the 1969 e lections -  this c h ie fly  due to 
the former's undertaking to consider establishing d ip lom a tic  re la tions w ith  
communist coun tries. Furtherm ore, the w ithdraw al o f some o f the F ilip in o  
forces -  a m ilita ry  engineering u n it -  from South V ietnam  was welcomed .(27) 
Soviet approval was also shown o f the sentiments expressed in President 
Marcos's S ta te -o f- th e -N a tio n  Message to the last p re -e lec tio n  session o f 
Congress, on 27 January, 1969, in w h ich  i t  was suggested tha t new re a litie s  
had to be faced , and the o ld a ttitudes o f u n th in k in g ly  fo llo w in g  'fo re ig ne rs " 
belie fs in fore ign p o lic y  must be cast away in favour o f a fore ign p o lic y  
d ic ta ted  by national in te res t. Hoping to confirm  such views the Sovie t 
Union broadcast condemnations o f C . l .A .  agents who were a lle g e d ly
(23) U .S . Senate^ Foreign Relations Committee Report. Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 184
(24) P h ilipp ine  Soc ie ty  and R evo lu tion , A .  G uerrero . (Ta Kung Pao, 1971. p .H O
(25) Ib id . pp. 293 /294 .
(26) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 185.
(27) SW3. 19 Novem ber, 1969. Moscow in English for South A s ia , 1 6 .0 0  G M T .,  
17/11/69. S U /3 2 3 3 /A 3 /1 .
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opera ting  during the 1969 e lections in an e ffo rt to prevent a Marcos 
v ic to ry . (28)
The main Soviet approach to the Philippines has been through trade , 
a lthough ca lcu la ted  on a pure ly ecommercial basis the prospects for S ov ie t- 
P h ilipp ine  trade do not appear p a rtic u la r ly  la rg e . In many o f its main 
exports the Philipp ines would be in com petition  w ith  established S ovie t 
trad ing  partners -  such as C uba. H owever, it  is c lea r tha t commercial 
considerations were not the on ly  ones taken in to  accoun t, and despite 
F ilip in o  ca u tio n , by M arch 1972 it  was announced tha t m achinery fo r trade 
re la tions w ith  the Soviet Union would be established. (29) Prior to this 
the Soviet Union had made repeated offers in the hope o f opening such trade 
re la tion s . Between M ay 1972 and O ctober 1973, i t  was reported tha t trans­
actions between the Philippines and soc ia lis t and communist nations resulted 
in a favourable  trade balance fo r the former o f some $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  
N everthe less, i t  is perhaps s ig n ific a n t tha t the firs t d ire c t trade contact w ith  
a communist country was established w ith  C h ina . (3 0 )  The Soviet Union 
has fo llow ed  up the opening o f the ir trading re la tions w ith  suggestions o f 
f in a n c ia l and techn ica l cooperation w ith  the Ph ilipp ine  G overnm ent on 
sp e c ific  pro jects -  such as o il e xp lo ra tio n . (31)
W ith  regard to d ip lom a tic  re la tions the Soviet G overnm ent cannot 
but have been encouraged by the establishment o f such re la tions between 
the Philipp ines and Poland, East G erm any, Hungary and C zechoslovak ia , in the 
autumn o f 1973; links that appeared to be a lead up to the fu lf i l lm e n t o f 
President Marcos's aspiration fo r a w o rld 'w ide  rapprochment w ith  'so c ia lis t 
co u n trie s '. (32) As far as the Philippines is concerned fr ie n d ly  re la tions  
w ith  the Soviet Union would help d isp lay a more independent pos ition , open 
the poss ib ility  o f new channels o f econom ic aid and -  as would appear to have 
a lready happened -  lessen the danger from pro-M oscow revo lu tio n a rie s ,
(28) SWB. I December, 1969. Moscow in English for South A s ia , 1 9 .0 0  G M T . 
28/11/69 . S U /3 2 4 3 /A 3 /4 .
SWB. 18 December, 1969. Tass in English, 0 8 .5 3  G M T .,  S U /3 2 5 8 /A 3 /3 .
(29) M a n ila  B u lle tin , 3 0  A p r i l,  1971. M an ila  B u lle tin , 29 M arch , 1972
(3 0 )  B u lle tin  Today, IO  December, 1973
(31) B u lle tin  Today, II September, 1973
(32) The A ge , 25 January, 1972
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A ccord ing  to a Governm ent announcement tw enty seven leading po litou ro  
members o f the PKP surrendered, ending the Party's fo r ty - fo u r year 
underground existence; documents o f amnesty were being prepared for the 
la tte r , along w ith  those imprisoned, w h ile  o ff ic ia ls  o f the Armed forces 
were c ited  by the Far Eastern Broadcasting C orporation as saying tha t the 
Communist Party may possibly be recognized by the G overnm ent. (33)
The P eking-orien ted fac tion  o f the Party is s t il l b a ttlin g  on w ith  l i t t le  sign 
o f being prepared to meet the G overnm ent.
The S ovie t in terest in the Philipp ines is derived from its general desire 
to have greater in fluence  in Southeast Asian countries than C h ina , and the 
prestige o f weaning away from the Am erican b loc one o f the la tte r 's  most 
dependable d isc ip les . A t  present the state o f S ov ie t-P h ilip p in e  re la tions 
is favourable -  a lthough , from the S ovie t v ie w , not to so great an exten t 
tha t i t  excludes equa lly  favourable  progress in M a n ila -P ek ing  re la tion s .
4 . A lthough Thailand established d ip lom a tic  re la tions w ith  the Soviet
Union as long ago as 1947 contact between the two countries has remained 
at a ra ther low le v e l. N o r has there been any considerable linkage between 
the Soviet Union and the subversive movements tha t operate in T ha iland .
Such movements are c h ie fly  Peking inspired and there are no ind ica tions tha t 
they have any connections w ith  the U .S .S .R . Indeed the opposite , for on 
21 M arch 1970 , 'Radio Peace and Progress' described the leaders o f the 
Communist Parties o f Burma, Thailand and M alaysia  as having isolated them­
selves from the w orking class by the adoption o f 'a d ven tu ris t' Chinese v/ays. 
There is much to suggest tha t the Soviet Union sees no hope o f ach iev ing  
substantial in fluence w ith  the Communist Party o f Thailand (CPT), and so 
is concentra ting  on im proving its re la tions w ith  the Thai G overnm ent. (34)
As in other cases trade is instrumental in this d ip lo m a tic  b id . However, 
despite trade agreements between Thailand and Bulgaria and Rumania being 
signed in M arch 1969, and one w ith  the Soviet Union in December 1970 ,
Thai trade w ith  the Soviet b loc has remained lim ited  (representing less than 
1% o f to ta l Thai exports), and w ith  on ly  a lim ited  po ten tia l for expansion.
( 9 8 N
(33) Asia Research Bu lle t in ,  V o l.  4 N o . 6 , 3 0  Novem ber, 1974. (Six m onth ly 
P o lit ic a l Supplement) pp. 2 9 /3 0 .
(34) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 145.
N or are com m ercial agreements a tta ined  w ith  the ease tha t is natura l -  
a normal a ir  agreement (signed on 6 M ay 1971) took some four years to 
n e g o tia te . (35)
G overnm ental re la tions between the two countries are over-shadowed 
by the Tha i-A m erican  a llia n c e , and although the la tte r has been subjected 
to some pressure w ith ,  and s ince, the N ixon  D o c trin e , Thailand is s t il l a 
member o f SEATED and continues to be used as a base fo r Am erican troops 
and planes. Soviet condemnations are le ve lle d  a t both the U n ited  States 
and the Thai Governm ent -  'The Thai ru ling  set are the on ly  ones to 
bene fit from the Am erican presence '. (36) But by fa r the greatest amount 
o f blame is heaped on the Am erican Government fo r Imposing an unequal 
a llia n c e  on the Thais:-
"There is also every sign tha t the a llia n ce  w ith  the U nited  States 
considerably restricts Thailand 's independent actions on the w orld  
scene. I t  has long become a ru le tha t Bangkok cannot make a step 
w ith o u t look ing  back to W ashington fo r perm ission". (37)
Soviet commentators also blame the a llia n ce  for fo rc ing  Thai invo lvem ent
in the Indo Chinese c o n f l ic t .  (38)
This a ttitude  suits the Thai G overnm ent who are now In d ica tin g  tha t
they are not p a rtic u la r ly  satisfied w ith  the Am erican a llia n c e  -  p a r tic u la r ly
when U .S . support was not guaranteed in d e f in ite ly .  As e a rly  as M arch
1969, Thanat Khoman pointed out tha t the moves towards a reduction  o f the
U .S . commitment in Asia co inc ided  w ith  an increased S ovie t in terest In
the re g ion . (39) In Novem ber o f the same year he to ld  an A m erican audience
th a t:-
" I f  you avoid  a tig e r (China) and come to face a c rocod ile  (S ovie t U n ion), 
i t  is not much o f a c h a n g e .. . I f  we do not have any o ther a lte rn a tiv e , 
may be we w il l  have to liv e  w ith  the c ro co d ile . . .This is e x a c tly  the 
in te rna tiona l pattern tha t may emerge i f  and when the U nited States has 
to y ie ld  to the pressure o f com ple te ly  w ithdraw ing  from this part o f the 
w o r ld . . .  because we cannot c la im  tha t our regional grouping is powerful 
enough. , .  We hope . .  tha t you w i 11 d iscree tly  support the e ffo rts  o f the
(35) Ib id .
(36) SWB. 3 0  J u ly ,  1969. Moscow in English for South A s ia , 1 6 .0 0  G M T . ,2 8 /7 /6 9 .
(37) Ib id .
(38) 'T h a ila n d ', S. G rik u ro v . Southeast A s ia , -  O p . C it .  -  p . 163.
(39) Bangkok Post, 2 0  M arch , 1969
(99)
( IO  O)
A lthough  the la tte r statement was undoubtedly part b lackm ail or th rea t to 
the U n ited  States should i t  continue its w ithdraw al suggestions, there is ye t 
the elem ent o f fe a s ib ility  there -  g iven the S ino-S ov ie t r i f t  why should the 
U .S .S .R . not be viewed as a prospective p ro tector from the Chinese ? This then 
may have been the reason behind the Thai desire to m ain ta in  re la tions w ith  
the S ovie t Union irrespective  o f how modest such re la tions m ight be. So fa r 
l i t t le  e ffo rt has been forthcom ing from the Soviet side on the possible assess­
ment tha t Thailand is more l ik e ly  to regu la rize  its re la tions w ith  China in the 
event o f an Am erican w ithdraw al rather than to expose its e lf to Chinese 
antagonism by p a rtic ip a tin g  in a S ov ie t-o rien ted  fore ign p o lic y . (41) The 
ideal fo r Thailand would be to balance its po ten tia l partners, but fo r this i t  
would be preferab le  to have reg iona l backing; as fo r in d iv id ua l countries 
indu lg ing  in such an e ffo rt there is always the discouraging exam ple o f 
S ihanouk's Cambodia which is fa r too close to Thailand fo r the la tte r to fo rg e t.
5 . The intense Indonesian opposition to the form ation o f M a laysia  placed
the S ovie t Union in a quandary as to what a ttitu d e  to adop t. That M alaysia  
apprecia ted the Sovie t position was shown in Novem ber 1965, when the then 
M alaysian Prime M in is te r, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in answer to a parliam entary  
question said th a t:-
"M a lays ia  w il l  consider having re la tions w ith  any country having any form 
o f ideo logy provided those countries desire fre in d ly  re la tions w ith  M a la y s ia ."  
The on ly  country that was s p e c ific a lly  excluded from this provision was C h in a , 
according to the Tunku M alaysia  would support any re ta lia to ry  moves against 
Peking's in fluence  in Southeast Asia because o f C h ina 's expansionist p o lic y .  (42) 
The ending o f C onfron ta tion  in 1966 was greeted w ith  re lie f  by the Sovie t Union 
as It  le f t  the la tte r free to c u ltiv a te  its re la tions w ith  a ll the Asian parties to the 
d ispu te .
(4 0 )  'Sm aller N a tio n a ' D ip lom acy: Thailand 's Current D ilem m a ', A . Suhrke .
Asian Survey, V o l.  X I ,  N o . 5, May 1971. p. 438.
(41) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 145
nations o f the area who are try in g  to form a cohesive g ro u p in g ". (4 0 )
(42) ^Bangkok Post, II Novem ber, 1965
Due to the fac t tha t the M alayan Communist Party has remained
so lid ly  P eking-orien ted the Soviet Union was v ir tu a lly  forced in fo  a position
where they had to seek to establish good re la tions w ith  the incumbent
governm ent. A  s itua tion  w h ich  ifi roGont y ears has suited Soviet po lic ies  and
approaches in Southeast A s ia . By the end o f 1967 a Soviet trade mission
had been established in Kuala Lumpur, and the setting up o f d ip lom a tic
missions at ambassadorial leve l had been announced. (43) The formal
establishment o f d ip lom a tic  re la tions fo llow ed  in 1968. Soviet broadcasts
ce lebra ted these links as the breaking o f a monopoly that the Western c a p ita lis t
powers had sought to impose over M a la ys ia . (44) Peking, in tu rn , condemned
these S ov ie t-M a lays ian  links as:-
" . . .T h e  S ovie t re v is io n is ts ., (w orking) hard hand in g love w ith  the U .S . 
im peria lists to organize a n ti-C h in a , anti-C om m unist and a n ti-pe o p le  
Southeast Asia regional coopera tion , thus pushing a h e a d . . . .  the ir 
co lla bo ra tio n  w ith  M a lays ia . (45)
C e rta in ly  in one respect this statement rung tru e , the Soviet c u lt iv a tio n  o f
M alaysia  was a n ti-P e k in g .
The Soviet U n ion , how ever, c la im ed the r ig h t to trade w ith  such 
'c a p ita lis t1 countries as M a laysia ; i t  was pointed out tha t many types o f states 
'Inhab ited  the same Earth, and as they could not get rid  o f each other they had 
to liv e  w ith  each o th e r1. Furtherm ore, i t  was cla im ed that 'no t to have any 
dealings w ith  them would be to p lay the im peria lis ts ' game'; that Chinese 
firms were doing a th riv ing  trade in M a lays ia , and tha t the Maoists in the ir 
chauvinism  considered themselves 'e n title d  to start a fire  w h ile  fo rb idd ing  
others even to sw itch on the l ig h t '.  (46) Soviet trade w ith  M alaysia  continued 
to expand -  rubber m a in ta in ing  its position as the main com m odity. Indeed, 
the U .S .S .R . became the biggest buyer o f M alaysian rubber -  by 1969 purchasing 
up to 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons p .a .  In September 1969, the firs t S ov ie t-M a lays ian  
trade and industria l e xh ib itio n  was organized in Kuala Lumpur, and the same
(43) Straits Times, 4 A p r i l ,  1967 
Straits Times, 24 Novem ber, 1967
(44) SWB. 16 February, 1968. Moscow in English fo r South A s ia , 1 0 . 0 0  G M T .,
14/2/68. S U /2 6 9 7 /A 3 /3 .
SWB. 25 M ay, 1968. Tass in English, 16.59 G M T ., Moscow Home S erv ice , 
1 9 .0 0  G M T .,  2 3 /5 /6 8 . S U /2 7 7 9 /A 3 /3 .
(45) Straits Times, 29 M ay, 1968
(46) SWB. 22 February, 1969. Talk in Standard Chinese (K uoyu), 0 9 . 3 0  G M T ., 
1 8 /2 /6 9 . S U /3 0 0 7 /A 3 / I .
year saw a v is it to M alaysia  by the Soviet M in is te r o f Foreign Trade, P ato lichev.
There has been a greater emphasis on increased Soviet exports to M alaysia  due
to the fa c t tha t the la tte r were in n e g lig ib le  proportions during the sixties and
hence the rubber imports had to be paid fo r in conve rtib le  currency, thereby
imposing strains on Soviet resources. (47)
By O ctober 1971, M a lays ia 's  establishment o f d ip lom a tic  re la tions
w ith  Czechoslovakia  le f t  A lb an ia  and East Germany as the on ly European
communist countries w ith  w h ich  i t  d id  not have re la tions; how ever, East
Germany was making approaches to the M alaysian Governm ent regarding
trade re la tion s . Two years la te r d ip lo m a tic  re la tions were established w ith
N orth  V ie tnam , and s im ila r negotia tions were in progress w ith  the G overnm ent
o f N orth  Korea. (48) Relations w ith  the Sovie t Union continued to be cord ia l
w ith  the la tte r e xp lo it in g  the in terna l in s ta b ility  in M alaysia  in Spring 1969,
to blame both Peking and the West for in te rfe rence . The West because:-
"The Western Powers repeated ly tried  to force the M alaysian Governm ent 
to fo llo w  a p o lic y  in accordance w ith  th e ir wishes. For instance, by 
reducing the world price o f rubber they tried  to put economic pressure 
on the c o u n try " .
W ith  regard to Peking:-
"In  recent years, Peking has repeated ly employed Chinese inhabitants o f 
various South-east Asian countries to create in terna l disorder and carry out 
a c tiv it ie s  against governments i t  d is like s . This happened in Burma and 
Indonesia, and i t  is happening at this moment in M a la y s ia ."  (49)
N o t a broadcast that could be guaranteed to improve race re la tions in a
s itua tion  where the la tte r were a lready under severe s tra in .
A nother im portant aspect o f re la tions between Moscow and Kuala
Lumpur was tha t w hich revolved around the proposal to neu tra lize  Southeast
Asia  -  but tha t w il l  be discussed be low .
(102)
(47) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 147
(48) Straits Times, 31 M arch , 1973 
B u lle tin  Today,  2 0  A p r i l,  1973
(49) SWB. 2 0  M a y , 1969. Moscow in Indonesian, 1 5 .0 0  G M T ., 1 6 /5 /69 . 
S U /3 0 7 8 /A 3 / I .
(103)
6 . C oncerning Soviet re la tions w ith  Singapore there is re a lly  l i t t le
to re p o rt. Singapore was proclaim ed an independent state on 9 August,
1965, having fa ile d  to settle  its e lf com fortab ly w ith in  the Federation o f 
M a laysia  and S ingapore. As ea rly  as November 1965, the Deputy 
Prime M in is te r o f Singapore led a delegation  to the Soviet Union and an 
agreement was reached, in p r in c ip le , to establish a Soviet trade mission 
and a Tass o ffic e  in S ingapore. A p r il 1966 saw a rec ip roca l v is it by a 
S ovie t trade de legation  w h ich  resulted in a trade agreement and the 
establishm ent o f a permanent trade m ission. D ip lom a tic  re la tions a t embassy 
leve l were set up in 1968 -  a move tha t the Soviet Union in terpreted as 
frustra ting  the 'attempts by the im peria lis t Powers to establish fu ll contro l 
over the former British co lonies in Southeast A s ia '.  (5 0 )  Despite the 
establishm ent o f such re la tions , the Singaporean Foreign M in is te r, M r. 
Rajaratnam, c r it ic iz e d  in no uncerta in  manner the Soviet invasion o f 
C zechoslovakia  in August 1968. (51)
W ith  regard to trade Singapore's main s ign ificance  to the Soviet 
Union is its fa c ilit ie s  fo r ship repairs and the importance o f Singapore's 
en trepot trade -  much o f the Soviet purchased M alaysian and Indonesian 
rubber being shipped through the re . (52) In A p r il 1971, a three-m an 
de lega tion  from the Soviet M in is try  o f M erchant M a rin e , v is it in g  S ingapore, 
said tha t the la tte r would be the main port o f c a ll for the Sovie t merchant 
f le e t as i t  increases its trade w ith  Asian countries. The de lega tion  also 
proposed the setting up o f a jo in t shipping line  by S ingapore, M alaysia  
and the Soviet U n ion . (53) However, the translation o f suggestions in to  
firm  proposals has been slow .
Moscow continues to be conscious o f the fac t tha t a large 
percentage o f the Singaporean popula tion is o f Chinese o r ig in , and w h ile  
emphasizing the 'na tiona l un ity  is one o f the essentials o f na tiona l deve lop­
m e n t', i t  never misses a chance to warn against the threat o f the 'G re a t
(5 0 )  SWB. II June , 1968. English for South A sia , 1 5 .0 0  G M T .,  9 /6 /6 8 .  
S U /2 7 9 2 /A 3 /2 .
(51) S traits Times, 24 August, 1968
(52) Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  p . 148
(53) Singapore Radio, 29 A p r i l,  1971. C ited  in U .S .S .R . and Third W orld .
V o l.  I .  N o . 5 , 26 A p r il -  1 June , 1971, p . 235.
Power chauvin is t ideas w hich Peking is e ithe r d ire c t ly  or in d ire c tly  
imposing on the overseas Chinese in South-east A s ia 1. (54) N o t a 
w arn ing  tha t the Prime M in is te r o f Singapore is in need o f.
THOUGHTS ABOUT THE THIRD ELEPHANT
So much for the Soviet Union's re la tions w ith  in d iv id u a l Southeast 
Asian coun tries . However, in a speech de live red  to the Moscow W orld  Conference 
o f Communist Parties, 7 June 1969, Leonid Brezhnev made a b r ie f reference to a 
new proposal tha t was to apply to the whole o f A s ia :-
"We are also o f the opin ion  tha t the course o f events is also b ring ing  to the 
fore the need to create a c o lle c tiv e  security  system in A s ia " .  (55)
This comment has been described as 'an exercise in k i te - f ly in g 1, and the Soviet 
Ambassador to Japan, Troyanovskiy, adm itted tha t the U .S .S .R . had not worked 
out any sp ec ific  plans for the scheme and were not even decided on w h ich  countries 
should be in v ite d  to jo in .  (56)
W hy v/as this system proposed and subsequently endorsed in G rom yko's 
report on fore ign  p o licy  to the S ixth Session o f the U .S .S .R . Supreme S ov ie t, 
on 10 J u ly  1969 ? C e rta in ly  there was an a n ti-C h in a  aspect to i t ,  w ith  the Soviet 
media a mere week before the Brezhnev speech going so far as to c a ll fo r ‘common 
re so lu tio n 1 in Asia on the grounds tha t 'some figures in A s ia , obsessed by G rea t 
Power chauvin ism , have renounced the p rinc ip les o f peaceful coexistence o f 
states w ith  d iffe re n t social systems and are even resorting to force in fu t ile  
attempts to achieve world leadersh ip1. (57) Besides this an ti-C h inese  aspect 
there was the background o f the Sovie t Union's expanding interests in A s ia , 
its desire fo r greater cooperation w ith  its southern neighbours -  In d ia , Pakistan,
(54) 'Radio Peace and Progress' in Chinese fo r Southeast A s ia , 14 M a y , 1971,
C ited  in U *S #S .R . and the Third W orld  -  O p . C i t e -  p . 234 .
(55) Speech reported on Moscow Horns Service*, 11.15 G M T . and Tas$, in English, 
1 2 .3 0  G M T . 7 June , 1969. SWB. S U /3 0 9 4 /C /2 6 .
(56) Kyodo, 2 J u ly ,  1969. C ited  in S ovie t Policy towards the Indian Sub- 
C o n tine n t, I .  C la rk . (Seminar Paper, D ept* o f In te rna tiona l Relations,
A . N . U . ,  A p r i l ,  1972) p . 13.
(57) Tass Report, I June, 1969* C ited  in C la rk  -  O p . C i t .  -  p . I I ,
(104)
A fghanistan and Iran (58) -  and as an a ttem pt to lim it  Am erican invo lvem ent 
on the co n tin e n t. A ll th is , i t  was fe l t ,  could be achieved by c u rta ilin g  
in tra -re g io n a l co n flic ts  and establishing some form o f m u ltila te ra l a llia n c e  
to w h ich  the United States -  and hope fu lly  China -  would not be pa rties .
However accusations tha t the whole concept was an attem pt to establish an 
an ti-C h inese  a llia n ce  are vehem ently denied by Soviet commentators, w h ile  
am b igu ities  in both the doctrine  its e lf and its presentation a llo w  for a m u lt i­
p l ic i ty  o f escape hatches. (59)
The ea rly  days o f the proposal were overshadowed by a com bination 
o f unce rta in tie s , a cool reception by many o f the Asian countries a t w h ich  i t  was 
d irec ted  and v iru le n t attacks on the whole scheme by the Chinese m ed ia . (6 0 )
In the face o f th is there was an increasing emphasis tha t the fin a l shape o f the 
system should be decided by the Asians themselves, w ith  the Soviet U nion 's ro le  
being set as one *prepared to take part in the co nsu lta tions '. (61) W h ile  
references continued to be made by Sovie t leaders and some o f th e ir Asian v is ito rs , 
a n d /o r hosts, to the idea o f c o lle c tiv e  se cu rity , there appeared to be l i t t le  e ffo rt 
made to re a lly  sell the plan w ith  the la rge-sca le  campaign tha t would be needed. 
This, how ever, was probably due to the Soviet fear o f provoking o u trig h t re je c t io n . 
N everthe less, fu rthe r moves were made by M r. Brezhnev towards d e fin in g  the 
proposal -  in his address to the F ifteen th  Congress o f the Soviet Trade U n ions:-
"C o lle c t iv e  security  in A s ia , as we see i t ,  should be based on such p rin c ip le s  
as the renuncia tion  o f the use o f force in re la tions among states, respect o f 
sovere ignty and in v io la b il ity  o f fro n tie rs , non-in te rfe rence  in in te rna l 
a ffa irs , extensive developm ent o f econom ic and other cooperation on the basis 
o f fu ll e q u a lity  and mutual advantage«, (62)
(105)
(58) lA  System o f C o lle c tive  S ecu rity *, P. Howard. M iz a n , V o l.  X I .  N o .  4 , 
J u ly /A u g u s t, 1969. p . 2 0 2 c
(59) Examples o f the ambiguous a ttitu d e  taken -  a Moscow Radio broadcast o f
8 J u ly ,  1969, c le a rly  ind luded China in the system; w h ile  an a r t ic le  in 
M zvestia1,  by M atveyev le f t  the question open -  3 August, 1969. O ther 
broadcasts suggested tha t i t  was China*s own fa u lt tha t i t  was e xc lu d e d .
Jukes -  O p . C it .  -  pp . 2 4 /2 5 0
(6 0 )  SWBC 2 January, 1974. N C N A  in English, 2 0 . 5 0  G M T ., 31/12/1973, 
F E /4 4 8 9 /A I/1 . SWB. 3 0  June , 1969 N C N A  in English, 0 9 .1 8  G M T .,  
2 8 /6 /1 9 6 9 . F E /3 II2 /A 2 /1 .
(61) A ndre i Gromyko at the 24th Session o f the U .N .  G eneral Assembly, 1969. 
C ited  in C o lle c tive  Security  fo r A s ia , V . Pavlovsky (N ovosti Press, 1973)p.53,
(62) C ited  in 'C o lle c tiv e  Security in A s ia 1, I .  C la rk . Round Table, V o l.  63,
N o . 252, O ctober 1973, pp. 4 7 7 /8 .
(106)
There have, over the past four years, been pe riod ic  in tens ifica tions in attempts 
to have the idea o f a c o lle c tiv e  security  system accep ted . Y e t despite the 
p u b lic ity  Moscow has m aintained a re luctance in specify ing  the type o f security  
system i t  envisages. W h ile  leaving  its e lf maximum f le x ib i l i t y ,  this re luctance 
has manoeuvred the Soviet Union in to  a position in w h ich  many o f its prospective 
a llie s  are uncerta in  o f the motives behind the Soviet proposal, and hence tend 
to in te rp re t them in a worse ra ther than a bette r l ig h t .  An example o f this is 
the v iew  expressed by the M alaysian G overnm ent M in is te r, G ha za li bin S ha fie , 
when speaking o f the four b ig powers a c tive  in Southeast A s ia , he to ld  a 
C ingapore conference a t the end o f 1973, ‘ Perhaps the Sovie t Union is the one 
tha t appears to be m o v in g .. .  w ith  a design and a purpose'. However, Shafie 
co n tin u ed :-
" I t  would seem that any Soviet in it ia t iv e  tha t is designated or even on ly  
such as to appear to fu rther the S ovie t cause in the S ino -S ov ie t dispute is not 
l ik e ly  to gain the support o f countries in the reg ion . This fac to r is unfortunate 
because the Sovie t Union has much to contribu te  to the developm ent o f the 
re g io n ."  (63)
Fear o f g e tting  themselves invo lved  in an an ti-C h inese  scheme has frigh tened o ff
many Southeast Asian countries from consideration o f the S ovie t p roposal.
H ow ever, o ther Asian states have adopted a w a it and see a tt itu d e . Typ ica l o f
the la tte r is the Thai Government w h ich  has expressed a cautious in terest in the
Asian security  plan -  according to the 'Bangkok Post1 (a newspaper w hich usually
re flec ts  the views o f the Thai Foreign M in is try ) -
" I f  the Sovie t Union is merely try ing  to broaden the base o f its cooperation w ith  
countries in the region on a ll matters, not exc lud ing  defense, and is not p lanning 
to set up an a n ti-P ek ing  fron t fo r its own reasons, the Soviet moves deserve 
care fu l co n s id e ra tio n ." (64)
I t  is tru e , how ever, that i f  a ll the Southeast Asian countries were assured tha t
such were the motives behind the Soviet proposal then there would be few  that
would re fra in  from granting i t  carefu l cons ide ra tion .
(63) M alaysian  D igest, 31 O ctobe r, 1973. p . IO .  C ited  in 'S ino -S ov ie t 
R iva lry  in Southeast A s ia ',  D . W ilson . Problems o f Communism, Vol .X X I I I ,  
N o . 5 , S ep tem ber/O ctober, 1974. p . 4 0 .
(64) C ited  in 'S ov ie t Security O b jec tives  in A s ia ', M . K irsch . In te rna tiona l 
O rgan isa tion , V o l.  X X IV , N o . 3 , Summer 1970 . p . 468.
Besides the fear o f an tagon iz ing  China another reason for the re je c tio n , 
or la ck  o f in te res t, (65) in the Soviet c o lle c t iv e  security proposal is the Southeast 
Asian preference fo r the ir own n e u tra liza tio n  plans. I t  fe ll to the M alaysian 
Prime M in is te r to v is it Moscow in O ctober 1972, to exp la in  this p re fe rence. In 
answer to questions a t a press conference, Tun Razak pointed out tha t w h ile  the 
ob jec tives  o f c o lle c tiv e  security  and n e u tra liza tio n  were essentia lly  the same,
'O u r n e u tra liza tio n  proposals re la te  to a sm aller a rea. To bring in the big 
countries in Asia in to  such a scheme w il l  be to bring In problems w hich  w e , the 
small countries (in  Southeast A s ia ), may find  d if f ic u l t  to re so lve '. (66) A lthough  
l i t t le  d e fin ite  came out o f this meeting the Soviet response was by no means 
unfavou rab le . Furthermore, im m ediate ly p rio r to the S ov ie t-M a iays ian  ta lks , 
the Polish Governm ent made an unequivocal statement o f support for the n eu tra l­
iza tio n  proposal. A jo in t communique issued stated th a t:-
"The Prime M in is te r o f M alaysia  exp la ined  his government's proposal for 
the n e u tra liza tio n  o f Southeast Asia and Premier Jaroszew icz expressed his 
support for the efforts o f the M alaysian Governm ent aimed at the conso lida tion  
o f peace and n e u tra lity . "  (67)
To what exten t this Polish support for the concept o f neu tra liza tion  was an
Ind irec t Soviet approval is d i f f ic u l t  to ascerta in . Bordering also on this category
is the support g iven by N orth  Korea, in January 1974, for1 the ASEAN proposal
fo r the n eu tra liza tion  o f Southeast A s ia ',  (68) a lthough In the la tte r case i t  may
v/e ll be more d ire c t ly  connected w ith  in terna l Korean developm ents.
Despite the enormous d ip lom a tic  strides tha t the Soviet Union has
made in Southeast A s ia , o ther countries in the region have displayed no greater
w illln g ie ss  than M alaysia  to barter th e ir n eu tra liza tion  scheme for the Sovie t
c o lle c t iv e  security  proposals. .N o r has Moscow's new approach -  o f a ttem pting  to
use Ind ia  to obta in  the support o f Indonesia, w hich i t  regards as the key to the
success o f the proposal -  achieved any more successful results . (69) Indonesia
(65) President Podgorny's advocacy o f this scheme met w ith  l i t t le  response from 
Ne W in when they met in Rangoon in 1971. M alaysian and Indonesian 
reactions have also been less than warm .
(66) Asia Research B u lle tin , V o l. 3 , N o . 9 , February 1974. p . 2489 BC.
(67) Straits Times, 6 O ctober, 1972
(68) Straits Times, 3 0  September, 1972
(69) Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 M a y , 1973
(107)
is not l ik e ly  to welcome the establishm ent o f any supra-nationa l organizations, 
presided over by an e x tra -re g io n a l great pow er, in its part o f the w o rld .
Indeed as ea rly  as O ctober 1969, i t  was made c lea r th a t:-
"S ince Indonesia re jects a ll m ilita ry  pacts, she also is not fascinated by 
the concept o f Asian c o lle c tiv e  se cu rity , an idea "dropped" by the K rem lin , 
a concept w h ich  opposes the new' th ink ina  develop ing in the U nited S ta te s . . . "  
( 7 0 ) .
The Foreign M in is te r, Adam M a lik ,  la te r condemned the Soviet proposal because 
i t  was ‘not ye t c le a r1 ; w h ils t M a lik  aiso pointed out tha t the d iffe rence  between 
the S ovie t idea and the 1971 Kuala Lumpur D ec la ra tion  for a zone o f n e u tra lity , 
was tha t the former had been proposed by the Russians a lone , w h ile  the other 
plan was supported by many coun tries. (71) N o t even a v is it by the S ovie t Deputy 
Foreign M in is te r, M r. F iryub in  to Indonesa, in March 1974, managed to w in  
Indonesian support fo r the S ovie t scheme.
Due to a general fa ilu re  to inspire regional enthusiasm for its plan the 
S ovie t Union has been accused o f e x p lo it in g  every opportun ity  to c la im  a 
degree o f endorsement, o ften u n ju s tif ia b ly . In support o f this accusation 
reports from Soviet commentators, such as V ik to r Mayevsky o f Pravda, are 
c ited  when they w rite  tha t the Soviet proposal has the support o f 'lead ing  
statem en1 in Ind ia  and other Asian states, in c lud ing  M a lays ia . In fa c t the 
main welcome that has been g iven to the proposal -  and tha t a q u a lif ie d  one -  
came from two o f the Soviet U nion 's immediate neighbours, Iran and 
A fghan is tan . (72)
(7 0 )  Harian Operasi Indonesian, 7 O ctobe r, 1969
(71) S traits Times, 25 August, 1973
Straits Times, 8 M arch , 1974; II M arch 1974.
M elbourne Radio, 9 M a rch , 1974. C ited  in U .S ,S . R. and Third W orld  
V o l.  IV . N o . 3 , 4 M arch -  21 A p r i l ,  1974.
(72) Iran on the basis o f a communique w hich was issued at the end o f a v is it 
to Moscow by the Iranian Prime M in is te r in August 1973. The v is it to the 
S ovie t Union by President Daoud o f A fghan is tan , in June 1974, produced 
a s im ila r agreement -  accord ing to 'P ravda1 on 9 June, tha t 'the crea tion  
o f a c o lle c tiv e  security system by the c o lle c tiv e  efforts o f a ll the states
in Asia would meet the interests o f Asian peop les '. However, this too was 
q u a lif ie d . C ited  in U .S .S .R . and Third W o rld , M a rc h /A p r i l, l9 7 4 . -  
O p . C it .  -  p . 2.
(I 0 8 )
The confron ta tion  between the Soviet c o lle c t iv e  security  idea and the 
Southeast Asian concept o f n e u tra liza tio n  has led to an in teresting deve lopm ent. 
O n ly  some two years ago the G eneral Secretary o f an Asian Communist Party 
(Sri Lanka) could  on ly  see two a lte rna tives  fo r the Asian co n tin e n t:-
"The idea o f 'c o lle c tiv e  se cu rity1 coun tering  the strategy o f in te rnec ine  war 
is th e  o n ly  re a lis tic  a lte rna tive  to the Guam D octrine  ( i . e .  N ixo n  D o c trin e )"
(73)
Towards the close o f the same year A le x e i Kosygin, Head o f the Sovie t G overn ­
m ent, during  Tun Razak's v is it  to the Soviet U n ion , said th a t:-
"We understand M alaysia 's in terest in norm alis ing the s itua tion  in Southeast 
A s ia , o f w h ich  you M r. Prime M in is te r spoke during  our ta lk s . Y our 
in terest finds a re f le c tio n , among o ther th ings, in the known plan fo r 
n e u tra liza tio n  o f Southeast A s ia . We trea t w ith  respect many consider­
ations in this p la n ."  (74)
A lthough  the jo in t  communique issued a t the end o f this v is it d id  not ind ica te
any d e fin ite  agreement over the n e u tra liza tio n  proposals, there would appear
to be a grow ing number o f attempts to equate the concept o f c o lle c t iv e  security
w ith  tha t o f n e u tra liz a tio n . It has been pointed out tha t both proposals:-
" ..........Advocate  p rinc ip les o f non-use o f force in se ttling  controversia l
issues, respect fo r sovereignty and te r r ito r ia l in te g r ity , e q u a lity  and non­
in terfe rence  in in terna l a f fa irs ."  (75)
Such an account o f the ASEAN n e u tra liza tio n  proposals being a fa r c ry  from
e a r lie r  descriptions o f that o rgan iza tion  and its purposes:-
" . . .T h e  U .S . im peria lists are seeking more f le x ib le  ways o f persuading 
the independent Asian nations to the U .S . l in e .  Washington is now 
using those nations and to per suade them to set up a lliances  lik e  ASEAN 
and A S P A C .. .  There is no doubt tha t such new m ilita ry  groupings would 
have close ties w i t h . . . .  the U .S . im peria lis ts ' pol icy  o f aggression in 
Southeast A s ia . " (76)
W hat was to account for the change in Soviet a ttitu d e  ? C e rta in ly
the re la tiv e  a c c e p ta b ility  o f the n e u tra liza tio n  proposals compared w ith  the
coolness w ith  w hich the c o lle c tiv e  security  system was rece ived has p layed its
p a rt. H ow ever, another underly ing  fac to r may w e ll have been the fea r o f a
to ta l U .S . w itk -d ra w a l from the region before the Soviet Union was in a position
(73) Pavlovsky -  O p . C it .  -  p . 63.
(74) Pavlovsky -  O p . C it .  -  p . 66
(75) Ib id .
(76) SW3. 3 0  June, 1969. Moscow in T ha i, I I .  O O  G M T .,  2 6 /6 /19 6 9 . 
S U /3 I I2 /A 3 /3 .
(109)
to prevent any po ten tia l Chinese expansion in to  the a rea. W h ile  
f in a l ly ,  i t  is possible that the Soviet Union has decided to adopt a more 
ve rsa tile  a ttitu d e  to A s ia , con tinu ing  to press its c o lle c tiv e  security system 
on the immediate Asian neighbours o f the U .S .S .R . (exc lud ing  China -  
a lthough not obviously so) and the countries o f South A s ia , w h ile  leaving 
its e lf free to support the n eu tra liza tion  o f Southeast A s ia , i f  the la tte r 
appears feasib le  in the fu tu re . W h ile  undoubtedly p re fe rring  its own 
scheme -  w h ich  was described by the Chinese as being p icked up from the 
'garbage-heap o f the notorious war-m onger John Foster D u lles1 (77) -  the 
S ovie t Union has been le ft  in a position in w h ich  i t  cannot denounce 
n e u tra liza tio n  openly fo r fear tha t Peking would c a p ita liz e  on such an 
a tt itu d e . The last decade has witnessed too much d ip lom a tic  e ffo rt and 
f le x ib i l i t y  o f approach being invested by the Soviet Union in Southeast 
Asia  fo r the results to be undermined by r ig id ity  a t this stage in the game.
(110)
(77) Hsinhua, 28 June, 1969. C ited  in 'The Soviet System o f C o lle c tiv e  
S ecurity  in A s ia ', A .  G hebhard t, Asian Survey, V o l.  X I I I ,  N o . 12, 
Decem ber, 1973.
(Ill)
CHAPTER SIX 
INTERESTED NEIGHBOURS:
O ther externa l powers besides the three G rea t Powers have an
in terest in the Southeast Asian reg ion . O f these i t  is fa ir  to designate
A u s tra lia , N ew  Zealand and Ind ia  as 'in terested neighbours1,  ex is ting
essen tia lly  on the sidelines o f Southeast A s ia . Japan, on the other hand,
is more in tim a te ly  invo lved in the region and w h ile  i t  cannot be placed on
the same leve l as the Elephants, i t  does w arrant special cons ide ra tion . Its
decisions have a g lobal s ign ificance  tha t cannot be overlooked , w h ile  th e ir
im pact on the Southeast Asian region are unden iab ly im portan t.
A lthough  shifts in the in te rna tiona l power structure have not le ft
-arrhecloce o$t974- 
Japan untouched by change, the Arnerican-Japanese alIiancep++44 forms
the backbone o f Japanese fore ign p o lic y . (I) I t  is true tha t Japan may
w e ll have fe lt  a sense o f outrage at the lack o f consu lta tion  invo lved  in the
‘ N ixo n  shocks' -  these consisted o f President N ixo n 's  announcem ent, w ith o u t
p rio r consu lta tion  w ith  Tokyo, in J u ly  1971, tha t he would v is it  Peking and
Moscow; and the fo llo w in g  m onth, the im position o f a IO %  surcharge on
fore ign  goods (the U .S . is Japan's biggest customer) and the deva lua tion
o f the d o lla r -  but subsequent Japanese fore ign p o lic y  has e xh ib ite d  l i t t le
change tha t would not have been demanded by the N ixo n  D octrine  in any
case.
A  com bination o f econom ic d if f ic u lt ie s  (2) and the thaw in C old W ar
(1) Asia Research B u lle tin , V o l . 3 , N o . 7 , December 1973. p . 2322 A .  
A ccord ing  to Prime M in is te r Tanaka -  'The U .S . -  Japan S ecu rity  Treaty 
is the basic framework o f s ta b ility  not just fo r Japan but fo r a ll o f A s ia 1.
(2) Far Eastern Economic R ev iew , 13 M a y , 1974. In fisca l year 1973 
(end ing  March 1974) Japan suffered its biggest d e f ic it  in in te rna tiona l 
balance o f payments -  $ 1 3 ,4 0 0  m illio n  -  w h ich  sharply compares w ith  
surpluses o f $ 8 ,0 4 3  m illio n  in 1971 and $2,962 m illio n  in 1972. Currency 
reserves tha t had h it a peak o f $ 1 9 ,2 0 0  m illio n  in February 1973, had 
a lready dec lined  three months la te r to $ 1 2 ,0 0 0  m il l io n .  Besides this 
there were worries o f o il shortages.
a ttitudes in the United States has encouraged Japan to re-assess its 
re la tions w ith  the Soviet Union and C h in a . The S ino-Am erican  rapproche­
ment marked the turning po in t In the Japanese a ttitude  towards the C hinese, 
w h ile  Japanese ‘economic d ip lo m a cy1 w ith  the Soviet Union has been proceed­
ing apcce . Indeed, Japanese a lignm ent has been the subject o f considerable 
S ino -S ov le t r iv a lry ,  w ith  the former making w ide propaganda use o f the 
Japanese-Soviet disagreement over the four northern islands o f Habom ai, 
S h iko tan, Kumashiri and E toro fu . (3) The Soviet U n ion , fo r its p a rt, has 
been seeking Japanese investment in a number o f S iberian pro jects whose 
pro jected crude o il y ie ld  to Japan has been estimated a t some 2 5 -4 0  m illio n  
tons per year, fo r some 2 0  years. (4) fteeont d i l  shortages have made such 
offers a ttra c tive  to the Japanese.
Needless to say the Chinese reaction  to Soviet-Japanese nego tia tions 
has been clamourous dissent, w h ile  d ivers ionary tac tics  have sought to  enhance 
Sino-Japanese re la tions . D ip lom a tic  re la tions between the two countries 
were established in September 1972, and in January 1974, a b ila te ra l trade 
agreement form alized the a lready s ig n ific a n t flo w  o f trade , w h ile  la y in g  the 
foundations fo r the expansion and improvement o f the la t te r .  Besides these 
developm ents, Peking's Foreign M in is te r, Chi P eng -fe i, not o n ly  suggested 
tha t Japan needed to m ainta in  its security  trea ty  w ith  the U nited States to 
counter Soviet threats, but also warned against a p rec ip ita ted  scrapping o f the 
trea ty  before Japan had b u ilt  up a c red ib le  defence c a p a b ility .  (5) This is 
a fa r cry from the days when the Chinese broadcasts were a ttack ing  U n ited  
S tates-Japanese-Soviet 'co llu s io n ' in Asia ; i t  Is now the Soviet media tha t 
is stressing the dangers o f a 'Chinese-Japanese lin k  up in the p o lit ic a l and 
econom ic f ie ld s '.  (6)
The ‘econom ic d ip lom acy ' tha t Japan has been using to a large ex ten t 
in its dealings w ith  the Soviet Union and C h in a , has also been used in dea lings
(3) Peking Review , 13 J u ly ,  1973
(4) 'Japan and Russia: The V iew  from T o kyo ', E. Pond. Foreign A ffa irs , V o l.  52 
N o . I ,  O ctober 1973. pp . 147/8.
Far Eastern Economic Review,  19 M a rch , 1973
(5) E. Pond -  O p . C it .  -  p . 152.
(6) SW3. 26 June , I9Ó9. N C N A  in English, 1 2 .0 0  G M T .,  2 3 /6 /19 6 9 . Peking 
Home S erv ice , 1 6 .0 0  G M T ., 2 2 /6 /19 6 9 . F E /3 1 0 9 /A V 4 .
Moscow Radio -  17 M arch , 1973. C ited  in Aslan Analysis ,  A p r i l , 1973, p . 3 .
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w ith  Southeast A s ia . A lthough in re la tion  to its carefu l manoeuvrings to 
establish satisfactory links w ith  theG rea t Powers, Japan's treatm ent o f Southeast 
Asia  w ould appear to place the la tte r in a position as an appendage to Japanese 
trade p o lic y . Despite the fac t tha t Japan is h e a v ily  enmeshed in interdependent 
econom ic re la tions w ith  the Southeast Asian region its economic strength and 
h istory o f im peria lism  are su ffic ie n t to place i t  on a separate leve l -  resu lting 
in the con tinua tion  o f Southeast Asian suspic ion, and even h o s t il ity ,  to the 
Japanese. In its most extreme form this assumes tha t Japan is seeking to construct 
by econom ic means the 'D a i Toa Kyoei Ken' (G rea te r East Asian C o-P rosperity 
Sphere) under Japanese hegemony tha t i t  fa ile d  to achieve through m ilita ry  m ig h t.
A  boyco tt o f Japanese goods in Thailand in la te  1972 appears to 
have had a considerable im pact on Japanese leaders and prompted some serious 
thought about the Japanese image in Southeast A s ia . A t  G overnm ent leve l moves 
were made to improve the q u a lity  and terms o f Japanese a id . The Japanese 
Economic Research Institu te  issued a general repo rt, the fo llo w in g  ye a r, w h ich  
recommended tha t in te rna tiona l p u b lic  re la tions should be seen as a m atter o f the 
highest p r io r ity .  This po in t was f in a l ly  d riven home by the rio ts and demonstrations 
tha t marked Prime M in is te r Tanaka's tour o f the ASEAN countries in January 1974 -  
w ith  the most v io lence  occurring  in Indonesia and Tha iland . A lthough th is led 
to  a Foreign M in is try  spokesman stating tha t the Prime M in is te r would take advantage 
o f his experience in Southeast Asia to remove sources o f loca l com p la in t, there is 
l i t t le  tha t can be done to conceal the econom ic in e q u a litie s . It has been suggested
1973
tha t a t the ppos'ont rate o f growth^ Japan w i l l  have an annual surplus o f some 
US $7 . b il l io n  in its trade w ith  Southeast Asia by the end o f the decade. (7)
Since W orld W ar I I ,  Japan's most im portant goal in Southeast 
Asia has been the promotion o f Its own econom ic developm ent and prosperity 
through ob ta in ing  im portant raw m ateria ls and markets fo r its m anufactures. This 
is set about doing by se ttling  war reparations w ith  various Southeast Asian countries 
and by jo in in g  the Colombo Plan in December 1954. M arch 1955 saw the United 
N a tions Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) ho ld ing  its regular 
m eeting in Tokyo, confirm ing Japan's re-em ergence on the Southeast Asian scene.
By the m id -s ix ties  Japan was combating linge ring  anti-Japanese sentim ent by pouring 
large amounts o f econom ic aid in to  Southeast Asian countries. How ever, the com pla in t
(7) 'Japan's Future Role in Southeast A s ia ',  A .  Singh Rye. New  D irections in the
In te rna tiona l Relations o f Southeast A s ia , (Economic Relations), Lee Soo A n n ,e d .
(Singapore U n ive rs ity  Press, 1973). p . 49.
most frequen tly  le ve lle d  a t Japanese aid has been tha t i t  is rooted in commercial 
considerations -  the most a id being concentrated in those reg ional countries tha t 
Japan does the most trade w ith ,  and tha t furtherm ore, the loans are 't ie d 1 to the 
purchase o f Japanese goods. It is true tha t the Japanese G overnm ent have 
promised to remedy this s itua tion  (8 ). However- Japan has s t i l l  fa r to  go to 
f u l f i l l  its promises fo r the Second U nited N ations Developm ent D ecade.
JA PA N  A N D  THE R E G IO N :
The Southeast Asian region plays a not inconsiderable ro le  in 
Japanese fo re ign  tra d e . The region has s t i l l  an uncharted w ea lth  o f raw m a teria ls , 
w h ile  its p ro x im ity  to Japanese industria l centres and the cheap, though la rg e ly  
u n s k ille d , labour fo rce , enhances its econom ic s ign ificance  to  the Japanese. 
Furtherm ore, Southeast Asia is im portant on the basis o f the expanding markets 
i t  provides and its s tra teg ic importance to the safety o f Japanese com m ercial 
rou tes.
I . I t  is the Philippines tha t does the most trad ing w ith  Japan and receives
more Japanese aid than any o ther Southeast Asian s ta te . N everthe less, its 
a ttitu d e  towards Japan has been marked by b itte r  memories o f the Second W orld  
W ar and the fear o f econom ic dom ina tion . This has been re fle c te d  in the 
successful opposition to the ra t if ic a tio n  o f the Treaty o f F riendship , Commerce 
and N a v ig a tio n  (FCN) -  negotiated w ith  the Japanese in I9 6 0  and ra t if ie d  
by the la tte r a t tha t time -  fo r over a decade. W ith  ra t if ic a t io n  o f the trea ty  
the aim o f the Japanese would appear to be to replace the U n ited  States as 
the Philipp ines major trading  partner, and also to acquire  e q u ity  in m anufacturing 
and e x tra c tive  industries. A lthough it  w il l  be some time ye t before Japanese 
investment can match tha t o f the U nited States, few effo rts  are being spared 
to ach ieve  tha t desired p os ition .
Japan's p rinc ipa l imports from the Philippines are raw m ateria ls , and 
Japan provides the largest market for F ilip in o  tim ber, copper, iron ore and 
m ercury. In 1972, the Philippines exports to Japan were va lued a t US
(8) For the Second United N ations Developm ent Decade, Japan has pledged 
1% o f its G N P  by 1975 and hopes to increase the ra tio  o f O f f ic ia l 
Developm ent Assistance to G N P  and m aintain  basic support fo r 'u n tie d 1 a id .
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$ 4 7 0 .  m il l io n .  (9) By 1973, when Japan became the N o . I .  consumer o f 
P h ilipp ine  products, the figure  had risen to $ 675 m il l io n .  Ph ilipp ine  
purchases from Japan, on the other hand, are mostly cap ita l equipm ent, 
industria l and producer goods. In 1973, the Philippines imported some 
$ 519 m illio n  worth o f Japanese goods, compared to $ 457 m illio n  in 1972.(10) 
Japanese investment has been perm itted in the Philippines since 
1967, and has indeed been encouraged by President Marcos who has p a rtic u la r ly  
strong fee lings about i t .  The bu lk  o f Japanese investment has been channelled  
in to  copper, n ic k e l,  tim ber and stee l; w h ile  a grow ing in terest is being shown 
in the coun try 's  ra p id ly  expanding tou ris t trade . However, a 1972 Study by 
the P h ilipp ine  Board o f Investment in to  d ire c t investment by Japanese enterprises 
in  the Philipp ines and Southeast A s ia , concluded tha t 'securing, m a in ta in ing  
and deve lop ing  markets has been the dom inant m otive fo r Japanese investment 
in the past1. It also warned tha t the establishment o f low -cost bases from 
w h ich  to export back goods to Japan would be o f growing importance during 
the I9 7 0 fs. A lthough Japanese investment brings much needed cap ita l in to  
the coun try r  the P hilipp ine G overnm ent have found tha t some o f its developm ent 
pro jects have been rendered uneconom ical by Japanese export co m p e titio n . (II) 
There would  appear to be a need fo r the Japanese to coordinate the ir commercial 
and th e ir  a id p o lic ie s .
2 . Despite the status o f Japanese-P h ilipp ine  re la tion s , i f  is not u n lik e ly
tha t Japan attaches greater importance to its links w ith  Indonesia -  due to the 
s ize , large popu la tion , s tra teg ic position and im portant raw m ateria ls o f the 
la t te r .  The p o lic y  o f the Suharto G overnm ent o f recovery through econom ic 
developm ent encouraged the Japanese to take the in it ia t iv e  a fte r Sukarno's fa ll 
in reorgan iz ing  a consortium o f Indonesia's creditors to provide a id in an attem pt 
to reduce in fla tio n  and econom ic chaos. M eanw hile  not on ly  was Japan b u ild ing  
up good re la tions w ith  Indonesia, but i t  was promoting its own commerce by 
underw riting  Indonesian imports o f Japanese goods (w ith  government yen 
c re d its ). (12)
(9) S ta tis tica l Handbook o f Japan, 1974, (Bureau o f S ta tis tics , O ffic e  o f the Prime
M in is te r) , p . 87.
(10 ) Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 M a y , 1974
(I!)  'Japanese P o licy toward Southeast A s ia ',  F . Langdon. C o n flic t and S ta b ility  in 
Southeast A s ia . Z a c h e r& M r ln e , eds. (Anchor Books, 1974). p . 335.
(12) F„ Langdon -  O p* C i t e -  p „ 334«,
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Indonesia is im portant to Japan as the producer o f low -su lphur 
content crude o i l ,  w hich is inva luab le  as a n o n -p o llu ta n t fu e l.  Even 
though this o il is on ly  a small part o f Japan ’s to ta l requirem ents, the 
la tte r takes 75% o f Indonesia's o u tp u t. Both the Japanese Governm ent 
and p riva te  enterprise are invo lved  in both the operation o f ex is ting  
o il w e lls  and in prospecting fo r new ones in o ff-shore  areas o ff  Borneo 
and Sumatra. Indonesia has undertaken to supply some 5 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
k ilo litre s  o f o il to Japan over the Imports o f b a u x ite , n icke l
and tim ber are also im portan t.
G iven  the example o f o ther Southeast Asian economies Indonesia has 
managed to  preserve its consumer market from Japanese dom ina tion . In 
fa c t ,  Indonesia has gene ra lly  got a favourable  balance o f trade w ith  Japan -  
its p rinc ipa l imports being m ach inery , chem icals, tex tile s  and industria l 
goods. A ccord ing  to figures from the Japanese M in is try  o f F inance, in 
1972 Indonesian imports o f Japanese goods were valued at some US $65. 
m il l io n ,  w h ile  Indonesian exports to  Japan amounted to $1,198. m il l io n .  (13)
Japanese investment in the coun try has now overtaken the United 
States and is Indonesia's major source o f fore ign  investm ent. There is some 
c o n f lic t  over the short-term  p ro fit investm ent favoured by the Japanese, as 
against the long-te rm  developm ent investment tha t Indonesia needs. W ith  
regard to the la t te r ,  the Indonesians have demanded tha t more re fin ing  
and processing industries should be Indonesian-based, thereby p rov id ing  loca l 
em ploym ent.
Japanese aid to Indonesia is s izeab le , being provided b ila te ta lly  
through ind iv id ua l agreements and m u lt ila te ra lly  v ia  the In te r-G overnm enta l 
G roup on Indonesia (IG G 1). Japan provides o ne -th ird  o f the aid pledged 
by the la t te r .  In add ition  to this a b i- la te ra l agreement was signed in 
M arch 1973, to provide an in it ia l loan o f Yen 6 2 , 0 0 0  m illio n  fo r seventeen 
projects associated w ith  o il in frastructure  deve lopm ent. O ther b ila te ra l 
assistance took the form o f the developm ent o f a h yd ro -e le c tr ic  power station 
and an associated alum inium  smelter a t Asahan, in N orthern  Sumatra.
That such measures, how ever, have not succeeded in to ta lly  w inn ing  over 
the Indonesians was shown by the fa c t that v io le n t demonstrations occurred 
in Indonesia during M r . Tanaka's tour in 1974. It is tru e , how ever, tha t 
the Indonesian ru ling  e lite  have continued to encourage and seek Japanese 
investm ent. _______________________ ___________
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(13) S ta tis tica l Handbook o f Japan , 1974 -  O p . C it .  -  p . 87.
3 . Thailand has been outspoken in pebenV^oofs afefut Japanese
‘econom ic im peria lism 1 -  or at least those sections o f Thai socie ty tha t 
have won the headlines. L it t le  positive  would appear to have resu lted , 
how ever, from the a lleged  ’sou l-sea rch ing ' that fo llow ed  the rio ts o f 
January , 1973. In M arch there was a report o f a Japanese proposal to 
establish a new jo in t committee o f Japanese ana' Thai o ff ic ia ls  to deal w ith  
problems aris ing from Japanese investm ent in the country -  but tha t proposal 
has ye t to be o f f ic ia l ly  concluded by both sides. (14) Despite the fa c t 
tha t Japanese investment in Thailand was con tro lled  somewhat since 
Novem ber 1972, when a number o f changes designed to p ro tec t loca l 
enterprise and control fo re ign  in fluence  were made to Thai investment 
law s, Japan remains safe ly in the N o . I pos ition . A ccord ing  to the 
s ta tis tics o f the Board o f investm ent, Japanese investments in T h a ilan d , as 
o f 31 January , 1974, to ta lle d  3 7 .4 %  o f a ll fore ign investm ents, w ith  the 
U nited States ranking second w ith  16.2% . (15)
There is an extreme trade im balance between the two coun tries , w ith  
Thailand im porting about tw ice  as much from Japan as i t  exports the re .
The figures in 1972 were in the order o f imports valued a t US $552 .7  m il l io n ,  
w h ile  exports amounted to $252.3  m il l io n .  This d e f ic it  has been reduced 
somewhat in the two years fo llo w in g  due to the improved performance o f 
several categories o f Thai goods, in c lud ing  the increased export o f some 
manufactured goods. The developm ent o f this c r it ic a l trade s itua tion  
was p a r tia lly  due to the fa c t tha t previous Thai adm inistrations made l i t t le ,  
or n o , e ffo rt to regulate the flo w  o f Japanese consumer goods in to  the 
co un try .
Japan has provided ce rta in  econom ic assistance fo r Thailand -  
p a rtic u la r ly  for its second and th ird  econom ic developm ent p lans.
Technica l tra in ing  for Thais has also been provided in Japan , w h ile  a 
number o f Japanese experts have worked in Thailand under Japanese 
techn ica l assistance programmes. Potential popu la rity  fo r such gestures, 
however^, has been more than offset by the fee ling  o f econom ic e x p lo ita t io n , 
and by rumours, such as the recent one tha t certa in  Japanese businessmen 
are fin anc ing  some members o f the N a tio na l Leg is la tive  Assembly to obstruct 
the G overnm ent's attem pt to abrogate Revolutionary Party Decree N o . 53 -  
w h ich  would open trade w ith  C h ina . Such rumours w il l  do l i t r le  to ease the 
a lready tense atmosphere concern ing Thai-Japanese econom ic re la tion s , nor 
indeed, to make the 6 , 0 0 0  -  7 , 0 0 0  member Japanese com m unity in
(14) Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 M a y , 1974
ilR\ Ik:”'
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4 . A nti-Japanese  feelings in M alaysia  are kept w e ll under contro l due
to the v ig ila n c e  o f the M alaysian Prime M in is te r^ Tun Razak* I f  there 
is d isapproval o f ce rta in  Japanese practices i t  is registered a t an o f f ic ia l 
leve l -  as occurred in June I973r when the "S tra its  Timss" c la im ed tha t 
M a laysia  m ight boyco tt the M in is te ria l Conference fo r the Economic 
Developm ent o f Southeast Asia in Tokyo, in O c tobe r, because o f Japan's 
'in d iffe re n c e ' towards the econom ic developm ent o f countries in the re g io n .
I t  added tha t the meeting would serve no purpose i f  Japan continued its 
'aggressive econom ic p o l ic y '.  W h ile  this threat was not carried out i t  was 
a sign o f o f f ic ia l displeasure over Japan's fast-expand ing production o f 
syn the tic  rubber, w h ich  i t  is feared in time w il l  erode the econom ic base o f 
rubber-p roducing  countries in Southeast Asia -  M a laysia  its e lf being a m ajor 
one . In A p r il 1973, Tun Ismail made this po in t when he c r it ic iz e d  the 
expansion o f this Japanese industry and said tha t by exporting  syn the tic  
rubber Japan was depriv ing  M alaysia  o f its liv e lih o o d .
Japan is M a laysia 's  leading trad ing  partner -  in 1973, Japan accounted 
fo r 23% o f M a laysia 's  to ta l imports and 19% o f its to ta l exports. The la tte r 
are p rim a rily  raw m ateria ls -  t in ,  rubber, palm o i l ,  b u a x ite , tim ber and iron 
ore; w h ile  M alaysia 's  imports are in the m anufacturing f ie ld .  Some Japanese 
consumer goods are assembled or manufactured in M a la ys ia , m a in ly  w ith  
Chinese partners. W h ile  the large M alayaw ata Steel m ill in M a lays ia  was 
sponsored by Japan, and is 39% Japanese owned.
Japanese investment in jo in t-ve n tu re  industries is encouraged and 
Japan ranks fourth among investing coun tries. Tun Razak put the 1972 figure  
for Japanese investment a t about M$ 5 0 ,  O O O , O O O  in some f i f t y  d iffe re n t 
industries, inc lud ing  e le c tro n ics , copper m ining and s h ip b u ild in g . The 
copper m in ing p ro jec t in the Mamut V a lle y , Sabah, is expected to produce 
some 5 , 2 5 0 , O O O  tons o f copper ore a year for 15 years, when in fu l l 
p roduc tion . A  Japanese consortium w il l  hold 51% e q u ity , and the en tire  
output o f the mine is to be exported to Japan.
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Thailand feel a t home.
A id  to M a laysia  from Japan is not as extensive as i t  is to other 
Southeast Asian countries, and is subject to s im ila r critic ism s -  't ie d  a id 1, 
the fac t tha t lines o f c re d it are o ften d ire c t ly  re la ted  to the promotion o f 
Japanese exports and the r ig id  procedures invo lved  in app ly ing  fo r and 
re ce iv ing  a id  disbursements.
5 . S ingapore's re la tions w ith  Japan -  despite com plaints about business
practices and the neg lec t o f loca l s ta ff -  tend to be on a good businesslike 
basis. A  fa c t tha t is perhaps encouraged by a ce rta in  s im ila r ity  in c ircum ­
stance and o u tlo o k . Japanese invo lvem ent in the island repub lic  is 
welcomed by o ff ic ia l c irc les  who c la im  tha t the Singaporean economy has 
l i t t le  to fear from Japan. Japanese investment has played a s ig n ifica n t 
ro le  in S ingapore's in d u s tr ia liza tio n  -  c h ie fly  through jo in t ventures -  
w ith  sh ipbu ild ing  a ttra c tin g  substantial amounts o f Japanese money.
H ow ever, there has now been a sh ift in emphasis to the a ttra c tio n  o f Japanese 
techno logy . Such p a rtic ip a tio n  is p a rtic u la r ly  sought fo r two S tra teg ic* 
pro jects -  a $ 1 , 0 0 0  m illio n  petrochem ical com plex and a fu l ly  in tegra ted 
steel m il l .  A lthough the la tte r is s t i l l  on the d raw ing -boa rd , Sumitomo and 
M itsub ish i have a lready agreed in p rin c ip le  to be partners w ith  Shell and the 
Singapore Government in the former p ro je c t. (16)
The trade s itua tion  is less satis factory although the trade d e f ic i t  
v is -a -v is  Japan is not p a rtic u la r ly  w orry ing  to Singaporean o ff ic ia ls ,  who 
account for it  la rge ly  by the im port o f cap ita l equipm ent fo r S ingapore's 
fac to rie s . Singapore in 1972 was the tenth largest market fo r Japanese 
manufactured goods. In June 1973, a sizeable Singaporean trade mission 
v is ited  Japan to promote Singaporean goods and i t  was hoped tha t a market 
could be opened fo r manufactured items in Japan. Despite such trade 
d e fic its  and some d iscontent a t the expansion o f the Japanese syn the tic  
rubber industry. Prime M in is te r Tanaka's v is it to Singapore would appear 
to have been one o f the few b righ t moments in his Southeast Asian tou r.
Despite the fa c t tha t there have been protests at Japanese 'econom ic 
im p e ria lism ', much o f the opposition to Japanese investment has come from 
student and rad ica l groups, w h ile  the Southeast Asian ru lin g  e lite s  have
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(16) Ib id .
tended to  cooperate w ith  Japanese business -  depending on the sta te , 
e ith e r fo r the sake o f na tiona l developm ent or fo r personal reasons. 
Furtherm ore, Southeast Asian countries have tended to seek such investment 
in d iv id u a lly  ra ther than form ing a "common fro n t1. I t  was the e xcep tio n  
ra ther than the ru le when ASEAN used its c o lle c tiv e  vo ice  to demand1 fa ir  
econom ic trea tm ent' (17) from Japan, p a rtic u la r ly  on such matters as the 
increased Japanese production o f syn the tic  rubber. (18)
A pa rt from the ASEAN countries, Japanese investment in other 
Southeast Asian nations -  Laos, the Khmer Republic (Cam bodia), and N orth  
and South V ietnam  -  w h ich  are p o l it ic a l ly  unstable, is no ticeab le  by its 
absence. W ith  regard to a id , Japan has sought to steer a n o n -p o lit ic a l 
course by agreeing to g ive  a id  to V ie tnam  as a whole ra ther than to e ith e r 
N o rth  or South. A t the fa r side o f the reg ion , a large proportion o f the 
b ila te ra l a id  going to Burma is donated by Japan, and fr ie n d ly  re la tions 
between the two countries have been fostered by an exchange o f goodw ill 
v is its  in 1972 and 1973.
W h ile  Japan's econom ic role in Southeast Asia is a key one and w e ll 
assured -  its d ip lom a tic  and p o lit ic a l ro le is less ce rta in . Its ac tive  
pa rticupa tion  in the Asian Developm ent Bank and its c a llin g  o f a C a b ine t- 
leve l conference on Southeast Asian econom ic developm ent in 1966, (19) 
have a ce rta in  p o lit ic a l s ig n ific a n c e , but are bas ica lly  econom ic. U n like  
these, how ever, Japanese membership o f the Asian and P ac ific  C ouncil 
(ASPAC) -  formed in June 1966 w ith  the expressed purpose 'to  promote 
constructive  cooperation towards the achievem ent o f peace and progress1 -  
hcs had a considerable p o lit ic a l im pact, w ith  Japan successfully preventing 
the o rgan iza tion  from being turned in to  an an ti-C h inese  movement. In 
this task Japan was ab ly  seconded by M a lays ia .
In lin e  v/ith  an increas ing ly  autonomous Asian p o lic y , Japan commenced 
d ip lo m a tic  in it ia t iv e s  towards M ongo lia  and N orth  V ie tnam  -  its re la tions 
w ith  the la tte r being fo rm a lized  in September 1973. Beside such moves 
Japanese d ip lom a tic  in it ia t iv e s  in the s ixties were very te n ta tiv e ,-  such 
as o ffe ring  m ediation in the Indonesian-M alaysian dispute in 1963, and 
supporting Suharto in 1966. A t the turn o f the decade, however -  1970 -
(17) Bangkok W o rld , 3 0  August, 1967. Pakistan Times, 7 M^ay, 1974.
(18) Straits Times, 19 A p r i l ,  1973
(19) S ig n ifica n t because it  was ca lled  on Japanese in it ia t iv e .
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Japan d id  p lay  a prom inent part in the D jakarta  Conference on C am bodia.
Two years la te r M r. Tanaka ca lle d  fo r a peace and reconstruction conference 
fo r V ie tnam ; i t  v/as suggested tha t the la tte r was designed c h ie fly  w ith  an 
eye to the in terna l Japanese p o lit ic a l scene, but peace in Indo China would 
remove Japan from the quandary in w h ich  i t  found its e lf -  the m aintenance o f 
s tr ic t lo y a lty  to the U nited S tates, w h ile  seeking not to com ple te ly  a liena te  
powerful communist neighbours. A fte r  Canada's w ithdraw al from the 
In te rna tiona l Commission o f C ontro l and Supervision o f V ie tnam , in  1973,
Japan refused a South Vietnamese in v ita tio n  to be the rep lacem ent.
A lthough  d iffe re n t reasons were g iv e n , Dne o f the main reasons would appear 
to  have been tha t the in v ita tio n  came on ly  from South V ie tnam , and was not 
endorsed by the N o rth .
The ro le  tha t Japan w i l l  p lay  in Southeast Asia w il l  depend la rge ly  
on the adjustment o f its re la tions w ith  the G rea t Powers in the not too 
d istan t fu tu re . Its re la tions w ith  the Southeast Asian countries themselves 
w i l l  depend la rge ly  on how d ip lo m a tic a lly  i t  pursues its own econom ic  
advancem ent. Concerning the a c t iv ity  o f Japanese companies abroad,
Japan has been described as 'a sick pseudo-great pow er1,  tha t is a powerful 
state w h ich  is not a c tu a lly  in fu l l contro l o f the n a tio n . In the interests o f 
p reventing  the a lie na tio n  o f those tha t i t  should be c u lt iv a tin g  the nation  
w i l l  have to be brought under contro l e As fo r the Japanese a ttitu d e  to 
the n e u tra liza tio n  o f Southeast Asia -  this too is a w a iting  the c la r if ic a t io n  
tha t the decided framework o f G rea t Power re la tions w i l l  de te rm ine .
AUSTRALIA:
It  is now gene ra lly  accepted tha t A us tra lia  is an In d o -P a c ific  power 
and not m erely a backward o ffspring  k in d ly  fostered by B rita in . Acceptance 
o f this change in status has been g radua l, as had the sh ift in a ttitu d e  tha t 
no longer views Asia as p rim a rily  a threat to A ustra lian  se cu rity . The 
a b i l i ty  o f past A ustra lian  Prime M in isters to understand Asia and its 
problems has been summarized as:-
" . .  .A fte r  M enzies ' aloofness and H o lt's  warm th, the track record o f G orton 
and M acM ahon was o f prime m in is te ria l bulls in the Asian china shop ." (2 0 )
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(2 0 )  Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February, 1974
1972, how ever, brought a new Labor G overnm ent to power under the 
leadership o f M r . Gough W h itlam  -  a man who appeared anxious to create 
an in d iv id u a l fore ign p o lic y  image in A s ia . A t  the most obvious leve l 
this took the form o f the d ip lo m a tic  recogn ition  o f C h ina , N orth  V ietnam  
and N orth  Korea, and a general reduction in A ustra lian  p a rtic ip a tio n  in 
both SEATO and A N Z U K .
U n like  Pakistan and France, A us tra lia  d id not to ta lly  w ithd raw  from 
SEATO^ nevertheless, i t  was made c lea r tha t both A us tra lia  and N ew  
Zealand -  under the new Labor G overnm ent o f Norman K irk  -  had strong 
reservations concerning the m ilita ry  nature o f the p a c t. In p lace o f the 
la tte r both Governments ca lle d  for increased emphasis on the socio-econom ic 
work o f the o rg a n iza tio n . The current A ustra lian  v ie w  o f SEATO would 
appear to be tha t the o rgan iza tion  can be safely le ft  to 'w ith e r aw ay ' in 
its own tim e . (21)
W ith  regard to A N Z U K  -  A u s tra lia , New  Zealand and the United 
Kingdom -  the three countries tha t provided forces under the Five Power 
Agreem ent to be stationed in M alaysia  and Singapore -  more d e fin ite  action  
has been taken . The A ustra lian  G overnm ent, true to the Labor Party's 
tra d itio n a l opposition to the despatch o f forces abroad in peace tim e , 
announced tha t i t  would be w ithd raw ing  the ground force component o f 
its A N Z U K  commitment at the end o f its tour o f d u ty . Resulting from 
this d ec is ion , N ew Zealand and the United Kingdom announced, in 
Decem ber, 1973, tha t they had reached an agreement to establish separate 
m ilita ry  forces in Singapore to replace the A N Z U K  presence.
The trea ty  tha t is considered by both A ustra lia  and N ew  Zealand 
as one o f the p rin c ip a l p illa rs  o f th e ir security is the A N ZU S  Treaty -  
between A u s tra lia , N ew  Zealand and the United States -  w h ich  was signed on 
I September, 1951. A lthough  i t  was o r ig in a lly  designed to guarantee the two 
sm aller partners against a resurgent Japan, events proved this unnecessary 
and the a llia n ce  hoc now*tol»&n on a more general conno ta tion . This treaty 
s t i l l  retains its importance fo r A ustra lia  despite a change from the days 
when any c ritic ism  o f Am erican p o lic y  genera lly  tended to be treated as a
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(21) N ew  York Times, 22 January, 1973
m ixture o f high treason and lese-m ajeste , by the ru lin g  L ib e ra l-C o un try  
Party governm ent.
C e rta in ly  there was a change in 1972 -  under the new Labor 
G overnm ent i t  was made c lea r tha t A ustra lian  subservience to every 
A m erican whim would cease, and tha t such occurrences as the A ustra lian  
invo lvem ent in the V ie tnam  W ar would not eas ily  happen aga in . A  
c r it ic a l p riva te  le tte r from M r. W h itlam  to President N ixo n  in December 
1972, condemning the bombing raids on H ano i, obviously came as a shock 
to Am ericans. Y e t by J u ly  1973, when M r. W h itlam  v is ited  W ashington, 
it  was made c lea r tha t A ustra lia  was s t i l l  very much the loya l a lly  o f the 
U nited S tates. Despite th is , how ever, there is a powerful current o f a n t i-  
Am ericanism  on the Le ft in A ustra lian  p o lit ic s  w hich concentrates on such 
issues as the future o f Am erican ins ta lla tions in A u s tra lia . Even g iven a 
Labor G overnm ent, these ins ta lla tions would appear qu ite  secure.
W ith  regard to Southeast Asia  A ustra lian  p o lic y  would seem to  be 
rooted in the desire fo r a general friendsh ip  w h ile  avo id ing  any onerous 
commitments. When ASEAN was firs t established the then leader o f the 
O pposition  p a rty , M r . W h itla m , suggested tha t i t  would be a good idea 
i f  A us tra lia  and N ew  Zealand were to jo in  the o rgan iza tion  (22);, how ever, 
i t  was soon made c le a r tha t this would  not be acceptab le  to the members.
A  more re a lis tic  approach was taken by M r. W h itlam  when in pow er, and 
in A p r il 1974, some A$5 m illio n  were made a va ilab le  fo r econom ic pro jects 
adopted by A S E A N . (23) Concerning the ASEAN proposal fo r n e u tra liza tio n  
o f the reg ion , as e a rly  as June 1972, A ustra lian  Prime M in is te r, W illia m  
M acM ahon gave the idea his q u a lif ie d  approva l, saying tha t his country 
was w il l in g  to support Southeast Asian moves towards n e u tra lity  but would 
not abandon its defence links under A N Z U S . (24) However, two years 
la te r , M r . W h itlam  provided a more enthusiastic endorsement o f the 
proposal : -
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(22) The G ua rd ian , 2 January, 1968
(23) Straits Times, 17 A p r i l ,  1974
(24) D jakarta  Times, 12 June , 1972
"A us tra lia  applauds this in it ia t iv e  and welcomes the ob jec tives  
w h ich  the ASEAN countries have set fo r themselves fo r a zone 
o f peace, freedom and n e u tra lity  in Southeast A s ia . I t  is a 
c rea tive  concept w h ich , i f  fu l f i l le d ,  w il l  not on ly  b en e fit the 
nations in the zone, i t  w il l  its e lf be a fu rthe r step towards d e ten te , 
i f  the great powers are able to agree not to use this region as the 
f ie ld  fo r destructive  r iv a lry "  0 (25)
That h jS Governm ent supported the n eu tra liza tion  proposal was made c le a r
by M r .  W h itlam  on his tour o f Southeast Asia in February 1974. N o r indeed
is there any wonder, as n e u tra liza tio n  o f the region would preserve i t  free
from the hegemony o f any one G rea t Power -  something tha t should be in the
A ustra lian  in te res t.
M r . W h itla m , besides backing the n eu tra liza tion  co nce p t, is also
a strong proponent o f A us tra lia 's  p lay ing  a larger ro le  in the re g io n , p a rtic u la r ly
w ith  regard to econom ic assistance. A t present, how ever, most econom ic aid
tha t A ustra lia  makes a va ilab le  goes e ith e r to Papua N ew  G u in e a , or to its
largest northern ne ighbour, Indonesia . Before tak ing  o ff ic e  the A ustra lian
Labor Party pledged to con tribu te  'no t less than 1% o f the na tiona l income to
econom ic a id for deve lop ing countries (26); a fte r six months in o ff ic e ,  how ever,
i t  announced tha t i t  would-1 be w orking towards an o ff ic ia l a id  ta rge t o f 0 .7 %
o f G .N .P .  by the end o f the d eca d e '. (27) This may be p a r t ia lly  exp la ined
by the econom ic d if f ic u lt ie s  tha t A us tra lia  found its e lf in .  Besides this
econom ic a id , M r. W h itlam  also favoured Austra lian  p a rtic ip a tio n  in a new
loose 'associa tion ' fo r Asia -  but this Asian Forum idea has y e t to get o f f  the
d ra w ing -boa rd . In the meantime A u s tra lia , now more a cu te ly  conscious o f
its own id e n t ity ,  jo ins the Southeast Asian nations in a w a iting  the developm ent
o f the new Asian balance tha t w il l  p lay such a decis ive ro le in de te rm in ing  the
future o f the region to A us tra lia 's  no rth .
(25) Prime M in is te r's  A ddress at State D inner in Kuala Lumpur, A ustra lian  
D e p t, o f Foreign A ffa irs , II February, 1974. N o . M / 2 0 .  p . 7 .
(26) A ustra lian  Labor Party P la tform , C onstitu tion  and Rules, C anberra , 1967. 
C ited  in 'W h ithe r W h itla m ? ',  P. K in g . In te rna tiona l J o u rn a l, V o l.  
X X IX , N o . 3 , Summer 1974. p . 432.
(27) C ited  in Ib id .
(124)
(125)
N ew  Z ea land , geog raph ica lly  fu rther from Southeast Asia than 
A u s tra lia , is tha t much more remote from Asian problems. H ow ever, the 
h istory o f its re la tions w ith  Asia run la rg e ly  p a ra lle l to the Austra lian 
e xpe rience . W hat makes this pa ra lle l even more s trik ing  was the e le c tion  
to o ff ic e  o f M r . K irk 's  Labor G overnm ent around the same tim e as M r.
W h itlam  assumed power in A u s tra lia .
On questions such as p a rtic ip a tio n  in SEATO, M r. K irk  adopted 
a s im ila r approach to tha t o f M r . W h itla m , te llin g  the annual conference 
o f the Returned Services Association in June 1973, tha t New  Zealand would 
s tead ily  decrease the leve l o f its invo lvem ent in SEATO. He sa id :-
"We can continue to p lay our part in c o lle c tiv e  defence arrangements tha t 
are valued by the countries o f Southeast A s ia " .  (28)
To this he added tha t N ew  Zealand could no longer a fford to re ly  too h ea v ily  
on B rita in  or the United States, and must learn to work more close ly w ith  
o ther countries in Asia and the P a c ific , 1 and espec ia lly  in the South P ac ific  
and Southeast A s ia 1. As in  earnest o f its emphasis on the socio-econom ic 
aspect o f SEATO, the New  Zealand Governm ent provided a fund o f US 
$ 1 8 ,9 5 0  to SEATO in March 1973, to a id  the construction o f community 
centres in the Philipp ines and to com plete a ham let irr ig a tio n  scheme serving 
some 7 0 0  displaced fam ilies a t Lam Dom N o i Dam, in the N orth-E ast o f 
T h a ilan d . (29)
W ith  regard to A N Z U K , how ever, N ew  Zealand d id  not adopt the 
same a ttitu d e  as the A ustra lian  Governm ent dec id ing  tha t N ew Zealand forces 
w ould remain in Singapore a fte r the Austra lians w ith d rew . A ccord ing  to 
M r . K irk :-
"W ithou t any re fle c tio n  on A ustra lian  p o lic ie s , i t  seems to us tha t in the 
re la tionsh ip  we are try ing  to foster in the region -  to improve and strenghten 
N ew  Sealand's links w ith  these countries -  the decision fo r us to keep on 
was the r ig h t o n e ."  (3 0 )
NEW ZEALAN D  :
(28) S traits Times, 13 June, 1973
(29) Bangkok Post, I M a rch , 1973
(3 0 )  The A g e , 17 August, 1973
I t  has, nevertheless, been made c lea r tha t the N ew Zealand forces w il l  
stay in Asia on ly  so long as M a laysia  and Singapore wish them to rem ain .
A  p o in t tha t was constantly made by M r. K irk  when he was in o ff ic e  
was tha t N ew  Zealand wished to rid  its e lf o f the image o f a 'r ic h ,  iso la te ^ , 
Europe-centred c o u n try ', and wished instead to become attuned to the 
re a lity  o f its geographical position and to become an a c tive  partner in 
Asian and P ac ific  a ffa irs . In ac ting  out this ro le  the N ew  Zealand G ove rn ­
ment approved the spending o f N .Z $  5 0  m il l io n ,  in b ila te ra l a id  to Asia  
and the P ac ific  over the three years commencing June 1973. (31)
Furtherm ore, M r .  K irk  pushed fo r a new P ac ific  Union -  o f the countries a long 
the western rim  o f the P ac ific  -  to complement A S E A N . (32) C oncern ing the 
N ew  Zealand a ttitu d e  to the n e u tra liza tio n  proposals, this was favourab le  from 
an e a r lie r  date than the A ustra lian  -  w ith  the in it ia l ASEAN dec la ra tio n  in 
1971 being supported by the N ew  Zealand Defence Secretary o f the tim e ,
M r . J .  Robertson. This sympathy w ith  the proposal was e n thus ias tica lly  
endorsed by Norman K irk 's  G overnm ent. (33) S im ila r concerns to A us tra lia  
w ould n a tu ra lly  recommend the scheme.
THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NEIGHBOURS :
Concerning the neighbours o f the Southeast Asian region i t  w ou ld  
appear lo g ica l for A ustra lia  and New  Zealand to s it back and applaud 
indigenous reg ional schemes fo r n eu tra liza tion  -  i t  is in th e ir interests to do 
so. In the event o f such proposals not being rea lized  both countries w ou ld  
undbouted ly pre fer a continued Am erican presence in Southeast Asia  than 
e ith e r Chinese or Russian -  the importance both Governmsnts ascribe to th e ir 
A N Z U S  Treaty would po in t to th is . I t  is also c lea r tha t ne ithe r G overnm ent 
w i l l  take any concrete steps to encourage the United States to w ithd raw  from 
the region more ra p id ly  -  w h ile  welcom ing the n e u tra liza tio n  proposals 
there is a large degree o f dubiousness as to whether these proposals w i l l  ever 
be re a liz e d .
(31) S traits Times, 2 0  June, 1973
(32) S traits Times, 26 M a rch , 1973
(33) S traits Times, 2 Decem ber, 1971 
S tra its Times, 22 December, 1973
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N o r is i t  in Ind ia 's  interest fo r the region to fa ll under the in fluence  
o f any one G rea t Power. H ow ever, as between G reat Powers, Chinese 
hegemony is viewed w ith  considerably greater apprehension than Am erican 
or Russian. I t  could indeed be argued that Soviet hegemony in Southeast 
Asia would re in force  the Indian position as against the Chinese; how ever, 
w h ile  Soviet support is welcomed in In d ia , it  is doubtfu l tha t the la tte r would 
seek too great a Sovie t presence on its own doorstep. Indeed Ind ia  its e lf ,  
as a new nuc lea r pow er, m ight ye t acquire certa in  ambitions fo r in fluence  in 
the Southeast Asian re g ion . In the meantime a zone o f n e u tra lity  would 
not on ly  be in Ind ia 's  in te res t, but would be in line  w ith  the in te rna tiona l 
'm o ra lity ' adopted by tha t country since its independence.
Japan -  a country tha t has been c ited  as a potentia l member 
o f the Asian balance -  has been very cautious in its approach to Southeast 
Asian p o lit ic s .  A ttem pts by the Soviet Union to invo lve  Japan in its 
security  suggestions have met w ith  l i t t le  success, and i t  is worth no ting  tha t 
the much p ub lic ized  Soviet proposal fo r an Asian c o lle c tiv e  security  system 
was not even mentioned in the extensive communique w hich was issued 
a fte r the Tanaka-Brezhnev meeting in the U .S .S .R . in O ctober 1973.
A ccord ing  to M r Tanaka the issue was never ra ised. Despite th is , the 
N ew  China News Agency reported tha t 'S ovie t revisionists tried  to drag Japan 
in to  th e ir Asian c o lle c tiv e  security system '. It  quoted the 'J i j i  N ew  A gency' 
fo r the disclosure tha t the reference to such a system was deleted from the 
d ra ft 'Soviet-Japanese jo in t statement when it  fa ile d  to make Japan express 
its a p p ro v a l'.  (34) A lthough i t  is true that the Chinese had a vested in terest 
in pu tting  this line  across, i t  seems rather u n like ly  tha t the issue would not 
have been raised by the Russians at some po in t in the m eeting .
In O ctober 1971, the M alaysian Prime M in is te r urged Japan to shed 
its 'low  posture' fore ign p o lic y . A t a press conference in Tokyo he pointed 
out that Japan's emergence as Asia 's most econom ica lly  advanced nation  -  and 
a w orld  power -  placed upon i t  a moral responsib ility  to concern its e lf  rather 
more than before w ith  the fundamental issues o f peace, progress and prosperity .
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(34) Asia Research B u lle tin , V o l. 3 , N o . 6 , O ctober 1973. p .2 2 0 4  B.
He added tha t he would welcome i t  i f  Japan was to become a 'fourth
guaran to r1 o f the Southeast Asian n e u tra liza tio n  p la n . (35) Some tw e lve
months la te r , M r . K iic h i A ic h i,  the special envoy o f the Japanese Prime
M in is te r, assured Tun Razak tha t Japan and China would oppose any move
by other powers to establish hegemony in the A s ia -P a c ific  re g ion , nor
would they seek such hegemony themselves. (36) This assurance came soon
a fte r the formal inauguration o f Sino-Japanese lin ks , i t  was undoubtedly
deemed necessary as a result o f Sovie t broadcasts.
As pointed out above , the ro le tha t Japan w i l l  p lay  in Southeast
A sia  w i l l  depend la rge ly  on the adjustment o f its re la tions w ith  the G rea t
Powers and its decision as to what form its defense w i l l  take in the fu tu re .
W ith  regard to the la tte r , three a lte rna tives  are apparent -  continued
re liance  on the United States nuc lear um bre lla , a tta inm ent o f an independent
nuc lea r d e te rren t, or n e u tra lity . Support can be discovered fo r each o f these
options, w ith  the ru lin g  L ib e ra l-D e m ocra tic  Party favouring  the f irs t ,  the
Socia lists the th ird , and some hawkish elements o f the LDP (Inc lu d in g  former
Prime M in is te r, Nobusuke K lshi and some o f his associates) and the r ig h t-
w in g , S e iran -K a i group, advoca ting  the second. Perhaps the strongest
externa l restra in t on those Japanese who favour nuclear armaments comes
from A m erica , as a nuclear Japan would d ra s tica lly  reduce the la tte r 's
dependence on the U nited States. Despite the N ixon  D octrine  and the
reversion o f O kinaw a -  minus nuc lea r ins ta lla tions -  to Japan in 1971,
- o f  the c l o s e  C974~
W ashington -s*+U- maintains in Japan its largest defence structure in the
Far East -  1 3 ^ 0 0 0  arm y, 3 3 , 0 0 0  navy and marines, 1 9 , 0 0 0  a ir  force
and 5 , 0 0 0  c iv il ia n  personnel. (37)
I t  is true that the M in is te r o f In te rna tiona l Trade and Industry,
Yasahiro Nakasone, stated in his Preface to the W h ite  Paper, 1 The Defence
o f Japan ' :-
"A ccord ing  to the Western way o f th ink ing  there exists a certa in  
preconceived idea tha t econom ica lly  great powers w il l  in e v ita b ly  
become m ilita ry  great powers, but we challenge tha t way o f th ink ing  
and hereby declare tha t the nation  o f Japan w il l  become a great power
(35) S traits Times, 15 O c tob e r, 1971
(36) S traits Times, 14 Decem ber, 1972
(37) Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 December, 1974.
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in an econom ic sense, but never in a m ilita ry  sense". (38)
Pt'/rne. M im slcr TanaKci 
L ike w ise , the last Prime M m w tePy  M r $ Tanaka,  made a s im ila r statement-
p rio r to his e le c tio n , to the e ffe c t tha t he would work towards making Japan
an econom ic super-power, but not a m ilita ry  super-power. W h ils t gauging
-Poilowrmg
from the p o lit ic a l h istory o f the preisani Prims M in is te r, Takeo M ik i ,  he is 
not a man to favour nuclear armaments. Neverthe less, i t  may be noted 
tha t a lthough Japan signed the N o n -P ro life ra tio n  Treaty in 1968 i t  has 
ye t to be ra tif ie d  -  an im portant decision tha t s till has to be taken .
I f  Japan proceeds to go nuc lea r and thereby becomes increasing ly 
autonomous o f the U nited States, its a ttitu d e  to Southeast Asia w il l  become 
a v ita l fa c to r in the future o f the re g ion . However, i f  its preson! course 
o f 'econom ic d ip lom acy ' is m ainta ined -  as i t  would appear l ik e ly  fo r some 
tim e to come -  the Japanese interest in the region w il l  be la rg e ly  determ ined 
by econom ic facto rs . In order to ensure the safety o f investments, stra teg ic 
com m ercial routes, raw m ateria ls and markets, it  is preferable fo r Japan 
tha t the region should cease being an area o f c o n flic t -  p a r tic u la r ly  G rea t 
Power c o n flic t,, I f  a neutral Southeast Asia could achieve this s itua tion  
then i t  would be in Japan's interests to back the proposal. However, at 
this stage, when the concept appears far from re a liza tio n  -  not to mention 
success -  the Japanese p o lic y  would appear to be to w a it and see in the 
re la tiv e  com fort o f the s ide lines .
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(38) 'Japan's Future Role in Southeast A s ia ',  P. Poh-seng. N ew  D irections 
in the In te rna tiona l Relations o f Southeast A s ia , (Economic Relations).
O p . C it .  -  p . 69.
(13.0)
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE Q U A N D A R Y  OF THE MOUSEDEER:
-  at* clos<3 o\ iS>74 -  
As the Southeast Asian region/consists o f some ten d iffe re n t
states i t  is necessary to g ive  i t  the b ene fit o f a closer sc ru tin y . There is
perhaps as much tha t serves! to d iv id e  Southeast Asian states as to un ite  them,
but those things tha t they hold in common are c h ie fly  problems tha t demand
urgent a tte n tio n .
Upon ach iev ing  independence the m a jo rity  o f Southeast Asian
states were confronted w ith  a m u lt ip lic ity  o f problems w h ic h  ranged from the
existence o f conscious e thn ic  m inorities  to socio-econom ic underdevelopm ent,
and from the need to forge a nationa l id e n tity  to the fear o f exte rna l aggression«,
States o ften  appeared to be fashioned around in d iv id ua l personalities ra ther than
c o lle c tiv e  id e n tit ie s , and leaders were faced w ith  the awesome leap from the
unquestioned m ora lity  o f demanding independence to the more debatab le  m ora lity
o f re a liz in g  nationa l interests. (I) In pursuit o f the la tte r i t  became c lea r that
u top ia  was not announced by the removal o f co lon ia l ru le and tha t in tra reg iona l
tensions and co n flic ts  could -  and d id -  deve lop . I t  is true tha t some o f these
in tra reg iona l co n flic ts  may be traced back to co lon ia l roots. These inc lude  the
superim position o f the concept o f centra l governmental au th o rity  and sovereign
state boundaries on people whose a lleg iance  and m o b ility  o ften continued to
fo llo w  h is to ric  patterns, and the fac t tha t these boundaries tended to be a rb itra ry  -
fo r example the d iv is ion  o f the centra l core o f the Laotian people between
Thailand and Laos. N everthe less, despite th is , the fac t remains tha t there was
no goal s u ff ic ie n tly  substantial or in tense ly enough desired, the common pursuit
o f w hich would have resulted in d iv is ive  feelings being overcom e. This s itu a tio n ,
how ever, may hope fu lly  be chang ing. (2)
(I) The Challenge o f W orld  P o litics  in South and Southeast A s ia , W . L e v i,
(P re n tic e -H a lI, 1968) p . 22.
(2) Levi -  O p . C it .  p . 142.
The basis for such reg ional cooperation as d id  occur was to be 
found in the shared problems o f underdevelopm ent and the management o f 
ra ther weak nationa l economies. Regional groupings inspired by econom ic 
cooperation ex is ting  in Europe and Latin  A m erica , the 'proven e ff ic a c y 1 o f 
w h ic h , accord ing to President Macapagal o f the Philippines in 1963, 1 makes 
it  im perative fo r us1 to explore the poss ib ilities  in A s ia . (3) Hence reg ional 
associations in Southeast Asia have tended to concentrate on econom ic and 
cu ltu ra l issues, steering ca re fu lly  away from the more controversia l questions 
raised by p o lit ic s  and se cu rity , w h ich  i t  was feared m ight throw  any reg ional 
venture on to the rocks o f disagreem ent.
I t  is true tha t the less formal reg ional meetings o f e a r lie r  years 
d id  have a ce rta in  degree o f p o lit ic a l content in th e ir de libe ra tions th is , 
how ever, was to  result in l i t t le  o f s ig n ific a n c e . Concerning the Bandung 
Conference o f 1955, w h ich  has been described as the 'H igh  N o o n ' o f the 
A fro -A s ian  movement, M r. M ehru's re a lis tic  assessment was tha t 'The seats 
■
were com fo rtab le1. (4) Even this "H igh  N o o n 1 period could o ffe r l i t t le  o f 
substance to those that sought u n ify in g  p o lit ic a l factors among Southeast Asian 
states. Thailand and the Philippines had recen tly  become members o f SEATO, 
w h ile  Burma and Indonesia were p roc la im ing  themselves n o n -a lig n e d . O f the 
n o n -a lig n e d , Indonesia and Burma fre e ly  chose this p o lic y  fo r a number o f 
reasons; Laos and Cam bodia, on the other hand, had n on -a lignm en t v ir tu a lly  
thrust upon them . A lthough in the years fo llo w in g  the Bandung Conference the 
concept o f non-a lignm ent was to acquire increasing re sp e c ta b ility  in the w orld  
at la rge , i t  d id not serve as the basis o f a regional bond due to the fa c t tha t its 
adherents were scattered geog raph ica lly  and id e o lo g ic a lly  -  a d iv e rs if ic a tio n  
tha t was to become increasing ly obvious a t successive non -a lig n ed  summits and 
conferences.
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(3) Levi -  O p . C i t . -  p . 51.
(4) A fro -A s ia  and N o n -A lig n m e n t, G . Jansen (Faber & Faber, 1966) p . 225.
W ith  the establishment o f ASA and M ap h ilin do  (5) the emphasis 
was f irm ly  placed on economic and social problems -  w ith  some rac ia l overtones 
to the la tte r . I t  has been argued that the stressing o f this emphasis obscures 
the real m o tiva ting  force behind the developm ent o f Southeast Asian reg iona lism , 
nam ely p o lit ic a l necessity (6 ), but g iven the ind iv id ua l p o lit ic a l considerations 
and decisions necessary to bring about regional cooperation in the firs t p la ce , 
the common interests among the states invo lved  therea fte r tended to focus on 
social and econom ic issues. W ith  regard to these econom ic issues there would 
appear to  be the inev itab le  array o f factors fo r and against Southeast Asian 
reg iona lism . As the s ituation  stands, and over the past decade, the shares 
o f the countries in tra reg iona l trade in th e ir to ta l in te rna tiona l trade is re la t iv e ly  
small (7 ), the prim ary exp lana tion  fo r this being the basic la ck  o f econom ic 
com plem entarity  among the countries o f the reg ion . N e a rly  a ll o f them are 
prim ary producers, w ith  two or more o f them producing large quan tities  o f the 
same com m odity -  t in ,  rubber, tim ber and the like  -  w h ich  are m a in ly  exported 
to ex trareg iona l destina tions. G iven  these circumstances the immediate e ffec ts
(132)
(5) ASA (the Association o f Southeast Asia) was established in J u ly ,  1961, and 
consisted o f the P h ilipp ines, Thailand and M alaya (la te r M a la ys ia ). The 
association was most remarkable for its surviva l as i t  was v ir tu a lly  frozen 
fo r three years due to the i l l - fe e l in g  between M alaysia  and the Philipp ines 
over the question o f N o rth  Borneo (Sabah). This disp ute has lasted fo r 
some time over the sovereignty o f Sabah. ASA ceased to func tion  in 
1967, g iv in g  away to A S E A N . M a p h ilin d o , established in August 1963, 
was a confederation o f M a lay  peoples -  Indonesia, M alaysia  and the 
P h ilipp ines . I t  suffered from both the M a la ys ia n -P h ilipp in e  antagonism , 
and the p o lic y  o f C onfrontation  tha t Indonesia adopted against M a la ys ia .
I t  also ceased to function  in 1967.
(6) Regional Cooperation in Southeast A s ia , S . X u to , (C hula longkorn 
U n ive rs ity , 1973) p . 55.
(7) H irosh i K itam ura, the D irec to r o f Research and Planning fo r ECAFE, 
cla im ed tha t less than 21% o f the ASEAN countries ' trade was in tra ­
re g io n a l, and i f  Singapore's entrepot trade is e xc lu de d , the share o f 
in tra reg iona l trade fa lls  to 6 -1 0 % . Economic B u lle tin  fo r Asia  and 
the Far East. V o l.  X X , N o . 2 , September 1969. p . 3 .
Furtherm ore, according to Premier Lee Kuan Yew 'As a percentage, trade 
w ith in  ASEAN to to ta l ASEAN trade w ith  the w orld  dropped from 18.3%  
in 1966 to 15.7% in 1970.” S traits Times, 14 A p r i l ,  1972
o f trade lib e ra liz a tio n  in the region would appear to be rather lim ited ; 
this is not to ru le out a phased trade lib e ra liz a tio n  programme, w hich although 
not to ta lly  free from d if f ic u lt ie s  is a p ra c tica l p roposition . (8) A  poo ling  
o f cap ita l and tra ined personnel -  both o f w h ich  are scarce in the region -  
together w ith  the ra tio n a liza tio n  o f industry could mean econom izing on 
scarce resources. Optimum scale can be achieved w ith  a larger m arket.
Even i f  the combined market does not su ffice , export po ten tia l to extrareg iona l 
countries can be rea lized  to advantage as a la rge r, protected market can 
absorb the fixed  cost o f production so tha t the price o f exports may be based 
on va riab le  cost a lo ne . W ith  w ide r markets and greater spec ia liza tio n  it  
should also be easier to a ttra c t fore ign  c a p ita l.  (9)
There are o f course the drawbacks -  w ith  the basic hindrance 
being the econom ic nationalism  and desire fo r independence tha t is so typ ica l 
o f  recen tly  autonomous states. There must, fo r exam ple , be agreed spec ia l­
iza tio n  and harm onization o f investm ent and production programmes. Furtherm ore, 
as has been shown by the Latin  Am erican Free Trade Association there is no 
guarantee tha t a ll countries w il l  bene fit equa lly  because o f the unequal econom ic, 
socia l and p o lit ic a l assets o f the various countries. However, g iven regional 
developm ent in the long-run  a ll countries should bene fit to a certa in  e x te n t.
A  po ten tia l obstacle , i f  reg iona l econom ic coord ina tion  and p lanning are not 
undertaken in the near fu tu re , is the developm ent o f vested interests.
In practise the econom ic elem ent cannot be separated o u t, and, 
as is the s itua tion  w ith  many another new ly  independent or underdeveloped area, 
p o lit ic a l-e c o n o m y  tends to be spelt w ith  a cap ita l 1P1 and a small 'e 1. N o t 
on ly  does this occur w ith in  the reg iona l associations but even th e ir  composition 
can be exp la ined  la rge ly  by d iffe r in g  foreign po lic ies  and attitudes to externa l 
powers. In 1967 M aph ilin do  fe ll to accusations tha t i t  was too racist in concept -
(8) 'Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia; Some Immediate Past Trends and 
Future P oss ib ilitie s ', A .H .  Ism a il. N ew  D irections in the In te rna tiona l 
Relations o f Southeast A s ia , (Economic Relations), Lee Soo A nn , e d . 
(Singapore U n ive rs ity  Press 1973) pp. 1 9 /2 0 .
(9) ‘ Problems and Prospects o f Economic Cooperation in Southeast A s ia 1,
Wu T a -Y eh . Economic Interdependence in Southeast A s ia , T . Morgan
& N .  Spoelstra, e d s ., (Centre for In te rna tiona l Economics and Economic 
D evelopm ent, U n ive rs ity  o f W isconsin Press, 1969). pp. 21 /4 .
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being a confederation o f the M a lay  peoples. (IO ) ASA , in its tu rn ,
disappeared in an e ffo rt to accomodate Indonesia w h ich  view ed the former
as a 'W este rn -insp ired ' o rgan iza tion  w h ich  i t  could -  or would -  not jo in .
ASEAN -  o f f ic ia l ly  launched in August 1967 -  also had a fu ll
programme o f econom ic and social aims, but again avoided the issue o f
reg iona l de fence . It is true tha t the word ing o f the D ec la ra tion  estab lish ing
ASEAN stated tha t the members “A re determ ined to ensure th e ir  s ta b ility  and
security  from externa l in terference in any form or m anifesta tion in order to
preserve th e ir na tiona l id e n tit ie s " , and tha t on Indonesian insistence a clause
was included in the Preamble o f the D ec la ra tion  a ffirm in g  th a t : -
" . . . A l l  fo re ign  bases are tem porary and remain on ly  w ith  the expressed 
concurrence o f the countries concerned and are not in tended to  be used 
d ire c t ly  or in d ire c tly  to subvert the na tiona l independence and freedom 
o f States in the area or p re jud ice  the o rderly  processes o f th e ir  na tiona l 
d eve lo p m en t".
Th is, how ever, was on ly  included when Adam M a lik  insisted tha t the 
p o lit ic a l surv iva l o f the Indonesian 'N e w  O rder' depended on its inc lus ion ; 
the o ther reference tha t he sought to inc lude  -  concern ing 'arrangements o f 
c o lle c t iv e  defence w hich should not be used to serve the interests o f any o f 
the big powers' -  was deleted a t the insistence o f the F ilip in o  Foreign 
S ecreta ry, Ramos. (II) Despite the guarded a ttitu d e  to reg iona l defence 
d isp layed at the ASEAN C onference, and the disavowals o f Ramos and the 
Singaporean Foreign M in is te r, Rajaratnam, (12) the poss ib ility  o f ASEAN 
deve lop ing  in to  some kind o f security  arrangement was not d iscounted by a l l . 
Tun Razak raised the poss ib ility  as d id  Adam M a ljK  who compared ASEAN to 
a house w ith  five  doors. 'I f  a burg lar comes in one door, its a problem fo r 
everyone in the house .' Some time la te r Thanat Khoman also spoke in terms 
o f Southeast Asian countries cooperating c lose ly and not re ly in g  too much on 
western assistance for de fence , security  and independence -  th is , how ever,
(l-O) M a n ila  B u lle tin , I January, 1966 
S traits Times, 4 January, 1966
(11) Philipp ines H era ld , 17 August, 1967
(12) M a n ila  B u lle tin , 13 August, 1967 
S traits Times, 9 September, 1967
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was phrased in terms o f an anti-C om m unist fro n t. (13)
Despite disavowals by other members o f Thanat Khoman's 
im plications,, the a ttitudes o f the G reat Powers appeared to re fle c t the 
la t te r .  A fte r the ASEAN D ec la ra tion  was signed the U .S . State Department 
issued a statement 'w e lcom ing ' the form ation o f the new association, w h ich , 
i t  pointed o u t, d id  'no t c o n f lic t  w ith  any m ilita ry  security  arrangements w ith  
member governm ents '. (14) Peking, how ever, accused the United States o f 
jo in in g  hands 'w ith  the Soviet rev is ion is t ru lin g  c liq u e 1 in an attem pt to form 
a fu ll moon to e n c irc le  C h ina , and declared tha t 'ASEAN is part o f this 
a n ti-C h in a  r in g ';  w h ile  the Sovie t Union also denounced ASEAN as an 
instrument o f Am erican p o lic y . (15) G iven  the receptiveness o f W ashington 
towards ASEAN i t  has been suggested tha t the P h ilipp ine  Governm ent's 
ob jections to the Indonesian inspired clauses on 'se cu rity ' stemmed more 
from its fears o f an 'a llia n c e ' dom inated by the Indonesian army than from 
any ob jections put forward by the Am erican A dm in is tra tio n . (16) Furtherm ore, 
c o lle c tiv e  security  agreements were lia b le  to impinge even more on the sensitive 
area o f na tiona l sovereignty than econom ic coopera tion .
Subsequent developments encouraged the members o f ASEAN to 
recognize tha t th e ir  creation was more successful and e ffe c tiv e  than its 
predecessors -  i t  is noteworthy tha t serious in tra reg iona l c o n f lic t  was success­
fu l ly  averted during ASEAN's ea rly  years. Besides th is , p a ra lle l events saw an 
"Asia  fo r the Asians" p o lic y  being g radua lly  accepted, in i t ia l ly  in Western 
Europe and la te r spreading across the A t la n t ic .  G reat B rita in  advanced its 
m ilita ry  w ithd raw a l from Southeast Asia to 1971, and ne ithe r the U nited States 
nor A us tra lia  appeared enthusiastic to f i l l  the defence gap, thus leaving  
Singapore and M alaysia  to seek a lte rna tive  security arrangements. A t  the 
same tim e , Thailand and the Philippines were grow ing increasing ly sceptica l
(13) S traits Times,  II August, 1967; 12 August, 1967 
Bangkok W o rld , 21 February, 1968
(14) Bangkok W o rld , IO  August, 1967
(15) S traits Times, 14 August, 1967
Japan Times,  26 A p r i l ,  1969. (Soviet)
Straits Times, 3 0  September, 1967
(16) P h ilipp ine  P o licy toward Regional Cooperation in Southeast A s ia , R .A b e ll,
(135)
(Unpublished PhD. Thesis, A . N . U .  ) p . 342.
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about the m ilita ry  value o f SEATO.
As ea rly  as January 1968, President Marcos o f the Philippines 
made o ff ic ia l v is its  to M a lays ia , Indonesia and Thailand openly proposing, 
in the process, ASEAN's expansion in to  a c o lle c tiv e  defence system. Even 
i f  i t  was phrased as a 'de terrent against the expansionist plans o f Red C h in a 1, 
this was a s izeable  step towards abandoning the caution tha t the F ilip in o  
delegate had disp layed in August 1967. The response to the proposal was 
m ixed , w ith  Thailand d isp lay ing  somewhat less enthusiasm than its fe llo w  
members, (17) However, even Thailand d id  not dismiss the plan in the 
lo n g -te rm . 1968 also saw piuch discussion in M alaysia  over the proposal for 
Southeast Asian n e u tra liz a tio n  „ This was to remain a M alaysian preoccup­
a tion  for some tim e , other ASEAN members not accep ting  the proposal u n til 
1971. Since the Kuala Lumpur D ec la ra tion  w h ich  emerged at the end o f 
N ovem ber, 1971 meeting o f the Foreign M in isters o f ASEAN -  a meeting 
outside the formal auspices o f the Association -  emphasis has sh ifted some­
what from the concept o f regional c o lle c tiv e  security systems to the furtherance 
o f G reat Power acceptance o f the 'Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tra lity ' 
w h ich  was to lead to the long-term  n eu tra liza tion  o f the reg ion .
The in it ia l agreement o f the ASEAN member states to the M alaysian 
proposal had, in fa c t, taken place a month before the Kuala Lumpur D e c la ra tion , 
a t a m eeting in N ew York convened by Tun Razak. The task o f d ra fting  the 
D ec la ra tion  fe l l ,  in the m ain, to T ha iland . I t  was pointed out at the November 
meeting th a t:-
"The n e u tra liza tio n  proposal has won approval in p rin c ip le  from C h ina , the 
Soviet Union and the United States, as w e ll as other pow ers". (18)
Despite the general acceptance in Novem ber 1971, a considerable d ivergence 
o f op in ion  was to make its e lf fe lt  even between ASEAN members. A  certa in  
re luctance  on the part o f Indonesia has been a ttr ibu ted  to the co nv ic tion  o f the 
Indonesian G overnm ent that as the largest and most populous state w ith in  
Southeast A s ia , Indonesia has the best c la im  to p lay the leading ro le in
(17) M a n ila  B u lle tin , 14 January, 1968
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 February, 1968 
Bangkok W o rld ,  21 February, 1968; 21 M arch , 1968.
(I 8) M a n ila B u lle tin , II N ovem ber, 1971 
The A g e , II N ovem ber, 1971
in s titu tin g  a new pattern o f regional o rder. Furtherm ore, th e ir  conception 
o f that order -  w h ich  w il l  be discussed below -  was not id e n tica l to tha t 
proposed by M a laysia ; how ever, the reduction o f the le tte r's  proposal to 
a zone o f peace, freedom and n e u tra lity  opened the way to the la te r 
im plem entation o f the Indonesian scheme. (19) In the m eantim e, Adam 
M a lik ,  who had e a r lie r said tha t ASEAN would be departing from its o rig in a l 
course i f  it  discussed m ilita ry  matters in connection w ith  the n e u tra liza tio n  
proposal, was g iven a special mandate by the Kuala Lumpur m eeting to approach 
China fo r a possible endorsement o f the n e u tra lity  proposal.
Tun Abdul Razak declared h im self happy about the resu lt o f the 
ta lks , po in ting  out tha t i t  had been delegated to permanent secretary leve l 
to  decide on the next step to be taken to ensure peace and security  in the 
region*, w h ile  a summit meeting o f ASEAN leaders was to be held in M a n ila , 
in M arch 1972, to underscore the D e c la ra tio n . P red ictab ly both Thailand and 
the Philipp ines sounded the note o f caution -  the former making i t  c le a r tha t i t  
would not g ive  up its defence commitments to SEATO u n til the prospects o f 
peace, freedom and n e u tra lity  in the region were assured. The Thai envoy,
Thanat Khoman, furtherm ore, dismissed any c o lle c tiv e  ASEAN defence 
arrangements as incom patib le  w ith  the n e u tra lity  proposed -  a ra ther d iffe re n t 
stand from tha t vo iced by the Cambodian observer e a r lie r in the m ee ting . (2 0 )
The P h ilipp ine  Foreign Secretary, Carlos Romulo, who described the conference 
as a h is to ric  occasion w hich would evolve  'an eventual in teg ra tion  o f a ll 
Asian reg ional groups' warned tha t i t  must not be forgotten th a t:-
"N o  dec la ra tion  o f n e u tra lity , d e m ilita r is a tio n , n e u tra liz a tio n , m u lt i­
a lignm en t, non-aggression or o f Southeast Asia as a 'Zone o f Peace ', 
w il l  stand fo r long i f  i t  is not respected by any o f these pow ers ."
He also noted tha t 'the con tinu ing  tragedy o f our tim e ' is tha t the a ffa irs  o f 
the nations in the region were very much determ ined by the 'ill-c o n s id e re d  
actions o f the super-powers' (21) It was made c lear by the Singaporean
(19) 'Regional O rder in Southeast A s ia ', M . L e ife r. The Round Table 
(Commonwealth Journal o f in te rna tiona l A ffa irs ) , N o . 255, Ju ly  1974.p .312.
(2 0 )  S traits Times, 27 N ovem ber, 1971
(21) Asia Research B u lle tin , December, 1971. p. 4 9 0  AB.
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Foreign M in is te r, M r. Rajarafnam, tha t considerable ‘g ive and take ' was 
needed to achieve the concensus w h ich  made i t  possible for the D ec la ra tion  
and communique to be issued; w h ile  Carlos Romulo pointed out tha t the 
Foreign M in is te rs ' consensus was subject to the approval o f th e ir respective 
Heads o f S ta te . This la tte r reservation was a ttr ibu ted  to the fa c t that the 
Philipp ines had ob liga tions and commitments w h ich  would have to be resolved 
before f in a liz a t io n  o f any n e u tra liza tio n  d e c la ra tio n . Another issue tha t m ight 
have carried  some w e ight was the s t i l l  vexed Sabah question, and the fear 
tha t n e u tra liza tio n  o f the region m ight impose a status quo s itua tion  under w h ich  
Sabah could not be raised a ga in . (22)
Despite the close re la tions p re va ilin g  between many ASEAN 
members and the Western b lo c , one o f the a ttractions o f n e u tra liza tio n  tha t 
came across c le a rly  was the urge to  stop being pawns, and to e lim ina te  from 
the area the G rea t Power r iva lr ie s  tha t had resulted in so much Asian su ffe ring  
during both the Korean and the V ietnam  wars. Furtherm ore, the n e u tra liza tio n  
plan was viewed as a bid to bene fit from the changing alignm ents in G re a t 
Power p o lit ic s . As against th is , how ever, was the necessity to trust China 
to a ce rta in  exten t; to resolve the clashes o f interest among ASEAN countries -  
w ith  Carlos Romulo saying dec is ive ly  tha t 'A ny th ing  we do here must be 
w ith o u t p re jud ice  to the b ila te ra l settlem ent o f outstanding problems between 
countries in the reg ion ' -  and the biggest single doubt about a proposed neutra l 
zone , the lack o f security tha t would go w ith  i t .  (23)
Despite the fac t tha t a ce rta in  degree o f consensus was reached 
in reg iona l c irc les  about the proposal, the circumstances o f in d iv id u a l 
geographica l loca tion  w ith in  the reg ion , together w ith  h is to rica l experience 
and in terna l p o lit ic a l and econom ic s ituations have tended to promote exc lus ive  
v ie w p o in ts . These encompass not on ly  in te rpre ta tions o f n e u tra liz a tio n , but 
also perceptions o f both externa l powers and in tra reg iona l re la tion s .
Despite its id e n tif ic a tio n  w ith  the Western bloc Thailand has been 
c lose ly invo lved  in regionalism  in Southeast A s ia , being -  or having been -  a 
member o f ASA , ASEAN , ASPAC, and a number o f other groupings; hosting
(22) S traits Times, 29 Novem ber, 1971
M a n ila  B u lle tin , I December, 1971
(23) The A ge , I December, 1971
Far Eastern Economic Review, II December, 1971
the headquarters o f many o f these in Bangkok; and frequently  ac ting  as
m ediator in in tra reg iona l d isputes. The long-tim e  Foreign M in is te r, and 
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b&¥& Special Adviser to the Thai G overnm ent, Thanat Khoman, has been
outspoken on the theme o f the need for Southeast Asian nations to mould
th e ir own destin ies, as he cla im ed in an in te rv ie w , in January 1969:-
"I am firm ly  convinced tha t e ffe c tiv e  solutions to the problems o f Southeast 
Asia can be found in p o lit ic a l consu lta tion  and cooperation rather than 
m ilita ry  a llia n ce s . When I say p o l i t ic a l ,  I mean not on ly  d ip lom a tic  
conversations, but also common concrete decisions, econom ic, cu ltu ra l 
and s o c ia l. In this part o f Asia we are not m ilita ry  powers. Therefore,
I be lieve  p o lit ic a l steps to be more e f f ic ie n t . "  (24)
Furtherm ore, w h ile  he pointed out tha t results in Asia from non-a lignm ent
measures were thus fa r not encourag ing, a successful regional o rgan iza tion
should be 'non -a ligned  by p r in c ip le ' -  i . e . ,  would not try  to fo llo w  the p o lic y
o f any o f the G rea t Powers, but would be prepared to cooperate w ith  them as
long as i t  was on the basis o f e q u a lity . (25) W ith  the announcement o f
President N ixo n 's  D octrine  Southeast Asian regionalism  became even more
a ttra c tiv e  to the Thais, acqu iring  as i t  d id  the dual purpose o f reducing
Thailand 's d ire c t ties to U .S . -  supported a lliances and increasing its own
importance w ith in  a ll-A s ia n  o rgan iza tions. (26) A consequence o f this -
as the hopeful Thais have undoubtedly considered -  is tha t a less c le a rly
a ligned  Thailand would possibly encourage Peking to attem pt to fu rthe r an
A m erican-Tha i d ivorcem ent through d ip lom acy , paying for the la tte r by a
substan tia lly  dim inished support ro le  on beha lf o f the Thai communists. (27)
A lthough  this is in the realms o f speculation i t  cannot be om itted from the
equation w h ich  confronts the Thai decis ion-m akers.
Thailand was the firs t ASEAN country Tun Razak vis ited  to
canvass support fo r n e u tra liza tio n ; how ever, the subsequent jo in t communique
issued in December 1970 noted on ly  tha t discussion on neu tra liza tion  had taken
p la ce . A  series o f comments tha t fo llow ed  tended to be somewhat co n tra d ic to ry ,
(24) Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 0  January, 1969.
(25) Ib id .
(26) China and Southeast Asia -  The P o litics o f S u rv iva l, M . G u rto v .
(Heath Lexington Books, 1971) p. 43.
(27) G urtov  -  O p . C lt .  -  p . 48
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w ith  ce rta in  members o f the G overnm ent -  in c lud ing  Thanom K ittikach o rn  -  
seeing the M alaysian proposal as ‘not very re a lis t ic 1,  w h ile  the Foreign 
M in is te r, Thanat Khoman, obviously supported the idea , in p rin c ip le  a t 
leas t. In June 1971 the la tte r was a lready speaking in terms o f a c o lle c tiv e  
approach to the b ig powers, and as Thai envoy to the Novem ber meeting 
in Kuala Lum pur, sa id :-
"W e, o f course, welcome this (the proposal). This is the firs t step, w ith  
many things to be cleared up la te r . But ( it)  is an im portant s te p ."
A  note o f w arn ing was added -  tha t the fin a l step was s t i l l  remote and must 
be approached w ith  c a u tio n . (28) Even w h ile  Thanat Khoman was w ork ing  
on the d ra ft proposal. General Saiyud K erdphol, C h ie f o f Communist Suppression 
in T ha iland , stated tha t n e u tra liza tio n  would not save the country from com m ­
unism -  ‘ Once we become n e u tra l, Am erican a id may drop or even be to ta lly  
c u t1. W h ile  some months la te r , the Deputy Chairman o f the then ru ling  
N a tio n a l Executive  C o u n c il,  G eneral Prapass Charusath ien, in agreement 
re jected  the proposed n e u tra liz a tio n . (29) In short the Foreign O ffic e  
appeared to be coming o ff  second-best in its support -  even i f  i t  was on ly  
support in p rin c ip le  -  fo r the scheme. This was confirm ed a t the end o f 
1971 w ith  the removal o f Thanat Khoman from the M in is try . The Deputy 
Foreign M in is te r, M a jo r General C ha ticha i Choonhavan, was la te r to ou tline  
the Thai position -  three phases being foreseen -  (a) the establishm ent o f 
'rea l and s tab le ' peace in Southeast Asia ; (b) the w ithdraw al o f fore ign  bases; 
and (c) a vigorous campaign for n e u tra liz a tio n . (3 0 ) By this stage, how ever, 
the re a liz a tio n  o f Khoman's 1970 pred ictions were demanding a change in 
p o lic y , thus causing C ha ticha i Choonhavan, in O ctober 1973, to re-emphasize 
the 1971 ASEAN D ecla ra tion  in addressing the U nited N a tions G eneral Assem bly,
(28) S traits Times, 25 M arch , 1971 
Straits Times, 16 June^ 1971 
Bangkok W o rld , 27 November,, 1971
(29) Sunday M a il ,  14 Novem ber, 1971. C ited  in The N e u tra liz a tio n  o f 
Southeast A s ia ,  N .  Sopiee. A ustra lian  Institu te  o f In te rna tiona l A ffa irs  
C onference, 1 4 -  17 A p r i l ,  1973. Session 2 , Paper 5 .
D jaka rta  Times, 9 August, 1972
(3 0 )  S traits Times, I February, 1973
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and to call for a new order in Southeast Asia ‘free from all forms of 
interference from outside1. Concurrent with this call was the collapse 
of the old order at home. (31)
A new element of obvious flexibility rather than radical change 
marked the new civilian Government's foreign policy approach. Thanat 
Khoman re-emerged as Special Adviser to the Government. Although it is 
not true - as Communist propaganda asserts -  that the new regime is not 
essentially different from that of the Marshals Thanom and Prapass, it is true 
that there are still sizeable numbers of American forces based in Thailand 
despite the recent withdrawals. The latter is one of the reasons for the lack 
of dialogue with North Vietnam*, which continues to regard the Thai Government 
as 'new wine in old bottles'. Despite this, relations with Peking have been 
pursued; Soviet officials were pleasantly surprised by the encouraging tone of 
references to Thai-Soviet relations made by Foreign Minister Charunphan; 
the first direct contact between Thailand and North Korea was established in 
1974; and in July, the Thai Government stopped the United States from 
flying reconnaissance missions over the Indian Ocean from the U-Tapao Airbase, 
one of the reasons given being that they undermined the ASEAN Declaration 
on peace and neutrality, which Thailand supports. (32)
Apart from the ill-feeling and mistrust that Thailand continues 
to be subjected to from some of its near neighbours due to its involvement 
in the Indo China war, there are other problems to be confronted -  internal 
instability and some coolness in its relations with Malaysia. Concerning the 
former, badly drawn boundaries and porous borders have resulted in ethnic 
minority problems in the North, North-East and South of Thailand. During 
1974, the rebel movements -  composed of Communists and/or ethnic minorities -  
continued to grow, principally in the North and North-Eastern regions. 
Furthermore, it has been reported that Government casualties continued to 
run almost 50%  higher than insurgent losses -  indicating that battlefield 
success is nowhere in sight. (33) Made easier by hostilities in North Burma
(31) 'Thailand', J . Race. Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 2, February, 1974,
p. 194.
(32) Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1975 Yearbook, p. 3 0 8
(33) Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 January, 1975
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and Cambodia, where the authorities are unable to exercise adequate 
border controls, there is a high level of smuggling in the disturbed areas of 
Thailand. Endemic corruption among local Thai officials and policemen does 
little to prevent the growth of this phenomenon. However, the result has 
been 'misunderstandings' at Government level with Laos and Malaysia 
complaining of lack of cooperation from the Thai Government. Both the 
smuggling and the boundary problems have extended to the sea where there 
have been disputes with Cambodia and South Vietnam, and numerous instances 
where Thai fishing boats have been shot at or arrested by the South Vietnamese.
The most serious deterioration in relations arising over ethnic 
minorities was the distressful one between Thailand and Malaysia over the 
predominantly Malay-Moslim population in the four southern provinces of 
Thailand. The situation came to a head with the controversial and mis­
represented remarks of the Malaysian Minister of Land Development and 
Special Functions, Dato Haji Mahammed Asri, in July 1974. The latter 
said:-
"In my opinion and view, the request for autonomy, with specific conditions 
in the administration for the four southern provinces of Thailand, such as 
those put forward by the Freedom Front, seems credible, and it could mean 
a wise move towards reconciliation and peace."
However, the Thai reports of these remarks managed to interpret them in the 
sense that Asri supported secession for the Muslims of Southern Thailand. Cool 
informal diplomatic exchanges took place between the two Governments, with, 
in the end, a letter being sent from Tun Razak which reassured the Thai 
Government that there had been no change in Malaysia's policy of non­
interference in Thai affairs. Nevertheless, a certain mutual suspicion lingered 
on with questionable 'intelligence reports' about Malaysian operations in the 
South having been leaked to the Thai press -  much the same as occurred in 
Manila concerning alleged Malaysian involvement in the troubled Southern 
Philippines. Furthermore, there is a certain fear among some Malaysians 
that the Thais short-sightedly prefer to have the Tenth Regiment of the Malayan 
Communist Party -  which straddles the border more effectively than any 
separatist movement -  continue its operations in the region so that it will 
force Kuala Lumpur to think twice before aiding secessionists since their
(142)
success would only bring the communists back within Malaysia. (34)
Although this situation is discouraging in that it creates disagreement between 
two stalwart ASEAN supporters, it does not appear likely to upset relations 
seriously and the latter would now seem to be restored to a satisfactory 
condition. It is, however, in controversies like this that the most benefit 
could be derived from an effective regional machinery to manage intraregional 
confl icts.
With regard to the larger perspective of the neutralization of the 
region, Thailand would seem to have adopted a cautious wait and see position -  
supporting the concept and participating in its furtherance, but not rushing 
the scheme. A significant contribution is being made by the improvement 
of bilateral relations with all of the Great Powers although relations with 
Peking have still quite some way to go. Nevertheless, as it has been 
suggested, the prevention of the exercise of undue influence by the Vietnamese 
Communists within Indo China may come to be seen as a common interest 
linking Thailand with China. (35) Until such a time when neutralization 
becomes definite and/or bilateral relations with all the Powers have been 
established on a satisfactory basis, there is little chance that any radical 
action - such as the expulsion of American forces from Thailand -  will take 
place.
Questioned in 1968 about his reaction to a proposal to neutralize 
Southeast Asia, President Marcos responded that he would like to remain silent 
on this question because although neutralization was an idea that had appealed 
to many Asian leaders, and to previous Philippine administrations, the Philippines 
was still a member of a mutual defence pact which precluded Its neutralization. 
(36) The pact referred to was, of course, concluded with the United States. 
Nevertheless, the following year saw Salvador Lopez, the Filipino Ambassador 
to the United Nations, speaking in terms of the long-term neutralization of the 
region 'where the Great Powers sort of neutralize each other'. Foreign Secretary, 
Carlos Romulo, concurred, making his position clear in December, 1969, when
(34) Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1975 Yearbook.
(35) Leifer - Op. Cit. -  p. 315.
(36) Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 May, 1968
in an interview with 'Agence Franee-Presse' he advocated a non-intervention 
agreement among the super-powers for the ultimate security of Asia in the 
event of an American withdrawal from the Philippines. (37) Such comments 
could be seen as being very much directed at the long-term; but not so in 
July 1971, when President Marcos urged an ASPAC meeting in Manila to 
study seriously the proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. A 
realization that the Malaysian concept warranted serious consideration was 
also reflected by Carlos Romulo the previous month, when speaking on a 
resolution that the Philippines ought to be declared a neutral country, he 
said:-
"I believe that the ultimate security of this region lies in an understanding 
among the four powers -  the United States, the Soviet Union, China and 
Japan -  that will not allow any single power to build a hegemony over 
this region. And since this is so, it is my hope that a sort of neutralization 
pact can be agreed upon by these powers, or a non-aggression pact". (38)
Carlow Romulo, however, in supporting neutralization was not the only voice
(Jraised on the issue. Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jose Ingles, labelled 
the neutralization proposal a 'negative approach', in November 1971, suggested 
instead total demilitarization or denuclearization of the region. Ingles 
represented those who saw the Malaysian proposal as inimical to the Philippines, 
especially with respect to its claim on Sabah, and hence suspect in that it 
originated in Malaysia. Ingles stressed that it was imperative for the Philippines 
to maintain its sovereignty unimpaired, and be uncommitted through maintaining 
friendly relations with all the powers. Furthermore, he encouraged President 
Marcos to continue to think in terms of his perceived role as Asian statesman 
supreme, through pressing for the establishment of his Asian Forum which 
the President had advocated earlier as a mechanism for defusing tensions in 
the region. (39)
The Constitutional Convention's Committee on Foreign Relations 
approved in principle a proposal for the neutralization of the Philippines -  
the accepted proposal stating that the latter would mean (a) the abrogation of 
military alliances between the Philippines, the United States and Asian countries -
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(39) Manila Bulletin, 14 November, 1971
bases from the Philippines. (40) President Marcos himself, however,
in considering the Malaysian neutralization proposal was more cautious,
pointing out -  rightly -  that:-
"Neutralization.. .  is by no means a settled concept and the idea of
neutralizing a collection of sovereign states with vital interests that
inevitably differ, must be unprecedented in history."
He added that too many unseen elements, involving not only the states to
be neutralized, but also the nature of the relations among the guarantor
nations needed to be studied before a categorical answer could be given.
Despite this, as the month before President Marcos had replied in an
interview that neutralization was preferable to polarization and becoming
'pawns in the struggle between the super-powers1.  It was clear that the
Philippines attitude was to maintain an open mind on the whole subject. (41)
Carlos Romulo was instructed to show the same caution when he went to the
November meeting in Kuala Lumpur. When he signed the Declaration it
was with the understanding that reservations were being made which would
have to be decided by the heads of the five ASEAN nations during the
March Summit. The Foreign Policy Council, composed of leading statesmen,
businessmen and publishers sustained the stand of the President. Furthermore,
President Marcos made it clear that Philippine agreement with the Declaration
would not, for the present, affect whatever military or bases agreements
that the Philippines had with the United States -  although the possibility
of this situation changing after the March Summit was admitted. (42)
The latter possibility was reinforced by remarks made by Carlos
Romulo some days later the Foreign Secretary told newsmen that
"What the ASEAN members seem to have in mind is a broadly based 
arrangement that will enable the countries of the region to meet their 
own defence requirement. In effect, a new form of security arrangement 
for Southeast Asia will have to be dev ised ...  not military alliances but 
devoted purely to the self-defence of the region and based on the native 
capabilities of the countries in the region."
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sp e c ia lly  SEATO; and (b) the w ithdraw al o f a ll U nited  Stated m ilita ry
(40 )  Manila Bulletin, 19 November, 1971
(41) Working Peoples' Daily (Rangoon), IO October, 1971
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In realization of neutralization. General Romulo made it clear that 
Phil ippine-U .S . defence arrangements must be 'phased out'. However, 
the Philippines was not the only country that had to take such a step -  but 
all the ASEAN member states with similar defence agreements with extra- 
regional powers. (43)
Further consideration of the impact of neutralization on the 
Philippines and the feasibility of the scheme was delegated to a special 
committee of elder statesmen. In this study the Nixon -Chou En-lai 
communique was given pride of place due to its implications -  political, 
economic and military -  on Southeast Asian nations. It was suggested 
that the communique with its pledge by the two powers not to seek hegemony 
in the region, might give impetus to the formation of a neutralized Southeast 
Asia. However, American secrecy concerning their China initiatives 
was to draw criticism from their smaller allies, as General Romulo later 
complained, the situation is unhealthy in which smaller nations 1 are left 
to guess about the causes of action by the Great Powers. (44) Closely 
bound up with consideration of the communique was the study of the security 
arrangements that the Philippines had with the United States, this due to the 
feeling that there was likely to be a change in the deployment of American 
forces in the Southeast Asian-Western Pacific area. Indeed, Philippines 
concern with security arrangements can be gleaned from the sudden trip by 
Defence Secretary, Juan Ponce Enrile, to the United States«, According to 
President Marcos the trip had something to do 'with our efforts to adopt a 
five-year program with the ultimate objective of self-defense or a self- 
reliant posture*. (45) The result was an announcement a month later that 
the Philippines would propose military cooperation among members of 
ASEAN for regional security. According to Jose Ingles' response at a 
press conference :-
"It will be better than SEATO because it will exclude outside powers from 
security arrangements in Southeast Asia."
(1.44
(43) Manila Bulletin, 4 December, 1971
(44) Japan Times, 17 April, 1972
(45) Manila Bulletin, 5 March, 1972
it was added that in the initial stages the proposal would call for joint 
patrols, training of personnel and exchange of intelligence. (46) Without 
undue formalities such developments have in fact taken place among ASEAN 
countries to a limited extent. It was the Philippines that also took the 
initiative the following year in calling for a forum to settle intraregional 
disputes -  a fitting initiative from a country that has often been involved 
in such disputes in the past history of Asian regionalism. (47)
Nor is the Philippines yet free from trouble with its neighbours. 
Besides the Sabah issue which remains unresolved if quiescent, the violence 
in the predominantly Muslim Southern Philippines -  which has been 
succintly summed up as the Filipino Muslims as a whole remain 'in an 
unhappy state of animated and violent suspension between integration and 
secession1 -  has caused tension with the Islamic nations. The latter is 
troubling not only for internal reasons (48) but because of the need to 
maintain ASEAN solidarity and the nation's oil supplies. However, despite 
some allegations of covert Malaysian aid to the insurgents, ASEAN has proved 
its worth as a forum of discussion of the Philippine situation, with President 
Suharto acting as mediator. Furthermore, the ASEAN nations represented 
at the 1974 Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference went out of their way to 
prevent extraregional extremists, such as Libya, from upsetting the Conference 
consensus in favour of a 'political solution'. In a speech to a seminar on 
security in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew used the Southern Philippines as an 
example of the need to control intraregional conflict in the interests of 
regional neutrality. (49)
In the context of Great Power politics President Marcos has made 
it clear for some time that diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and China 
would be established as soon as possible. However, there has been no
(46) Djakarta Times, 22 April, 1972
(47) Straits Times, 21 July, 1973
(48) Although in an informal discussion in the A .N .U .  on 14 February, 1975 
former Filipino Senator Raul Manglapus suggested that the trouble in 
the Southern Philippines might be useful as an excuse for President 
Marcos to continue his martial law.
(1-47)
(49) Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 M arch 1974: IO  June , 1974;
8 J u ly ,  1974.
significant diminution in the American military presence in the Philippines 
despite much publicized statements by various Philippine politicians and 
officials in the past three years about the need for greater independence in 
the country's external relations. It would appear that the phasing out of 
the American presence will be rather a long-term procedure if it is to take 
pi ace. Like Thailand, the Philippines is not prepared to break off one 
security arrangement if the alternative -  neutralization of the region -  has 
yet to be agreed to by the Great Powers and implemented. However, also 
like Thailand, the Philippines has a heritage of involvement in Asian region­
alism and is even more conscious than most of its need to prove itself a part 
of Asia. The importance of a sense of identity plays a major role in the
Philippine political and national psyche -  as Carlos Romulo wrote:- 
iThe sense of identity is most intense in Asia because of our past 
experience, and without identity, just as without vision, nations die.
This identity asserts itself i n . . . .  the insistence of our various countries 
that they be allowed to determine their individual national destinies; 
in our refusal to be involved in the political manoeuvres of the big 
powers." (50)
That the Philippines has been so involved makes it even more vital for it 
to play its part in this new bid to free the region from Great Power 
interference - if it can do so cautiously by not antagonizing its long-term, 
although now less reliable, ally then so much the better.
3. It has been suggested that the Indonesian approach to foreign
relations is rooted in the doctrine of 'national resiliency', which, in turn, 
is based on the proposition that real national security resides not in alliances 
but in 'self-reliance', i . e . ,  domestic economic and political strength and 
stability, infused by a high national morale. While the multiplicity of 
economic problems that confront Indonesia, and its dependence on large- 
scale financial aid from Japan and the West, can leave one in doubt as to the 
reality of Indonesian 'national resiliency1^  it is true that it is not a member 
of any military pact and is formally non-aligned.
(148)
(50) Identity and Change, Towards a National Definition, C. Romulo 
(Solidaridad Publishing House, 1965) p. 79.
As the largest Southeast Asian state -  and very conscious of the 
fact -  Indonesia demands a certain pride of place among its fellow regional 
members. Its refusal to join ASA In 1966 resulted in the establishment of ASEAN 
a year later, and the latter is very much Indonesia's chosen vehicle for both 
promoting political stability through economic and social development, and 
seeking to play the role of diplomatic manager in the creation of a regional 
order. Although Indonesia welcomed the Malaysian proposal for the neutralization 
of the region -  in reply to Tun Razak's first policy speech as Prims Minister -  it was 
later made clear that it would not be included under the formal auspices of ASEAN 
lest it might be detrimental to the latter. It was only when neutralization was an 
accepted and respectable concept that it was allowed to slip under the ASEAN 
cloak. However^ according to Adam Malik -  although he had earlier said that 
Indonesia had had 1 the same idea' as Malaysia -  the solution he preferred was the 
development within the region of ‘an area of indigenous stability, based on 
indigenous socio-political and economic strength'. An extension of 'national 
resiliency1 to the entire region. Furthermore, he added, that he felt Switzerland 
and Austria to be unsuitable models for 'a vast and diverse area', and a big power 
agreement on neutralization unlikely. (51)
Despite the proposed alternative, Adam Malik signed the 1971 
Declaration for Indonesia mentioning as he didr—
"Although the present talks have been successful, it is apparent that there 
are different interests among the respective stares. But member nations 
have listened with open minds to views of others while being guided by a 
common aim of creating peace, stability and security in the region."
However, it was made clear that Indonesia would support neutralization if it 
was meant to free the region from externa! interference. (52) Obviously the 
fear was that a precipitate American withdrawal might leave a vacuum that the 
Soviet Union, or, worse still, China might fill before the countries of the region 
had time to build up their indigenous forces. In pursuit of such a build up 
Indonesia encouraged bilaterial cooperation with other ASEAN members rather 
than a regional military pact. The latter was seen as opening the way for inter­
ference in the internal affairs of member states -  something that Indonesia is
(149)
(51) Malay Mail, 26 September, 1970. Cited in Sopiee -  Op. Cit. -  p. 7. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 September, 1971
(52) Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO, No. 2, 15 January 1972. p. 4980
particularly sensitive about. Concerning existing military pacts in
Southeast Asia, Adam Malik claimed that they were temporary and would
gradually be abolished, adding that the contractual parties had assured him
that the military pacts would gradually become defunct. (53)
President Suharto also spoke out in favour of freeing the region
from the danger of its becoming an arena in which Great Powers could
confront each other. However, his interpretation of neutralization was
something different again from that envisaged in the 1971 Declaration:-
"Through the national resilence of each country in the territory of 
Southeast Asia, the concept of neutralization of Southeast (Asia) 
will possibly (be) realized in its true sense and not just neutralization 
dependent on the big powers." (54)
Once again the emphasis was placed on the endeavours of the individual 
national entity. However, in the context of the Great Power perspectives, 
Indonesians must have viewed 1972 as a successful year. According to Adam 
Malik, since France as a nuclear nation supported the proposed neutralization, 
other nuclear nations would take it into consideration. For example, the 
Nixon-Chou joint communique's support for the Bandung principles of non­
interference could be construed as support for the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia, thus leaving the Soviet Union as the only nuclear nation -  at that time -  
which had not decided whether or not to support the proposal. (55). All 
in all an interpretation that was rather over-optimistic at this stage.
Discussions concerning neutralization in Indonesia have tended 
to crystallize around the two related topics of relations with the Great Powers 
and Asian defence. Time and again it has been reiterated that the presence 
of foreign troops in the region must be temporary - although the 'temporary' 
duration has never been specified - and that military cooperation between 
ASEAN members must be based on independent and active policy without forming
(53) Straits Times, 2 May, 1972
Concerning bilateral relations -  Straits Times, 25 April, 1972 
Indonesian Newsletter, 15 September, 1972. 72/34.
Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO, No. 17, 29 April, 1972. p. 5155.
(54) Indonesian Newsletter, I December, 1973. 72/48 
Djakarta Times, 18 August, 1972
(55) Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO. No. 21, 27 May, 1972. p. 52 0 6 .
(1 5 0 )
defence pacts. Concerning relations with the Great Powers, Indonesia 
has rivalled Singapore in holding the most conservative position of the 
ASEAN countries towards China, although Adam Malik has admitted that the 
neutralizationof Southeast Asia would be useless without normalization of 
relations between the countries of the region and China. (56) Although 
the two countries have engaged in some ‘ping-pong1 diplomacy, and Adam 
Mai id has said that Indonesia will 'in time' normalize relations, the situation 
remains stalemated. It may be that the Foreign Office is considerably 
keener to normalize relations with China than the President and his aides.
In shorty behind the rhetoric relations with the Great Powers have changed 
little over the past three years.
What has changed, however, is Indonesia's position in the 
region. Despite the fact that Malaysia was the country that tended to take 
initiative - both over the neutralization proposal and in establishing relations 
with China -  Indonesia has emerged as the dominant force in the area, a 
position which it considers itself well qualified to hold. This position was 
virtually institutionalized by the choice of Djakarta for the ASEAN secretariat 
in preference to Manila; whilst, as mentioned above, President Suharto 
emerged as mediator in the recent PhilIppine-Malaysian dispute, even if this 
did earn him a slight reproach from the latter. A number of factors have 
contributed to the acceptance of Indonesia:-
(a) In spite of its break with Peking in the wake of the 1965 abortive coup 
attempt and its increasingly closer ties with the United States and Japan, 
Indonesia still preserves its prestige as a major non-aligned power -  a 
position that it tends to play on as when it refused to join ASA on the basis 
that it was aligned with the Western bloc.
(b) The much prized Indonesian oil resources which fellow ASEAN members 
hope will relieve their fuel shortages. This asset also promises prosperity 
for Indonesia.
(c) Despite large numbers of political prisoners and occasional outbursts of 
rioting^ the relatively stable political situation in Indonesia, ruled by a 
strong man who inspires confidence in the other strong regimes ruling in
(151)
(56) Straits Times, IO  M a y , 1973
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in Singapore* the Philippines and to a certain extent, in Malaysia, (57)
(d) Indonesian realism which emphasizes economic and social development 
is attractive to countries such as Singapore; on the other hand, Indonesia's 
support of neutralization pleases Tun Razak.
Furthermore, while Indonesia refused to talk about 'militarizing' ASEAN 
at the moment through formal pacts due to the fact that it would needlessly 
limit flexibilityj, there is no guarantee that this attitude will be maintained, 
Indeed, if is quite feasible that Indonesia does not wish to see the crystallization 
or attempted implementation of any long-term proposal for the region at present, 
until its own military capabilities have been built up. It may even be in this 
context that Indonesia's planned possession of nuclear armaments in 1985 was 
announced in July 1974 -  while it was termed an 1 armament of peace1 this 
could be because it was conceived as an instrument to maintain peace in the 
Southeast Asian region, (58) In such a case the 'militarizing' of ASEAN 
might be reconsidered. Certainly Indonesia has already gained from ASEAN 
regionalism, that it would also stand to gain from a successful 'Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality' is beyond doubt -  the uncertain factor is how to 
achieve the latter without risking insecurity.
4 . It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister of Singapore,
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, who is now perhaps the most pessimistic of ASEAN
Heads of State about the prospects of a neutralized Southeast Asia, suggested
neutralization for the region himself as early as April 1966, when speaking
at a meeting of the Socialist International in Sweden. (59) Conditions and
Lee Koan a^es^menr attitudes, however, have changed since then and Lee -Kuan Yew nm*-q<sesses Of Hie Silua\"on has cUsjg changed*tbe situation in a different l ight. Given the neutralization proposal the 
concept must now prove its feasibility rather than residing in the realm of 
rhetorical notions. Hence while Lee Kuan Yew welcomed the discussion 
of neutralization -  saying in March 1971 that the Malaysian proposal was 
'the best answer' for the region, provided the Great Powers agreed to it -
(57) Bulletin Todayf 15 May, 1974
(58) Indonesian Newsletter, 31 July, 1974. 7 4 /2 0
(59) Straits Times, 28 April, 1966
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he told a seminar on Communism and Democracy, in May, that -  ‘we must 
. . .  be realistic and expect that there will be considerable competition for 
influence among the major powers over this region.1 (60) In November, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs was in Kuala Lumpur to sign the Declaration. 
There, Mr„ Rajaratnam stressed the need to reach agreement on the meaning 
of the neutralization concept; to have the total and sincere agreement of the 
big powers; to win over the support of the other countries in the region and to 
concentrate on ensuring individual domestic stability and strength. Given 
such a situation neutralization of the region was declared to be 'theoretically... 
the most perfect of all the solutions that could be thought of' . (61)
However, as the pragmatic Prime Minister has invariably pointed 
out a 'Shangri-la Southeast Asia' is not possible -  particularly if it depends 
on the 'total and sincere agreement' of the major powers. In July 1972, 
he told 'Newsweek' that he would like the United States to maintain sufficient 
presence in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam war to stop another power, or 
group of powers, from gaining complete hegemony over the area. He did 
not think that they needed bases to do that, as the Soviet Union did not have 
bases and 'they are extending their influence all right'. (62) By December, 
however, in a debate on the B .B .C ., Lee Kuan Yew said that he would be 
'most alarmed1 if the Americans withdrew militarily from Thailand; at this 
point he appeared to support a version of the famed 'domino theory' -  
declaring that if South Vietnam were to become communist, then Laos and 
Cambodia would not be far behind, and without Thailand 'as a buffer' 
communism would spread 'through accretion from contiguous areas' into the 
Malay peninsula. In short, Thailand was the linchpin that must be protected 
at all costs. (63) Furthermore, unlike his earlier stand that American bases 
were not necessary, Lee continued to speak in terms of American forces in 
Thailand, finally provoking a protest from Adam Malik who pointed out that 
Singapore had never submitted such a suggestion to meetings of ASEAN. (64)
Mr. Rajaratnam took a more moderate line saying that the presence of American
(60) Sunday Times (Singapore), 21 March, 1971; 9 May, 1971
(61) Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO. No. 2. 15 January, 1972 . 4980/1
(62) Aslan Almanac 1972, Vol. IO, No. 43, 28 October, 1972. p. 5476
(63) The Mirror (Singapore) 6 November, 1972
(64) Indonesian Newsletter, 2 July, 1973. 73/26.
military bases in Thailand had not militated against neutralization of
the region because when the big powers guaranteed that neutrality the
Thais were certain to ask the Americans to go home -  with a vote of
thanks. However, since as yet there had been little sign of the required
guarantees the issue was rather theoretical. (65)
What distinguishes Lee Kuan Yew from his ASEAN colleagues
in their considerations over the future of the region is that the former,
rather than favouring the neutralization of Southeast Asia would prefer
to see it being satisfactorily internationalized. For Singaporean thinking
the basic premise is that the Great Powers are unlikely to act as guarantors,
hence some solution must be found that will prevent the region from being
carved up into spheres of influence for the latter. On the occasion of
the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, in March 1973, Lee argued that
'for the small countries, the question now is not how to avoid being sucked
into warring camps of the Great Powers, but how to have their interests
taken into consideration when the Great Powers reach their compromises'.(66)
This is going one step further -  for it is unlikely that the Great Powers will
bother to consider the interests of the smaller Southeast Asian countries
unless the latter are economically powerful and/or politically significant.
As Great Power detente would appear to be undermining the last, economic
strength is undoubtedly the factor that Singapore is relying on for notice -
particularly with the potential scramble for off-shore oil resources in the
region. Indeed, both Lee Kuan Yew and Rajaratnam have repeatedly
emphasized that:-
" . . . Unless we are economically viable other countries will listen to 
us with great politeness and very little else. Therefore, ASEAN 
must first be economically viable before others will listen to us." (67)
If there is a Singaporean obsession which rivals the Philippine one with
national identity, it is to be a proven viable and respected independent
entity -  one of the reasons for its fear that in a neutralized Southeast Asia
it might be swamped by a tide of larger, more populous but underdeveloped
(65) Straits Times, IO April, 1973 
Bangkok Post, 15 April, 1973
(66) Sunday Times, (Singapore), 18 March, 1973
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countries, particularly its neighbouring Malay states, it is hoped that 
the continued involvement of the Great Powers in the area - whose 
competing interests will, In theory, cancel one another out -  would 
relieve Singapore from the potential pressures of its neighbours. (68)
The security 'mix' that Lee Kuan Yew has envisaged has gone 
through a number of stages. In early 1971, for example, he suggested that 
a Soviet naval fleet in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could 
be useful as ‘a counterpoise to China's weight leaning on the littoral 
countries of Asia'. He also hoped that Britain, New Zealand and 
Australia would retain a military presence in Malaysia-Singapore and 
that the United States Seventh Fleet would stay in the area. With the 
run-down of the Five Power forces the emphasis has shifted to the Seventh 
Fleet. By May 1973, Premier Lee was in Tokyo proposing that Japan, 
the United States, Australia and various European powers, should form a 
permanent joint naval task-force to patrol Southeast Asian waters in order 
to keep the peace and match the growing Soviet influence in the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans. According to Lee, this would result in counter­
balancing forces that would achieve a certain degree of equilibrium.
The latter being the focal point of the various proposals. When questioned 
about the basic contradiction between his idea of involving extraregional 
powers in Southeast Asian affairs and the concept of neutralizing Southeast 
Asia by eliminating undesirable foreign interference and influence, he 
replied that while all were agreed that the ideal solution would be to aim 
for a secure and stable Southeast Asia, free from all pressures and Influences, 
this objective would take some time to achieve. However, within the 
next twenty-five years, barring sudden changes in trends, the region would 
have to face a triangular equation - of China, Russia and America -  and 
that someway or other a balance would have to be maintained between the 
three. (69) While admitting that his idea was in direct contradiction to 
the ASEAN concept, Lee Kuan Yew excused this on the basis that the latter
(68) 'A Neutral Southeast Asia?1, J . Girling. Australian Outlook,
Vol. 27, No. 2, August 1973. p. 129.
(69) National Times, 23-28 July, 1973
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was not operable in the immediate future. Indeed, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, was to say that he did not think that neutraliz­
ation was practicable in the next twenty-five years, unless the super-powers 
and the middling powers changed their habits. (70) Singapore, in the 
meantime, shows little sign of encouraging such a change. Should the 
conditions for neutralization of the region develop, it is unlikely that 
Singapore would refuse to go along with its four ASEAN colleagues -  
however, the Singaporean attitude remains that if such a situation does not 
materialize then there are alternatives to be considered, and preferably 
ones that will maintain Singapore's security and status.
As the initiator and foremost advocate of the neutralization of 
Southeast Asia, the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration was a triumph for 
Malaysian diplomacy. Speaking at that conference. Tun Razak announced 
that ASEAN members would have to undertake three major steps to make 
the neutrality concept a reality - a show of determination by themselves 
to exist as sovereign, independent states free from external interference; 
an approach to other countries in Southeast Asia to commit themselves to 
the principle of neutrality; and an approach to the big powers, especially 
China, the United States and the Soviet Union to guarantee the neutrality. 
Referring to defence arrangements, Tun Razak said that all countries in 
the region must ensure that they would not be used in any conflict.
Ultimately when the Great Powers had accepted neutralization the question 
of bases and treaties would be phased out. 'If we can get outside powers 
to respect us, then we don't need any security arrangement. Once peace 
and security have been achieved such arrangements do not arise.
Neutralization will never involve a military alliance', he said. (71)
The latter section of the Tun's Address was perhaps a reflection of the
Iidealistic level on which discussions concerning neutralization tended to 
take place at this early stage -  that peace and stability once achieved 
would be the status quo situation. However, even the fact that the 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration -  with its emphasis on a 'Zone of Peace, Freedom
(70) The Age, 29 August, 1974
(71) Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO. No. 2, 15 January, 1972. p. 4981.
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and Neutrality1 -  fell short of the original Malaysian proposal must 
have opened the latter's eyes to the position where the acceptance of 
neutralization was by no means a foregone conclusion.
In line with its commitment to neutralization, Malaysia's 
foreign policy continued to shift from a total commitment to the West to 
a non-aligned stance; while endeavours to secure neutralization by the 
steps outlined by Tun Razak above, formed the central element of that 
foreign policy. In 1972, anxious to enhance his country's non-aligned 
image and to gain acceptnce for the concept of neutralization, Tun Razak 
made a three week state visit to Switzerland, Austria, Poland and the 
Soviet Union. The neutralization proposal was explained to the Russian 
leaders, but no endorsement was requested or received. The visits to 
Austria and Switzerland were undoubtedly symbolic -  although an 
unexpected 'bonus' was the meeting in Vienna between the Prims Minister 
and the Chinese Ambassador to Austria - and Poland proved itself ready 
to receive the proposal warmly. Although Tun Razak claimed that the 
Great Powers would not be approached as prospective 'guarantors' for 
neutralization until all the countries in the region agreed to it (72) 
Malaysia has worked steadily itself towards improving its relations with 
all the major powers. A notable triumph was the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China. As the first ASEAN country to blaze 
the Peking trail, the conseuqences -  if any - will obviously be closely 
watched by its ASEAN colleagues, each of whom have a multiplicity 
of reasons why they should not follow Malaysia's example.
On the question of bases in Southeast Asia there is the continuing 
inconsistency between Malaysia's participation in the Five Power Defence 
Agreement and the country's pursuit of non-alignment, although this has 
been reduced in recent years due to the run-down of the ANZUK forces. 
However, in March, 1973, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, 
was still insisting that the Five Power Agreement was necessary because 
of the 'fluid situation1 in the region. He added that when neutralization
(72) Straits Times, 2 0  January , 1972
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of Southeast Asia is phased in, the defence arrangement can be phased 
out. (73) This would appear to be the consistent Malaysian stand on 
this issue -  as early as March, 1971, Tun Razak told the Malaysian 
Parliament:-
"As long as Malaysia's intention to make Southeast Asia an area of
of peace and calm has not yet been achieved, Malaysia is forced
to take measures it thinks fit to ensure the nation's security." (74) |n o recx « in gIn rooont years more emphasis has been placed on the Indonesian notion
of 'national resiliency' with respect to security -  particularly internal
security where domestic forces have proved successful in controlling
i974communist insurgents in tho pact yoar. (75) Moreover, as the Malaysian 
Minister for Internal Affairs, told a conference on Regionalism in South­
east Asia:-
"In time each state of Southeast Asia will attain national resilience, a 
process that will be greatly aided by intra-regional harmony and 
external power disengagement from the region." (76)
Given this simultaneous development of internal national resilience and
Southeast Asian regionalism, Malaysia has declared itself undisturbed by
the prospect of a power vacuum should the United States withdraw its
forces from the region. Furthermore, in the event of internal stability
that is difficult to handle -  such as communist insurgency -  Tun Razak
suggested that Southeast Asian countries could call on friendly regional
neighbours for aid. Despite this it has been asserted that Malaysia has
no intention of forming a defence arrangement with its ASEAN counterparts,
but rather relying on bilateral agreements for defence cooperation. (77)
In an effort to dissociate itself from pro-Western and extraregional pacts,
Malaysia made a point of withdrawing from ASPAC in March 1973. (78)
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Besides the work calculated to enhance the standing and
feasibility of the neutralization concept in the eyes of the Great Powers
and of the world, Malaysia has endeavoured to improve its relations with
the Southeast Asian states outside ASEAN. To the latter it has broached
the subject of neutralization, in the process establishing diplomatic
relations with Hanoi -  Indonesia being the only ASEAN country to have
diplomatic links with North Vietnam prior to Malaysia. Improved relations
with Indonesia include economic and technical cooperation; joint border
control committees aimed against communist insurgents; a common spelling
system and a joint decision to extend their espective territorial waters from
three to twelve miles, in effect declaring the Straits of Malacca to be
national waters of the two nations. The latter was objected to by the
United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and Singapore who favour free
passage through the Straits; but while Malaysia and Indonesia conceded
the 'right of innocent passage1 they were opposed to the internationalization
of the waterway, or passage for tankers exceeding 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons.
cxT the close W'f- This, however, is a question that remains as-ye-t unsolved.
As has been noted above, Malaysian relations with two other 
ASEAN members -  Thailand and the Philippines -  have not been so cordial; 
although Malaysian-Thai relations would have appeared to have been marred 
by suspicion rather than any danger of a direct break. With Singapore, 
a realistic approach to common problems is encouraging relations to return 
to an even keel after the traumatic period which followed the Republic's 
expulsion from the Malaysian Federation. The fear that Malaysia's 
reputation and position as the pacesetter of ASEAN might remove it somewhat 
from its colleagues does not appear likely to be realized as long as neutral­
ization continues to be viewed by Foreign Office officials as a long-term 
concept -  and particularly if the problems and apprehensions of Malaysia's 
neighbours are not overlooked in the heady atmosphere of Great Power 
relations.
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THE QUANDARY:
From the foregoing consideration of the mousedeer it can be 
seen that the very sweep of the neutralization proposals gives rise to 
serious difficulties. Despite apparent agreements over definitions at 
the ASEAN committee level, the primary difficulty resides in differing 
concepts of regional neutrality. On the one hand, Singapore would 
appear to favour internationalization of the region; on the other,
Malaysia is calling for the virtual exclusion of such powers. Moreover, 
while Indonesia supports the latter stand it approaches it from the level 
of expanding 'national resiliency1, whereas others favour the regional 
approach. Meanwhile, Thailand and the Philippines continue to host 
substantial numbers of American troops and bases.
Outside the ASEAN members are five other states that have to 
be considered -  although the ASEAN committee agreed in June 1973 that 
the neutrality zone should initially include only the five ASEAN members. 
It was to be left open-ended to include North and South Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Burma at a later stage, (79) this being a change from the 
original Malaysian position on the issue. Of the Outer Five -  Lon Nol's 
Khmer Republic (Cambodia) announced official support for neutralization 
in February 1972; Laos as early as April 1971; and Tun Razak, at the end 
of discussions with General Ne Win, in February 1972, stated that Burma 
backed neutralization but would 'take part in a regional plan only if the 
other countries are genuinely neutral'. (80) Hanoi and Saigon have both 
been less forthcoming on the matter -  much depending on the conclusion 
of their struggle.
Given this complex mix of countries the joint adoption of 
neutrality could rather resemble 'the formation of a party of independent 
M.P's: either they act as a party and cease being independents, or their
(79) Straits Times, 23 June, 1973
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party group disintegrates under the stress of their diverse policies1. (81)
On the other hand, they could agree to accept one link in common -  
neutrality -  and be otherwise independent; an independence that would 
probably be considerably fuller than that experienced by many Southeast 
Asian states over the past two or three decades. The latter fact would 
appear to be recognized by the countries of the region -  the fear, however, 
is that security would have to be bartered for this independence. It is 
here that both the development of an effective regionalism and individual 
‘national resiliency' must be brought to bear. The latter for reasons of 
internal security; the former because it could -  if necessary -  be utilized 
as both a defence and a mediatory mechanism, besides giving regional 
governments a vested interest in driving the ‘burglar from the house', 
to borrow Adam Malik's metaphor.
While the development of both regionalism and a greater 
individual self-confidence has been a hopeful sign over the past years -  
there is little hope that the mousedeer will be able to resolve their 
quandary in the near future without some sign of acquiesence from the 
elephants. Progress has indeed been made towards a 'Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality', but its eventual realization will depend largely 
on decisions made by extraregional forces and how they can be manipulated 
in favour of the mousedeers' aspirations.
(81) 'Neutrality within the Asian System of Powers', A. Stargardt.
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LITTLE REST FOR THE EXHAUSTED MOUSEDEER:
C O N C L U S IO N :
The Malaysia proposal for the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia has been under discussion for some seven years now. The Great Power
response which was one of the prerequisites for the realization of the scheme
has, however, been ambiguous. It is true that these years have been busy
ones for the Great Powers themselves in that they have established a more
flexible network of relationships, which in turn has served to undermine the
crude philosophy of bipolarity -  ‘them and us1. Examined in the Asian context
this new balance of power undoubtedly favours the United States -  China and
the Soviet Union being hampered by their rift; while Japan has not yet brought
its full potential weight to bear on the situation. The doctrines of the three
Great Powers in relation to Southeast Asia are set in the context of this new
balance of power. China claims to be the natural leader of the Third World
and hence, automatically, the dominant influence in Southeast Asia. The
Soviet Union seeks to curtail Chinese influence by expanding its own significance
in the region. The United States wishes to make good its large scale military,
political and economic investment in Southeast Asia by maintaining its influence
there at little further cost to itself - in President Nixon's terms, 'Peace with
honour'. In practice, however, these contradictory aims have led to a number
of Great Power compromises grounded in the pro con t Chinese weakness vis-a-vis
the two super-powers.
From the viewpoint of the Great Powers, how do the costs of 
a neutralized Southeast Asia balance against the benefits accruing from the 
latter ? Successful neutralization would cost China little except the reconciliation 
of the ambiguous dual policy that it has been accused of following. Should the 
region become stabilized, the prospects for effective subversion would be diminished 
and the Chinese impact could be established by more orthodox channels. It is
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certain, given the historical and geographical relationship of China to Southeast 
Asia that irrespective of what arrangements are reached Chinese influence on 
the region will be significant. As for the Soviet Union, successful neutralization 
would also cost it little - in the short term at any rate -  whilst it might achieve 
both the erosion of the American presence in the area and the containment of 
any concrete Chinese expansion. On the other hand, the physical encirclement 
of China would be prevented, and in the long-term there is the growth of Chinese 
influence in the region to be feared. For the United States the costs are both 
tangible and intangible -  withdrawal would mean a decline in its influence, 
but above all there is the openly expressed fear that the credibility of U.S. 
commitments elsewhere would be undermined. However, it would appear 
possible that domestic benefits would outweigh, and have outweighed, such 
considerations. America's continued military and economic aid to the region 
might well off-set the undermining of its political influence -  but here it might 
yet have to enter into competition with the other Great Powers and the American 
Congress might veto the indefinite continuation of such aid. This whole question 
of economic aid to a neutral Southeast Asia raises the issue of what constitutes 
'interference1 in internal affairs, but this rather tangled question will not be 
dealt with here.
It may be seen that the benefits are chiefly derived from the 
successful realization of neutralization, whereas the costs are mainly entailed 
in the agreement to implement the proposal. This inevitably leads to the 
question -  but if the scheme fails, what then ? And even more rslevant 
to the Great Powers, the query, what do we lose in the process ? Furthermore, 
caution gives rise to the vicious circle as to which should come first -  the 
withdrawal of American bases from Southeast Asia or the proof that neutralization 
will work. A legion of 'ifs1 and 'buts' confront the proposal which makes the 
ambiguous attitudes of the Great Powers almost understandable.
The Chinese have -  with good reason -  been the most open in 
their support for neutralization of the region, repeating a number of times that 
not only will China never seek hegemony over the region, but that it will oppose
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efforts by other powers to establish such hegemony. (I) The Soviet Union has 
been less outspokenly in favour of neutralization as its attention was rather taken 
up with its own proposal for a collective security system for Asia. As pointed 
out already the Soviet attitude has become quite moderate both with regard to 
ASEAN and the neutralization proposal. Lack of acceptance of the collective 
security plan in Southeast Asia would appear to have prompted the Soviet Union 
to equate collective security with neutralization for Southeast Asian consumption 
in the hope that the former would gain greater acceptability. Nevertheless, 
governments of the region have made it clear that for them their indigenous plan 
is preferable, and if the equating of the two is in fact a tacit approval of the 
latter, then so be it. Such approval may also be seen in the Polish support 
for neutralization. As the country with the most to lose from the arrangement, 
it is natural that the United States would be the most ambiguous in its attitude 
to the proposal. On IO November, 1971, an United States State Department 
spokesman said that the United States had not agreed in principle to the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia (2), and by the end of 1974, private correspondence 
from the U.S. Embassy in Canberra (Australia), still declared that:-
"Pending a clarification of the extent and purposes of the Zone (of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality) the United States has taken no position on it." (3)
This being a similar stand to those taken in the intervening years. (4) The most 
positive official statements were those which designated neutralization as 'a worthy 
long-term goal1. On the negative side, the United States Ambassador to the 
Philippines, Mr. W. Sullivan, said that Peking and Moscow were manoeuvring 
to draw into their camps one or another of the states in Asia, hence:-
(1) 'A Neutral Southeast Asia?', J . Girling. Australian Outlook, Vol. 27,
No. 2, August 1973. p. 130 n. 17.
Chinese Embassy News Bulletin, 12 June, 1974. No. 7403  
Straits Times, 31 March, 1973
(2) Asian Almanac 1972, Vol. IO, No. 2. 15 January, 1972. p. 4982
(3) Letter from the U.S. Embassy, Canberra to the author - 31 January, 1975.
(4) Indonesian Newsletter, 6 July, 1972. 72/7.A. (Sec. of State, W. Rogers).
Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 April, 1972. Vol. LXVI, No. 1712, p. 575 
(Ass. Sec. Green).
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"Neutralization in the sense of Switzerland is something that is almost 
impossible for nations in Southeast Asia to contemplate. In my judgement, 
even attempting to make a sort of tropical Scandinavia out of Southeast 
Asia will probably not also be in the cards." (5)
However, more flexibility is perceived in less obvious statements -  the communique 
signed between the United States and North Vietnam on the occasion of Dr.
Kissinger's visit to Hanoi, on 4 February, 1973, declared that complete and 
serious fulfillment of the Paris agreement on a ceasefire would make a positive 
contribution to peace in Southeast Asia ‘on the basis of full respect for the 
independence and neutrality of the countries of that region1. (6) Although 
Indo China was the region referred to it is undoubtedly a step in the right 
direction. Furthermore, acceptance of neutralization by the other two Powers 
and pressure for it from the Southeast Asian states would also have an impact 
on the American attitude -  an attitude that given the Nixon Doctrine may be 
open to change on the issue in any case.
However, the states of Southeast Asia have not always been 
applying pressure for identical ends, although fecenVyoars'*haflo"see» increasing 
agreement, with Singapore being the notable exception. Although this agreement 
on neutralization remains, as yet, in the realm of theory, there has been a degree 
of harmonization of economic and political interests through ASEAN. Furthermore, 
the latter has been active and effective in defusing internal disputes between 
members. These developments augur well on the basis that the realization of 
long-term gain may yet prevail over the short-term. Even granted this increasing 
agreement, however, it may be argued that countries in Southeast Asia have little 
bargaining power in their relations with the Great Powers. As against this, 
weakness -  as Thomas Schelling has observed -  can often prove an asset in inter­
national political 'bargaining', often a better one than bluffing strength. (7)
This, indeed, has been borne out by Asian governments playing on threats arising 
from their proximity to conflicts in Indo China, as well as the dangers of their 
internal insurgents, to extract aid from the United States. It is true that it requires
(5) Straits Times, 26 September, 1973
(6) Girling -  Op. Cit. - p. 130
(7) China and Southeast Asia -  The Politics of Survival . M. Gurtov. (Heath 
Lexington Books, 1971) p. 171.
more complicated diplomacy to maintain relations with three Great Powers 
at once -  but the latter situation also provides an element of flexibility that 
was lost in the first. Suspicion about the reliability of all the major powers 
makes this element of flexibility in relations an invaluable asset to Southeast 
Asian governments. Furthermore, close links with one or other of the major 
powers not only does not guarantee security, but they invite opposition from those 
other powers that are not favoured. Hence, Thanat Khoman's suggestion that 
close links with the United States might even become a 'liability.
It is true that formal neutralization -  as discussed in the 
Introduction -  might invite a reassertion of rigidity since it would entail 
obligations being placed on the guarantors to come to the assistance of the 
neutralized region if the latter was violated by outside aggression. As illustrated 
in history, however, the interpretation by the guarantors of their obligations is 
not above dispute -  depending on the national interests of the latter. In the case 
of neutralized Belgium (neutralized in 1839) the British Prime Minister, Derby, 
stated that 'a collective guarantee is one that is binding on all parties collect­
ively, but which if any difference of opinion should arise, no one of them should 
be called upon to take it upon itself the task of vindicating through force of 
arms'. (8) Prussia, on the other hand, interpreted the guarantees involved in the 
neutralization of Belgium as unconditionally binding upon each of the signatories, 
and this it believed had been secured by the treaty. It is true that such ambiguities 
can be catered for, but even the best forma! agreement is subject to loopholes 
being found or differing interpretations being taken. Hence, formal neutralization 
could well mean increased Great Power involvement and conflict in Southeast 
Asia, particularly as it raises problems of maintenance and enforcement -  both of 
which would be more difficult as the area under discussion is a region rather than 
a single national entity. In short, formal neutralization can only be successfully 
realized if the interests of the states concerned are sufficiai tly convergent, and 
if the participants include other states than those with vested interests in the 
neutral ized area.
Since the initial Malaysian proposal, the emphasis has shifted 
somewhat to the "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality', even though the 1971
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(8) A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World, C. Cruttwell, 
(Oxford University Press, 1937) p. 190.
Declaration did appear to view neutralization as the ultimate goal. This was 
later changed -  in July 1972 -  to neutralization being na> means of establishing 
Southeast Asia as a 'zone of peace, freedom and neutrality1 ”,  and only one of 
the means to be considered at that. This more flexible concept is envisaged as being 
realized through Great Power agreement, but without necessarily having these 
Great Powers as guarantors. Hence the regional states would be considerably 
freer to define their own terms as they have hitherto being doing in the field of 
theory. From such definitions the status coveted would appear similar to that 
of Switzerland (9), and a guarantee of both independence and inviolability of 
territory -  although this is not necessary and might slow down the process of 
neutrality until territorial disputes such as the Sabah question are resolved, if 
they will be. Furthermore, Southeast Asian governments would undoubtedly 
agree with the Swiss reply to a note received in 1917, in which the governments 
of France, the United States and Britain had attached certain conditions to Swiss 
neutrality and the inviolability of Swiss territory. The Swiss said:-
"The Confederation claims the sole right of deciding whether, and on what 
terms, it will recognize the necessity of calling in the help of foreign 
powers.” (IO)
However, this may only be a grace granted to the old man of neutrality and 
in newer adherents may be considered an impudence.
Significant steps have been taken in pursuit of this less formal 
approach - including during the third meeting of the Neutralization Committee, 
the suggestion that Instead of seeking iron-clad guarantees from external powers 
on the proposed zone of neutrality, these powers could be allowed to recognize 
and respect the zone. In other words that a specific blueprint would be 
drafted embodying the neutrality proposals which could then be shown and agreed 
to by the Great Powers. Undoubtedly there would have to be some bargaining 
to achieve a blueprint acceptable to all, but this is only to be expected. If 
such developments occurred it is apparent to all that the American forces would 
have to be removed from Southeast Asia, as would ail external forces. However,
(9) Neutrality as a Principle of Swiss Foreign Policy, W. Hofer (Schweizer 
Spiegal Verlag, 1957) -  Hofer claims that Swiss literature on the subject, 
not surprisingly, argue that there was a guaranteec However ,^ strictly 
speaking there was only a recognitionc
(I O) lbidc This was to be confirmed in Art* 435 of the Treaty of Versailles*
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the build-up of an American presence in the West Pacific, the Indian Ocean 
and the waters off Southeast Asia would suggest that the United States is 
preparing an alternative-a particularly effective alternative as the nuclear 
balance with the Soviet Union is now primarily operated by missile-carrying 
submarines. It is also possible that a continued limited American presence in 
such places as Ramasun, or even a naval base of reduced size in the Philippines, 
could be bartered for the final demise of SEATO -  which may indeed have been 
maintained to be used as just such a bargaining card for either the United States 
or its two Asian members . Taking into account ths aims of the cornerstones of 
the Asian triangular balance, China's present interest in preventing U„S0 isolation­
ism due to fear of Soviet expansion could be equally well realized by an American 
maritime presence in the region; whilst, the withdrawal of U.S., territorial 
forces would increase Chinese ideological prestige and, at the same time, would 
increase the opportunities for Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. The Soviet 
ambition to prevent an over-close Sino-American collusion would be aided by the 
reduced American presence and interest in Asia, and the likely growth of Sino- 
American competition for influence and economic gain in Southeast Asia.
The United States, on the other hand, could maintain its role as 'balancer1 in 
the Sino-Soviet dispute. Outside these three powers, Japan, for economic 
reasons should be quite satisfied to see Southeast Asia removed from the arena 
of Great Power conflict -  although an increased self-confidence and sense of 
autonomy in the region would undoubtedly force japan to change its approach, 
due to the obvious resentment caused by the latter. The argument that a less 
formal agreement, such as is proposed, would be less secure than a formal 
neutralization treaty is doubtful when the perceived national interests of the 
Great Powers are involved - as they are here. After all the discussion, whether 
it will be possible to achieve such an agreement is another question. It is in 
the interest of each of the Great Powers that neither of the others attain hegemony 
in the region, but the crucial question still stands - are they each prepared to 
exercise the self-restraint that is demanded ?
The same question could be applied to the Southeast Asian 
states themselves, as intense intrareglonal conflict merely invites Great Power 
intervention. It is necessary for effective regional machinery to regulate such
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disputes to be established, but there is also a need for a psychological change 
as the historical records show that most Southeast Asian governments facing 
domestic crises turn for aid to foreign powers, thus involving the latter automatically.
(II) If Southeast Asia is to become a region of neutrality in a real sense this 
almost structurally dependent relationship with the Great Powers will have to be 
changed. In its stead emphasis should be placed on the structuring of viable 
national entities -  a task that has not been well accomplished in this region.
When the term 'mousedeer' was used above it was generally 
in the context of the governments of Southeast Asia, as against the ‘elephants' 
who represented the Great Power governments. This was justified on the grounds 
that it is, in fact, the governments of the region -  and often only a small elite 
within these governments -  that are negotiating their ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality1 with the Great Power governments. However, the eventual 
success of this concept -  if it is given the opportunity to succeed will depend 
on the total mousedeer, government and people. Given the conditions of many 
of the latter internal stability would not appear realistic where the only answer 
provided by their governments to legitimate greviances is further repression.
Relating this situation to the question of security that so obsesses these same 
governments and has, in part, prompted them into investigating such solutions 
as the proposed 'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality', that timeless realist, 
Machiavelli should be given the last word:-
"The Prince who is more afraid of his own people than of foreign interference 
should build fortresses; but the Prince who fears foreign interference more 
than his own people should forget about them.. .  (For) the best fortress that 
exists is to avoid being hated by the people. If you have fortresses and yet 
the people hate you they will not save y o u . . . . “ (12)
(11) Girling -  Op. Cit. -  pp„ 132/3.
(12) The Prince, N c Machiavelli (Trans. G . Bull, Penguin Books, 1961) pp.118/9 
Cited in 'Regional Security in Southeast Asia', J . Girling. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. II, No. I, March 1971. p. 65.
APPENDIX I
MEETING OF 
FOREIGN MINISTERS 
OF ASEAN 
MEMBER COUNTRIES
DECLARATION AND 
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
26th -  27th NOVEMBER, 1971 
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
DECLARATION
INDONESIA 
MALAYSIA 
THE PHILIPPINES 
SINGAPORE
And the Special Envoy of the 
National Executive Council of 
THAILAND :
FIRMLY BELIEVING in the merits of regional co-operation which has 
drawn our countries to co-operate together in the economic, 
social and cultural fields in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations;
DESIROUS of bringing about a relaxation of international tension 
and of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia;
INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in
particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all States, abstention from the threat or 
use of force* peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal 
rights and self-determination and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States;
BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on rhe Promotion 
of World Peace and Co-operation" of the Bandung Conference of 
1955* which, among others, enunciates the principles by which 
States may co-exist peacefully;
W E ,the  Foreign M inisters o f
RECOGNISING the right of every State, large or small, to lead its
national existence free from outside interference in its internal 
affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, 
independence and integrity;
DEDICATED to the maintenance of paace, freedom and independence 
unimpaired;
BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new developments 
by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both 
within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, 
stability and harmony;
COGNIZANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free
zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa 
a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace 
and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts 
and tensions;
REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration
which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of Southeast 
Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic 
and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and 
progressive national development, and that they are determined to 
ensure their stability and security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities 
in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples";
objective, and that we should explore ways and means of bringing 
about its realization, and
CONVINCED that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective 
expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of Southeast 
Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable 
to their independence and their economic and social well-being:
DO HEREBY STATE
(I) that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary 
efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for. Southeast 
Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from 
any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;
(2) that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts 
to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute 
to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.
Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th November, 1971.
On behalf of the 
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
(Adam Malik)
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
On behal f of 
MALAYSIA
AG R EEIN G  tha t the n eu tra liza tio n  o f Southeast Asia is a desirable
(Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein)
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,,
On behalf of the 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Carlos P«, Ronrjlo)
Secretary of Foreign Affairs«,
On behalf of the 
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
(S. Rajaratnan)
Minister of Foreign Affairs«
On behalf of the
KINGDOM OF THAILAND
(Thanat Khoman)
Special Envoy of the National Executive Council«
(iv )
(v)
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Joint Communique issued at the end of the meeting of Foreign Ministers 
of ASEAN countries in Kuala Lumpur.
As agreed at their meeting in New York on 2nd October 1971,
a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASEAN countries was held in Kuala Lumpur 
on 26th -  27th November 1971 „ The meeting was attended by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia His Excellency Tun Adam Malik, the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia His Excellency Tun 
Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines His Excellency Dr« Carlos P* Romulo, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Singapore His Excellency Mr. S . Rajaratnam and the Special 
Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand His Excellency Tun 
Thanat Khoman, The Foreign Ministers' Meeting was preceded by a 
meeting of their officials on the 25th -  26th November 1971.
The Meeting was held in a very informal and friendly atmosphere 
and was characterized by free and frank discussions in the spirit of regional 
co-operation and consultation among ASEAN member countries.
The Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy exchanged views and 
discussed matters of mutual interest concerning recent developments in the 
international situation as they affect the region of Southeast Asia.
The Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy agreed to continue to 
consult each other with a view to fostering an integrated approach on all 
matters and developments which affect the Southeast Asian region.
At the end of their deliberations, the Foreign Ministers and the 
Special Envoy signed and issued a Declaration in which they stated their 
determination to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition 
of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 
free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers, and also 
stated that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden
the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, 
solidarity and closer relationship.
The Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy agreed that their 
concern for peace and stability should be manifested through a meeting at 
the highest level. They accordingly agreed to recommend that a Summit 
Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the members of ASEAN be 
held in Manila at a date to be announced later.
The Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy also agreed that they 
would bring the contents of their Declaration to the attention of the other 
countries of Southeast Asia and would encourage them to associate themselves 
with the aspirations and objectives expressed in the Declaration.
The Foriegn Ministers and the Special Envoy also agreed to establish 
a Committee of Senior Officials initially of the ASEAN countries to study 
and consider what further necessary steps should be taken to bring about 
the realization of their objectives. The Committee would be convened 
in Malaysia.
The Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy expressed their sincere 
appreciation and gratitude to the Government and people of Malaysia for the 
warm and generous hospitality extended to them during the meeting.
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